Studies & Comments 13
Klaus Lange (ed.)

The Future of Security
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THE FUTURE OF SECURITY
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INTRODUCTION

KLAUS LANGE

It is absolutely essential to adjust our current models of political reality to the increased complexity of our political world if they are going to serve a useful function in simulating possible scenarios and assessing future opportunities as well as threats. Not so many decades ago, the circumstances of the Cold War and the dangers associated with it, culminating in the possibility of a nuclear Armageddon, made it comparatively easy to talk about "security" since each interlocutor had essentially the same meaning of the word in mind: the common understanding was that security was given to the degree to which a Third World War ending in an all-out nuclear exchange was unlikely. There was general consensus that the climax of insecurity or instability during the Cold War period was reached during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Yet it is worth remembering that irrespective of the Cuba Crisis, there had been numerous additional crises between 1950 when the Korean War started and the signing of START I in 1991 which had all carried the potential of dangerous escalation and which had contributed to a universal consensus on the part of all parties in understanding what "security" meant in discussions where it figured prominently.

Today, we are confronted with a vastly different situation. The likelihood of a nuclear catastrophe – at least a global nuclear catastrophe – has decreased considerably. With this, the all-encompassing fear of the annihilation of options for further human progress in the fire of nuclear war has also disappeared. This development has resulted in a previously unknown differentiation of the concept of security. An essential precondition for any discussion on "security" today is prior agreement among the parties as to what kind of security is being discussed here. The range of possible meanings is multifaceted. Security can mean security vis-à-vis the activities of non-state actors such as terrorist and / or criminal organizations, energy security, security against uncontrollable migration, information security, data security, security of the private sphere, and protection of civil rights. But it can also mean protection against a scenario whereby the system of international relations develops in a direction where the main protagonists act in a way which is irreconcilable with our system of values. Finally, there is the classic definition of security as the absence of violence in inter-state relations, as well as many other current usages of the term "security" which make meaningful communication on the subject difficult.

In view of the kaleidoscope of meanings which has to be taken into account today, it makes sense to talk about an extended concept of security. But it is intellectually dishonest to imply that such an "extended concept of security" indicates that a common denominator of security can be defined. If such a common denominator were at all possible, it would be so wide-ranging that theory formation based on it would be an exercise in triviality, in the sense that it would allow for any and every theory to be propounded.

All this leads to the obvious conclusion that the time has not yet come for new initiatives of theory formation on the subject of security and security politics. It is evident today that the so-called "realist" approach which was the predominant one in our context has its limitations. The "realist" approach suffers in that it cannot adequately accommodate complexity, and since there are no other convincing theoretical approaches available, it may make sense to resort for the time being to a theory-free stock-taking of relevant processes and phenomena until a renewed attempt at theory formation based on new data can be made.

To paraphrase Hegel's well-known statement on philosophy: if it is correct that security theory is "its own time comprehended in thought" and if it is furthermore correct that the ever-accelerating pace
of globalization is the main factor determining global society in the future, then complexity in combination with global interdependence will constitute the fundamental and basic factors on which any prospective theory formation pertaining to security and security politics will have to primarily focus.

This volume of conference papers should therefore be seen as a modest contribution to the stock-taking which has been proposed above as a topical academic programme. It addresses the specific regions, deliberations and processes which must be taken into consideration in any future attempts to form security-related theory. It is in this sense that the title "The Future of Security" promises far more than it can ultimately deliver. It is not so much that the future of security is discussed, but the aim is rather to draw attention to certain aspects of security which will undoubtedly play a key role as cornerstones in subsequent efforts to form the mosaic of any forthcoming theory of security.

It is our hope that the over-ambitious formulation of the topic does not preclude a close look at the complexities as well as the current trends and developments addressed in the volume. Finally, it is also the intention of this volume to stimulate a fruitful academic debate which could serve to facilitate new incentives and insights in discussions on "The Future of Security".

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At the turn of the millennium, a paper written by this author carried the same title as the current article. This would indicate that our concern about the changing face of international security is not entirely new. Nor are the threats to international security entirely new. What seems to be new, however, are at least three factors: the range of the threats has become more global, the threats have become more varied, and they are more interdependent. Pierre Hassner explains this development by proposing that instead of referring to "war" it is more appropriate to use such general terms as "violence" or (armed) conflict.

In trying to describe this development, the somewhat simplified explanation presented in the original paper is still valid today. In essence, it claims that we are confronted with a threefold development. First of all, there are more actors on the global stage; secondly, they are fighting about more issues; and thirdly, they are using more means to do so.

To give just one illustration of the latter: there are now worldwide some 500 million Kalashnikovs in the hands of innumerable actors, be they South American guerrillas, Yemeni "freedom fighters", Black African rebels or Somali pirates. The distinction between regular armed forces here, and irregular or private armed groups or companies there, is becoming ever more blurred. One result of this ongoing diversification of armed groups is an awareness of the growing difficulties which are facing not only peace-making operations but also organizations like the ICRC in applying the Geneva conventions of humanitarian assistance.

The second change has to do with the fact that in the current globalized world the number of potential issues of conflict is growing. To name but a few: the protection of minorities; access to ever scarcer resources – water, for instance, is one of them; the resurgence of religious intolerance or messianism; drug wars; discrimination against minorities, or indeed their expulsion.

The third factor is the increasing interdependence of ever more issues. This means that we are paying the price of globalization in terms of international, or indeed global, security. There are, for instance, increasingly fewer armed conflicts which remain local and isolated, and which therefore can be generally managed in the area where they take place.

Studies published by two Geneva-based institutions – the Small Arms Survey project (Director: Professor Keith Krause), and the worldwide foundation Democratic Control of Armed Forces (Director: Ambassador Dr. Theodor H. Winkler) – claim that the international security community is faced with the following developments, all of them fairly recent:

— the increasing privatization of warfare, i.e. the engagement of more non-state or private armed forces (often correctly called mercenaries), particularly in and by the United States;
— new variations of violence or its shift to targets other than states, for example minorities. In other words, it is time to say, sadly, "Goodbye to Clausewitz";
— the ensuing difficulty of peace-making, which raises questions such as: who are the partners? What kind of sanctions can be imposed? With what kind of means? For how long? And the even more delicate question: who is going to pay?
— finally, deterrence: i.e. war or conflict prevention only works if and when one is dealing with interlocutors, partners or adversaries who have both the will and capacity to negotiate, and who will then be able to implement what has been agreed.

The specific circumstances will govern whether all of these recent developments are positive or, indeed,
negative. They seem desirable, if not mandatory, for the sake of settling disputes or even peace-making and peace-keeping. Outside interference can be helpful. But in most cases it is problematic, if not outright counterproductive. So it seems to be in the case of Afghanistan and Pakistan; in Georgia and in Somalia; perhaps also in Libya; certainly in several Black African countries – like Rwanda or the Congo; not to mention Vietnam.

That brings us to the role of international organizations in conflict prevention or resolution. Here again the balance sheet is more than mixed. It is regrettable that the general conclusion regarding their utility is not all too encouraging. Some of them are no doubt more useful than others. More often than not, “ad hocery” and “coalitions of the willing” seem to prevail.

But what must be emphatically stated above all about these organizations is that there are hardly any new or fundamentally up-dated institutions which have been recast and modernized in order to adjust and respond to the changing environment and challenges discussed above. The majority of changes in almost all of the organizations have been cosmetic. That is true, admittedly with variations, for NATO, the OSCE, for the CIS, SEATO, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the African Union – to name only the most visible ones. Many if not most of them are children of the Cold War or its immediate aftermath. Perhaps this conservative passivity bordering on the sclerotic can be traced to the difficulties which have been previously mentioned: first of all, the difficulty of identifying the security problem, and then agreeing on the appropriate institution to deal with it.

Bearing in mind in particular the various security challenges already mentioned, the question must be asked why most of these organizations, including the United Nations, have become weaker or out of date. One answer could be that security is becoming more and more of a domestic concern – a concern that includes not only physical threats but increasingly non-military ones of a social, economic, and environmental nature. In other words, security is perceived in modern societies to be less a matter for armed force and more for that of the society in general. By their very nature such security concerns are more diffuse, hence less easy to identify. There is therefore much more controversy when it comes to defining them and agreeing on the way they should be addressed and eventually dealt with by the appropriate institution.

If there is a general satisfaction and even pride in our economic and financial globalization, the conclusion might be drawn that there is a need, sooner rather than later, for a no less global security network. It alone might be capable of sustaining a modicum of peace and stability. It could help to prevent the kind of armed conflict or even wars that have plagued and devastated large parts of the world to date, and particularly in the past century. Unfortunately, the art of peace-making – although it sometimes meets with success – is today still far from what Immanuel Kant and others have taught us.
OLD THREATS, NEW THREATS: NEW SOLUTIONS?

MICHAEL E. G. CHANDLER || “Security” means different things to different people, in part depending on how threats to that security are perceived or interpreted. Too often threats are not taken seriously enough, underestimated or even ignored, usually by people in positions of responsibility and politicians who are often only interested in positive news. More important is the question whether the population at large is aware of the threats. From a Western point of view, one of the significant threats to our security stems from terrorism, a dynamic threat that is constantly changing. Unlike natural disasters, about which we can do little, responding to threats from terrorism requires pre-emptive action and costs an inordinate amount of time, effort and money. These are out of all proportion to the amount ‘invested’ by the terrorists in their so-called causes. Instruments and measures have been developed to combat this global problem, but are they sufficient? Are they the right ones? Are they being used, or does the international community need to look at new ways of tackling this scourge?

BACKGROUND

Given that the theme of this volume is the future of security, it is useful to look back and examine the current situation for lessons to be learned, before looking to the future. On a subject as important as our security and the threats to that security, it is important to continually take stock; review the threats; develop ways to reduce their impact and, ultimately, neutralize them. There is much that threatens our security and although this paper will only concentrate on one of them, namely terrorism, it needs to be kept in context.

In December 2004, Indonesia along with some neighbouring countries felt the full shock of nature with a huge devastating tsunami. In the past few years, Pakistan has experienced violent earthquakes and portentous flooding which has killed and displaced hundreds of people and caused billions of dollars worth of damage. Australia has had terrible droughts, devastating bush fires and also serious flooding. New Zealand has had recent earthquakes, the last of which had a devastating effect. But all these events pale in significance compared with the earthquake and tsunami that struck northern Japan on 11 March 2011, the severity of which has been compounded by the release of radiation from the damaged nuclear power stations at Fukushima. A comparison of the results of these natural disasters with the numerous terrorist activities and attacks since 9/11 might well provoke the question: what need for terrorists in the face of the destructive havoc caused by nature?

Although 9/11 seems to be an obvious starting-point for a basic review, it is in fact unrealistic. Acts of terrorism had been perpetrated for many years long before 9/11, both nationally and internationally. Most West European countries experienced domestic terrorism long before al-Qaida became a household word. The UK had, and to a minor extent still has, splinter groups claiming to represent the IRA; Italy, the Red brigades: Spain, the Basque separatists ETA, and Germany, the Red Army Faction.

But some of the most significant acts which were to have a much greater and longer-lasting impact were the terrorist skyjackings by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) which go back as far as 1968 (El Al flight to Tel Aviv from Rome) and 1970 (five aircraft to Dawson’s Field, Jordan). Tragically, issues the PFLP wanted to publicize then have still not been resolved after all these years. The Israel-Palestine conflict is a long-running sore which continually provides fuel for those who wish to promote sectarian hatred by claiming that Jews and Christians are committed to attacking and oppressing Muslims and are anti-Islam. It is a theme that is used by those who speak for al-Qaida when they seek to foment this extreme form of religious hatred. It is also an issue that if resolved would
help reduce, albeit not eradicate, much of the anti-Western rhetoric of the Islamist extremists, both Sunni and Shi’a.

But just as in 1968 and 1970, attacks against aircraft still remain a popular choice with Islamist terrorists. The intent is to monopolize media attention for maximum impact, for the spectacle resulting from a successful crash would be visually awesome, and akin to the potential damage caused by weapons of mass destruction. It does not require much imagination to visualize the effect of a fully loaded airliner, possibly in flames from an onboard-explosion, crashing onto a densely populated urban area.

Ten years ago the iconic attacks of 9/11 took place in the US. This attack had been preceded by the 1994 Bojinka Plot when a bomb left on a Philippine airliner by al-Qa’ida operative Ramzi Yousef exploded in the air near Okinawa. Despite a hole in the fuselage, the crew managed to make an emergency landing and only one passenger was killed by the explosion. Since 9/11, there have been several attempts: by the shoe-bomber Richard Reid on American Airlines Flight 63 from Paris to Miami on 22 December 2001, and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the ‘under-pants bomber’, on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit on 25 December 2009. On 28 November 2002 East African associates of al-Qa’ida made an unsuccessful attempt with shoulder-launched Strela 2 (SA-7) SAMs to shoot down an Arkia Israel Airlines Boeing 757 airliner as it was taking off from Mombasa. In August 2006 authorities in the UK thwarted attempts to blow up a series of airliners bound for North America from London Heathrow. Most recently, in December 2010, there were the ‘toner-cartridge’ IEDs sent from Yemen through the international courier system that if detonated would have caused the planes to crash.

Air travel has been significantly affected by these acts or attempted acts of terrorism: every time terrorists design a new means to counter the countermeasures in place for passenger and baggage screening, counter-countermeasures have to be developed. Each time they tend to become more stringent, time-consuming, often more labour-intensive and annoying for passengers. New detection equipment is designed and developed at great expense, and screening procedures are reviewed. The considerable expense incurred by this and all the other measures that have to be implemented has to be somehow met. The cost is invariably passed on to the customers. This is just one aspect of the future of security that will continue for a long time.

OLD THREATS

Ten years ago the most significant terrorist grouping was al-Qa’ida. It was global, unlike all the other terrorist organizations. It was ‘stateless’ so no government could be held to account for its actions – although its sympathizers and supporters soon became apparent – and it was difficult to truly understand its aims and how it intended to achieve them. At the time it had a recognizable structure. It was headed by Osama bin Laden who along with his de facto deputy, Doctor Ayman al-Zawaheri, presided over the Shaura or “cabinet / council” composed of a number of key players responsible for operations, logistics, media, religious affairs and finance. Although Osama bin Laden was credited with approving the 9/11 attacks, there has been considerable debate as to how much influence he wielded as time passed. However, recent intelligence from the attack on his Abbotabad hideout suggests he was still in control. Nonetheless, his original perception of a ‘caliphate’ subject to the strictest observance of Sharia and stretching from “Andalusia to the Philippines” still resonates amongst his radicalized following. Ten years ago the main groups associated with al-Qa’ida were:

- Abu Sayyaf
  [Southern Philippines]
- Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
  [Southern Philippines]
- Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)
  [Indonesia]
- Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)
  [Pakistan]
- Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)
  [Pakistan]
- Ansar al-Islam
  [Iraq and Europe]
- Ansar al-Sunnah
  [Iraq post-2003 invasion]
- Taliban
  [Afghanistan]
- Group Salafist for Prayer and Combat (GSPC)
  [Algeria]
- Group Islamiste Combattant Morocain (GICM)
  [Morocco]

Grouped respectively in South East Asia, South Asia, Iraq (and Europe), Afghanistan and North Africa, collectively they have been responsible for a series of high-profile bombings, kidnappings and assassinations across the world. In particular, many of the attacks have been against tourists and there have also been thwarted attempts in Singa-
pore against embassies of the US, its allies and other facilities. The effect of these various attacks has been to energize governments, regional groupings and international organizations to take the al-Qaida threat seriously and to try and build a more cohesive approach to combating it. There has been some progress in this area, although when an event does occur, it does show up considerable weaknesses in some areas. The ability of the terrorists to be innovative and to develop new ways of keeping law enforcement and security services guessing is all too apparent. But al-Qaida as such and the threats posed by militant Islam have changed significantly over time.

NEW THREATS

Al-Qaida

A survey of the new threats must begin with an assessment of al-Qaida. Some of its groups have either continued, albeit with a reduced capability, whilst others have restructured themselves or taken on a new mantle. But the structured al-Qaida of the 9/11 era has gradually ceased to exist. Over time it has become an ideology or franchise to which the individual geographical groups adhere. Core al-Qaida nonetheless still exists, albeit dispersed. For all claims to the contrary, the location of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan has now been proven correct following his death in the US Navy SEALs raid on his hideaway villa in Abbottabad.\(^1\) It is not possible that he could have lived there, ostensibly undetected, for so long without the knowledge of and some support from a small – albeit hard-line Islamist – element or cell within Pakistan’s ISI Inter-Services Intelligence. As the structure of al-Qaida has changed, so too have some of the individual groups, reorganizing or re-aligning themselves, often as a result of national and international counter-terrorism efforts. Today, the main groups are:

- Abu Sayyaf
- Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)
- Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)
- Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)
- Harakat-e-Jihad Islami
- Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, resurgent Taliban [Afghanistan and Pakistan (TTP)]
- al-Qaida in Iraq (or Mesopotamia)
- al-Qaida in the Maghreb (AQIM) [Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger, Sahel]
- al-Qaida in Yemen (AQIY)
- al-Shabaab (in Somalia)

Similar groupings continue to exist in South East Asia, although their capability appears to have been reduced. Detachment-88, Indonesia’s elite counter-terrorism force, has been particularly effective against Jemaah Islamiyah but there is still a significant threat due to radicalization, jihadism and extremists. In the Philippines, unlike Abu Sayyaf, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) has for some time been trying to negotiate a settlement to its grievances rather than pursuing the futile expedient of simply killing people. In South Asia, the picture is not so encouraging.

The high-profile attacks in Mumbai on 26 November 2008 highlighted the virulence and operational capability of LeT in carrying out a seaborne assault in the way it did. This was a low-cost operation with a very high media impact – a constant objective of Islamist extremist groups. Similarly, the Taliban which were previously associated on an operational level only with Afghanistan, have now become a major threat to peace and stability in Pakistan. There the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has been responsible for a large number of savage and indiscriminate terrorist atrocities against Pakistanis, across the country. Despite very early warning signs, the Taliban that were routed in Afghanistan in December 2001 were allowed without any hindrance to regroup, retrain and recruit new jihadis in the Federal Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. The result has been a resurgent Taliban. Stronger and better equipped for insurgency operations against US and NATO / ISAF troops than before its 2001 demise, they have taken full advantage of the vacuum caused by the Coalition invasion of Iraq in 2003. Furthermore, successful insurgent tactics against the Coalition in Iraq have been exported to the Afghan Taliban, particularly the use and deployment of IEDs. Also, the Afghan Taliban have been obtaining weapons from Iran, which demonstrates that even radical Sunnis can cooperate with extremist Shi’i when they have a common enemy and a common goal. Neither the Taliban nor the Iranians want US forces or their allies to establish bases in Afghanistan, especially in the eastern areas of the country.

It was a gross error of judgement on the part of the Bush Administration that it elected to abandon Afghanistan yet again in 2002, at a crucial juncture in the post-conflict situation, in order to concentrate on invading Iraq. Saddam Hussein was not a threat to the US or its allies; he was an inconvenience but not a threat. He was being contained
and could have been for much longer. Bringing peace and security to Afghanistan should have been seen as a much higher priority, especially after the devastation caused by years of civil war, droughts and the arcane rule of the Taliban. The subsequent involvement of the US, NATO and its partners has been far more damaging for the US image abroad in the eyes of the Muslim Umma. Countering the Taliban has been significantly more difficult and the cost enormous, in blood and funding. In addition, the US standing in the world and the capacity to endure such expeditionary interventions in future trouble spots, viz. Libya and the 'Arab Spring', have been significantly undermined. Meanwhile, the opium trade which is a major source of Taliban funding continues to flourish. The most significant consequence has been significant radicalization across the Muslim world and amongst Muslim minority communities in Western countries, many of whose members now pose a genuine threat.

Prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the al-Qaeda presence in Iraq was confined to a group of some 600 ‘dissident fighters’ called Ansar al-Islam, centred in a north-eastern corner of the Kurdish area close to the Iranian border. Instead of bringing peace and stability to the country, the invasion became a battle-cry for al-Qaeda, who claimed that the occupying forces of the US-led Coalition were a legitimate target and that Iraq was the new battlefield for jihad against the Crusaders and their allies.

The net result was a huge influx of foreign fighters from Arab states, the Maghreb and Europe who joined a plethora of ‘units’ that had come together under the banner of “al-Qaeda of Mesopotamia (or the Two Rivers)” and later “al-Qaeda in Iraq”. A key figure in bringing these divergent Sunni extremist groups together was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, an extremely cruel and ruthless Jordanian Palestinian. Zarqawi, who had formed al-Tawhid wal-Jihad in the 1990s, was eventually tricked into a location which he thought was a safe house, and died as a result of a Coalition airstrike on 7 June 2006. The latter group – al-Qaeda in Iraq – exists today, albeit smaller but still very potent, directing its efforts against the Iraqi army, police, and the population at large, especially the Shi’a and Christians, in order to show that the government is not capable of providing security.

Thus the population at large remains threatened even though the US military footprint has been reduced and has retreated to the background. In particular there has been an upsurge in attacks on the Christian minority. This phenomenon is likely to get worse and is being repeated in other countries, for example the Christmas 2010 attack against Coptic Christians in Alexandria, Egypt, and in Pakistan.

Meanwhile, just as fighters left Iraq and joined the Taliban in Afghanistan when the Coalition started to make significant inroads against them in late 2001, so too have Islamists left Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan to join al-Qaida in Yemen (AQIY) and/or al-Shabaab in Somalia. Its ranks have also been swelled by released ex-Gitmo detainees and dissident Saudis, formerly members of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the forerunner of AQIY. AQIY is proving to be of significant concern to the US and its allies, influenced as it is by Anwar al-Awlaki. Awlaki is credited with being the prime influence behind the ‘toner-bombs’ mentioned above; the Fort Hood massacre by Major Nidal Malik Hasan and the ‘under-pants’ bomber. Awlaki is considered by some to have a global influence, on a par with Osama bin Laden ten years ago. The difference is that he was educated in the USA and spreads his message in English as well as Arabic through the medium of his online magazine called “Inspire”.

Somalia and al-Shabaab

Just across the Gulf of Aden from Yemen lies Somalia. For years classified as a failed state, its tenuous and fragile Transitional Federal Government in Mogadishu and the population are constantly under threat from Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (al-Shabaab for short). Al-Shabaab (the “Youth”) is an Islamist extremist organization linked ideologically to al-Qaida. Its puritanical form of Islam is alien to that of the majority of Somalis who are Sufis. Somalia is more or less split into three regions: Somaliland in the North, Puntland in the North East, and South and Central Somalia which include the capital Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab controls much of South and Central Somalia and the capital Mogadishu, although it has recently suffered setbacks due to offensives by AMISOM and newly trained Somali Army Forces units. AMISOM, which is the African Union Mission in Somalia and is based in Mogadishu, has enabled the Transitional Federal Government to survive. After the twin bomb explosions in Uganda during the World Cup final in July 2010, an atrocity claimed by al-Shabaab, AMISOM has supported the Somali Armed Forces in a series of operations that have taken the fight back to al-Shabaab, regaining control of some parts of Mogadishu and the prov-
Somali piracy
Before leaving the subject of Somalia, it is important in the context of threats to future security to consider the scourge from piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin. The international community was slow to respond to this particular phenomenon of the 21st century and so, indeed, was the shipping industry. Far more could have been and still can be done to protect ships and crews. But competition in the industry has become so intense and amplified by the downturn in the global economy that the charter companies in particular are not prepared to pay extra to ensure that ship-owners and ship-managers can effectively protect their vessels from pirate attacks. The longer the pirates enjoy the rewards of the risks they take, the more difficult will it be to wean them off piracy and encourage them to take up a less lucrative but legal livelihood. The problem is similar to that of trying to persuade farmers in Afghanistan to grow wheat for a quarter of the income they obtain for cultivating poppies for the opium trade. The major difference is that unlike the Taliban who encourage opium poppy cultivation, al-Shabaab has not really been involved with piracy. Piracy has other, more basic socio-economic roots, particularly since Somali fishermen saw their livelihood threatened as fish stocks were being rapidly depleted by large, unlicensed, foreign fishing trawlers and factory-ships. Once they started to redress this significant grievance, they realized that piracy-related activities could be much more lucrative.

Without an effective government, rule of law and functioning judicial system in place, it is difficult for the international community to address these concerns on the ground. In addition to dealing with the tactical threat posed by the Pirate Action Groups, means must be developed to deal with the more significant players who direct the gangs and benefit from the bulk of the ransom money that is paid. Most of this money is laundered elsewhere, while members of the Pirate Action Groups usually get no more than a few thousand dollars for their efforts. However, by investing in SatNav technology and better communications systems, as well as capturing large trawlers to use as mother-ships, the pirates have dramatically extended the range of their operations and attacks are now being reported over 1,000 nautical miles from the Puntland coast of Somalia where most of the Pirate Action Groups hideouts are located.

Iran and militant Shi'a
As the al-Qaida ideology has waxed and morphed over recent years, a new force in militant Islam has been developing, also aided by the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. With the downfall of Saddam Hussein, Iran was quick to assert its influence over the majority Shi'a population. Coalition forces were attacked not only by Sunni jihadists but also by extremist militias supported by the al-Quds arm of the Iranian Republican Guard Corps (IRGC). The influence of Teheran as a long-standing state sponsor of terror can be traced back to the early days of Hezbollah and the truck bomb attacks against the US Marines camp in Beirut. Thereafter, its influence has grown significantly, particularly with Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Lebanese Hezbollah fighters travelled to Iraq to train Shi'a militias fighting against the Coalition and today Hezbollah has a stranglehold on Lebanese politics.

Nonetheless, even Lebanese Christians and Sunnis, who detest Hezbollah and all that it represents, tend for the most part to regard Israel as the greater threat. Israel is Lebanon's greatest enemy, and this once again highlights the importance of securing a lasting settlement in the Middle East. When that is achieved, some of the wind will be taken out of the sails not only of Ahmadinejad but also of Syria and Hezbollah's Hassan Nasrallah. In addition, there is now clear evidence of Iranian-made weapons being smuggled to the Taliban from Iran, and it is extremely unlikely that Iranian weapons would be sold to the Taliban or made available to them without the knowledge of the government in Teheran. It is in Teheran's interests that the Taliban ensure that the US is not able to establish and maintain a foothold in western Afghanistan, and the IRGC has been implicated in the movement of opium westwards through Iran to Turkey and Iraq, and onwards to Europe.

In addition to its activities in the Middle East, Iran has tried – without much success – to extend its influence in West Africa. Due to an uncharacteristic ineptitude on the part of Iranian intelligence, attempts to bring weapons into the region have caused diplomatic problems between Gambia, Senegal and Nigeria to such an extent that Iran has been reported to the
UN Security Council for trying to cause civil unrest in the region. Iran and Shi'a militant Islam are becoming an increasing threat to global peace and security. However, unlike al-Qaida, where it has been difficult to ensure sanctions imposed on the organization are effectively implemented, in the case of Iran this should be much easier. There are nevertheless some states which are reluctant to fulfil their commitment to the UN and are instead more concerned to protect their vested interests even though these will eventually recoil on them, though not before causing considerable suffering to others.

Home-grown Islamist extremists

Finally, one of the most significant threats to have emerged and one which will continue for the foreseeable future is the third generation of al-Qaida, the homegrown variety, which is of particular concern to European countries and the USA. These are individuals or small groups, either from within immigrant families or indigenous converts to Islam who have become radicalized as a result of the bin Laden / Zawaheri / Awlaki rhetoric and proselytizing on extremist websites. Home-grown terrorists carried out the attacks on the Madrid rush-hour trains in March 2004 and the London 7/7 suicide bombings in 2005. They were members of the Sauerland Group arrested in Germany in September 2007 and the Düsseldorf Cell detained in April 2011.

NEW SOLUTIONS?

The title of this paper poses the question whether or not we need to find new ways to tackle the threat from (global) terrorism. Do we need new solutions to the threats, especially as they evolve? Before considering what new solutions might be needed, it is useful to assess what measures are currently in place and how effective they are. Some of the main international instruments on which states are expected to base their counter-terrorism strategies and legislation are:

— UN Conventions on Terrorism
— UNSCR 1373 (2001)
— Sanctions against Iran:
  UNSCR 1737 through to 1929 (2010)
— The Financial Action Task Force (FATF/OECD), with the 40 plus 9 Recommendations
— EUROPOL Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP) which monitors SWIFT transactions

The UN Conventions have been introduced and implemented over the last 40 years in response to different aspects of terrorism. They cover such issues as attacks on diplomats, aircraft, airports, the marking of explosives and terrorist financing.

UNSCR 1267 of 1999 is a Chapter VII resolution requiring all states to take the necessary measures to implement a travel ban, an arms embargo and the freezing of assets of individuals and entities designated on the 1267 Consolidated List. The effectiveness of these sanctions is only as good as the quality of the information concerning the names on the list and the willingness of states to implement the sanctions. Many claim to have the measures in place; many still do not, even after ten years; and too many only pay lip service to effective implementation, especially if they do not consider themselves threatened or are sympathetic to the al-Qaida ideology, or for that matter, to the Palestinian cause. Nonetheless, it is one of the best sanctions resolutions to date – or at least it was while it was supported by the ‘operationally independent’ Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Monitoring Group (AQM). The AQM had been given a relatively robust – by UN standards – mandate by the UNSC which it implemented with vigour, calling states that were not fully implementing the required measures to account. Despite public denials before the UNSC, states that had been named and shamed by the AQM in their reports to the Council did make significant efforts to improve their counter-terrorism measures, proof that sanctions do work when properly policed.

A direct and unanimous reaction to the 9/11 attacks, UNSCR 1373 (2001) provides the basic framework for all states to impose or request the imposition of the same sort of sanctions contained in UNSCR 1267 (1999) against al-Qaida, but in this case against any form of terrorism. The Resolution goes further in demanding that states do not assist in the training of terrorists or harbour terrorist groups on their territory. It is a powerful tool which most states neglect to use, on the assumption that it refers to every state but their own.

Sanctions against Iran have been imposed not so much because of its support for terrorism but in view of its alleged nuclear ambitions. Many countries and the IAEA are convinced that Iran’s nuclear energy programme is not just for peaceful purposes but is intended to give the country a nuclear weapons capability. However, it is clear that these sanctions have not been properly implemented and even
Germany seems to be somewhat ambivalent about their implementation. This is exemplified by one such ongoing case which concerns the Hamburg-based, Iranian-owned European Iranian Trade Bank EIH.\(^5\) It acts as a conduit for payments to two other Iranian banks, Bank Mellat and Refah Bank, both of which are subject to sanctions under the quoted UNSCRS. Despite the fact that the US Government has specifically brought these breaches to the attention of Berlin, the Bundesbank has turned a blind eye to the practice. There are also alleged connections through functionaries of the EIH bank to the Iranian Sepah Bank, which has been blacklisted since 2007. Furthermore, recent reports in the German media have claimed that following a visit to Tehran by the German Foreign Minister, a significant sum of money from India to Iran in payment for the purchase of oil was channelled to Teheran through the German banking system via the EIH.\(^6\)

Given this raft of internationally recognized instruments and resolutions, states do have at their disposal a variety of legal tools on which to base their legislation and fulfil their obligations as members of the international body. As this paper has demonstrated, there are many instances where appropriate measures have not been put into place or resolutions effectively implemented. This has allowed terrorists to obtain funding, move around freely and continue to function as a threat to global peace and security. Consequently, there are few arguments in support of devising new solutions to deal with terrorism when the ones that are already in place are not being properly and diligently implemented. Far better to make full use of existing measures, apply them correctly, and then see how they can be improved, before inventing any more rules and regulations which may in any case be ignored, with the end result that terrorists benefit.

A further obstacle to countering terrorism is the lack of a universally agreed definition. This automatically leads to different perceptions of the threat, which in each particular case has to be managed differently while there is a need to achieve a global consensus in dealing with terrorism as a whole. But this is not an easy undertaking; although most countries seem to understand what terrorism is, the international community has still not agreed on a definition. The best that has been achieved is the definition drawn up by the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change for the UN Secretary-General in 2004, namely:

"any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or compel a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act."

If this one aspect were addressed and successfully resolved, it would go some way to demonstrate international consensus and could provide a new basis for future counter-terrorism measures.

**AFTERNOTE**

This paper was written and presented before Osama bin Laden was killed on 2 May 2011 in Pakistan by United States Navy SEALs. Many have speculated on the impact his death will have on the shape of future Islamist terrorism and whether the world will be safer following his demise. Although most agree that his death is a serious psychological blow to al-Qaida, it is the ideology and how it spreads that will continue to make the ongoing global threat from the associates and affiliated groups an issue for concern for the foreseeable future.

Rohan Gunaratna, a leading expert on al-Qaida, has summarized the post-Obama bin Laden situation: "Although bin Laden is dead, he has unleashed a potent ideology that will continue to politicise, radicalise and mobilise a tiny segment of the global Muslim population.\(^7\) Bin Laden may be dead, but the same cannot be said of al-Qaida.

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**NOTES**

1 Sherwell, Philip: Osama bin Laden home video: terrorist leader shown as frail figure watching himself on TV: The Telegraph (online), 8.5.2011, front page.


6 Spiegel online: Bundesbank-Hilfe bei Grossgeschäft; Westerwelle sprach in Teheran über Öl-Deal, 10.4.2011.

7 Gunaratna, Rohan: Osama bin Laden is Dead: RSIS Commentaries 68/2011.
EUROPE, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND NORTH AFRICA IN THE WAKE OF THE ARAB SPRING

MICHAEL BAUER || The Arab Spring is creating a political landscape in the Middle East and North Africa that is more diverse than ever. After its initially cautious reaction, the EU is now embracing this process of political change and has embarked on a re-launch of its policy towards the Middle East and North Africa that is based on bilateralism and the concept of positive conditionality in order to take into account this increased diversity. A focus of the European efforts is currently on support for the consolidation of the political transformation processes in the region, in particular the new political systems in Tunisia and Egypt. In addition to that, the EU should seek to help the reform countries of North Africa and the Middle East to implement socioeconomic measures that help to address the economic and social grievances which played a major factor in the public protests. Economic diversification, the creation of employment opportunities, and the enhancement of the education systems are the key challenges in this regard.

THE IMPACT OF THE ARAB SPRING

After decades of authoritarian rule, the Arab peoples are at last asking to be allowed to determine their political future. The uprisings of the recent past have elicited different responses from the governments in the region. Some have been responsive to popular demands, whilst others have tried to appease the population with lukewarm political reforms. And others have opted for suppression. This has led either to revolutions and the downfall of the long-term rulers, as in the case of Tunisia and Egypt; or it resulted in violent conflict, as in Libya, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain. In Morocco, Jordan and Oman, the rulers tried to engage the protest movement and announced far-reaching political reforms. It remains to be seen, however, if these promises will be actually delivered. The resource-rich countries of the region, in particular Algeria, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar and Kuwait employed yet another strategy and tried to buy off their peoples’ calls for more freedom with economic gifts. While the small Gulf countries might succeed with this strategy, the prospects for Saudi Arabia and Algeria are less clear.

The Arab Spring has left its imprint on every country of the Middle East and North Africa, and the political landscape of Arabia is now more diverse than ever. For the European Union and its member states this means that the policy of turning a blind eye to authoritarian rule as the price for ostensible stability, in itself a morally doubtful practice, can no longer be sustained. Moreover, it also underscores that multilateral projects such as the Union for the Mediterranean, hardly an effective institution already before the Arab Spring started, will not be able to address the increasing regional diversity.

The initial response of the Europeans to the developments of the Arab Spring was rather cautious and shaped by concerns about regional stability and security. In the face of the escalating conflicts in Libya and Bahrain it became once again apparent that Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy is still not in a position to react to rapidly evolving crises. Yet, Europeans have taken a more positive approach to the Arab Spring in the meantime. In order to support the Arabian people in their quest for political freedom and socioeconomic opportunities, the EU needs to develop a diversified approach that takes into account the different conditions in the countries of the region.

At the same time, Europeans proposed to their southern neighbours a new deal for political cooperation and economic development. This has become clear not only in the political statements
issued on European and member state level, but also in the strategy papers for a re-launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) that have been drawn up by the European Commission. The documents "Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean" and "A new response to a changing Neighbourhood" offer the right kind of strategic guidance for re-orienting the ENP in the wake of the Arab Spring. In particular, the emphasis on political differentiation, the concept of positive conditionality, and the "more for more" principle that stipulates that the EU should focus its support efforts on countries and governments that actually deliver on their reform promises have to be welcomed. Moreover, the newly established European "Task Force for the Southern Mediterranean" might help reduce the inconsistencies of the EU’s operational practices of the past.

It seems the EU has understood that, now more than ever, it needs to forge a partnership with its southern neighbours that is based not only on intergovernmentalism and the preservation of the status quo, but on a shared vision of collaboration, cooperation and development that also envisages a role for civil society and the private sector.

SHORT-TERM RESPONSES TO CRISES AND ENCOURAGEMENT OF REFORMS

In the short term, the EU will have to deal with the humanitarian crisis and the destabilizing effect of the conflicts such as streams of refugees from North Africa and the disruption of public services, and food and medical supplies. Coordinated humanitarian aid efforts to address these problems are urgently needed. Moreover, Europeans must take a clear political stance vis-à-vis the governments that resort to violence to suppress their peoples’ demands and make clear that they do not regard these governments as legitimate partners. Targeted sanctions against ruling elites that are responsible for the use of violence are in order. The EU should also seek the support of the international community and the United Nations for this position.

At the same time, the Europeans should continue to encourage their partners in the region to pursue a policy of reform that is focused on political transformation, sustainable economic development and civic empowerment. Both the Europeans and the stakeholders in the region would prefer to see an orderly transition instead of political chaos and violence, and in accordance with the "more for more" principle, Europe's efforts should be focused on the countries that are performing well. Jointly established benchmarks and targets to measure the progress of reforms will be needed in order to allow for consistently applying the concept of positive conditionality.

In the light of the political developments, the Europeans should indicate to their partners that they are willing to provide technical and financial support, and, if such help is needed, assistance for the political transformation processes. This could include support for and advice relating to the establishment of political parties, unions and other political groups, judicial and security sector reforms and help with the organization and monitoring of elections, and the implementation of constitutional changes and legal reforms that are currently in progress in many Arab countries.

A very immediate challenge in this regard is the consolidation of the political transformation in Egypt. Despite Mubarak’s removal from power, the old guards still prove to be resilient to genuine political change. In the past, the country held a role model function for the Arab world; it will regain this position in a positive sense if the political change is to be successful. However, if the transformation in Egypt fails, it will deal a heavy blow to the Arab Spring’s prospects to succeed altogether.

SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND MODERNIZATION

Moreover, the remodelled structure of cooperation with the EU’s southern neighbours should include a joint vision for economic and social cooperation and human development. Challenges like unemployment and social exclusion will not disappear because of political changes alone, but need to be addressed with economic and social reforms. Of particular importance in this regard are projects designed to deal with the mismatch between micro-economics and macroeconomics which has led to economic grievances and popular unrest. A number of targeted measures seem in order in this context.

A very immediate effect could be achieved if the EU were to grant the Middle Eastern and North African economies free access to the European market to allow them to make use of their competitive advantages and help them to create much-needed jobs. This is especially true when it comes to agricultural products. The agricultural sector plays an important role for the labour markets and economic...
production of many countries in the region. Yet, it needs to be taken into account that the agricultural methods employed in many countries of the region do not fulfill the criteria of economic and ecological sustainability. In addition to the opening of the European market, the EU should, therefore, also offer support to increase the effectiveness of the agricultural production processes in the South. This is particularly true with regard to the use of water and arable land.

In the medium term, however, sustainable economic growth, enhanced employment opportunities and wealth generation need economic diversification and capacity building, i.e. the creation of an industrial infrastructure and a functioning service sector. This applies for resource-poor countries like Morocco or Jordan as well as for countries endowed with rich oil and gas reserves like Algeria or Saudi Arabia.

One of the preconditions for a successful modernization and diversification of the national economies would be a continuation and strengthening of the reform efforts in the education systems in Arab countries. As various international indicators indicate, improvements on almost all levels of the education system are needed, including the fields of vocational training and education governance. The EU and its member states should offer their expertise on these issues to their southern neighbours.

Moreover, cooperation in the education and research sector is also a tool that can be used to decentralize relationships and bring societies closer together. This should not be limited to inviting academics from the Middle East and North Africa to work at European research centres. The goal should be to create facilities in the region and to link them up with the European Research Area. Cooperation should also include partnerships on the secondary education level, and in areas such as vocational training and education governance.

Similarly, a liberalized migration regime would be of benefit to all the parties concerned. It would help to meet the demographic challenges on both sides of the Mediterranean, at the same time creating cultural and social links, and would have a very immediate positive effect for the people in the Middle East and North Africa. In particular, jointly managed circular migration schemes should be put on the political agenda. In order to ensure that there is a lasting effect on local labour markets, migrants should be empowered to develop their business ideas when they return to their home countries.

A shared vision of sustainable energy security should be developed as part of a long-term perspective. Joint projects such as the Mediterranean Solar Plan that was launched as one of the projects of the Union for the Mediterranean or the private sector Desertec Industrial Initiative and the Trans-green project constitute blueprints for a renewable energy generation partnership. Projects such as these would also help to create urgently needed high technology employment opportunities in North Africa.

CONCLUSION

The Arab Spring offers the region a great opportunity for political and socioeconomic modernization. Europe must not miss the chance to support the Arab people in their demands for political and economic participation.

This requires a re-launch of the EU’s policy towards the Middle East and North Africa that is based on differentiation, bilateralism and positive conditionality in order to take into account the diversified political landscape of the region. A clear focus in this regard should be on support for reform and post-revolutionary countries. They are in dire need of economic and political support to help them in consolidating their transformed or new political systems. In addition to financial help, Europeans should focus their support on the preparation, implementation and monitoring of the elections as well as on reform efforts to strengthen the rule of law.

With regard to the violent escalation in countries like Libya or Syria, the EU should take a clear political position, condemning the use of violence and targeting the perpetrators with sanctions; in operational terms the EU’s role will focus on humanitarian aid to the affected population.

In the medium and long term, however, the main task will be the identification, planning and implementation of projects that help the countries of the South to address their socioeconomic challenges. The Union for the Mediterranean was intended to be a “union of projects” but failed to deliver on these promises due to its political and institutional paralysis. Some of the envisaged projects still make sense and should be reconsidered within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Moreover, the cooperation should be augmented with projects that immediately enhance the living conditions of the people in the South, e.g. the opening of the European market.
liberalized migration schemes as well as cooperation in education and training. In addition, Europeans should support economic diversification and future projects like the generation of renewable energy.

Cooperation along these lines will go a long way to consolidate the Arab Spring and to seize the opportunities that the Middle East and North Africa hold for the people who live there as well as for external actors.

Guide to further reading


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CHINA'S RISE AND THE EMERGING CHINA-INDIA COMPETITION

JAGANNATH P. PANDA || A predominant aspect of global politics in the current century will be the emerging competition between China and India. Both countries are pursuing their own individualistic approach in bilateral and global dealings. The competition between them in areas like securing resources and multilateral groupings carries huge implications for Asian politics.

INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, the US-dominated neoconservative vision of a unipolar world has increasingly been giving way to a multipolar world vision, led mostly by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Various international theories suggest that China’s current actions and behaviour are of a “growing great power”, an incomplete great global power. Asia’s rise is also predicated on India’s progress as a power. Competition for resources, power rivalry and the desire to build up influence rapidly in multilateral groupings and organizations is restricting these Asian giants from thinking alike in Asian ways.

FRAMING THE DISCOURSE OF COMPETITION
The conventional argument regarding the China-India relationship is that pragmatism based on economic engagement above all else has in recent decades prevailed in these relations and has been expanded to multilateral forums over an array of factors such as environment, trade, human rights and economic issues. This paper disagrees: it argues that the China-India discourse is based on their mutual regional and global competition; that any seeming cooperation between them is for appearance’s sake. As populous societies, they are heavily dependent upon resources and identity formation, and are seriously competing with each other for resources and for a better global space and identity.

Their competitiveness essentially stems from their historical rivalry and differing perceptions about each other. China’s containment policy towards India takes various forms: repeated claims on Arunachal Pradesh and unresolved boundary issues; opposing India’s global pre-eminence, for example not supporting India’s candidature for the UNSC permanent seat and membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO); and keeping close relations with India’s neighbours. This paper focuses on (a) competition over resources like energy in areas such as Central Asia, Myanmar and Afghanistan; and (b) global identity formation by assuming an influential position in multilateral groupings like the UNSC, SCO and BRICS.

ASIAN HOTSPOTS AND RESOURCE COMPETITION
The effect of climate change and overarching population growth makes China and India natural competitors for resources like energy, water and food. While food and water have so far not really been a major factor of competition between the two Asian giants, energy has emerged as the most vital resource for competition in different geographic locations in Asia, such as Central Asia, Myanmar and Afghanistan.

Central Asia
Central Asia is a region well known for its oil and gas reserves. It is reported that Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have almost 300 trillion cubic feet of gas and 90-200 billion barrels of oil. India’s oil need in the coming decade is forecast to rise to 7-8 million barrels per day from the current demand of 2.7-3 million barrels; the requirement for gas would jump to 60-90 million cubic metres. India has sought to build gas pipelines to this region in order to enable it to diversify from coal as feedstock for electricity generation.
Two projects are in the picture: the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline and the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline.

China has scored over India in the recent past by sealing most of the gas and energy deals from Myanmar and by buying up the Canadian-owned oil company in Kazakhstan. More importantly, Pakistan has been successful in its approach in influencing the Chinese to take a keen interest in the IPI pipeline politics. Diplomatic circles in India are worried that the Chinese are wooing the Iranians heavily over IPI. Investment by Chinese companies in Iran's energy sector has been rising in the last four to five years, and is close to US$ 120 billion. Iran has become officially China's number two oil supplier, accounting for almost 14 percent of its imports.  

**Myanmar**

Oil and gas seem to be the prime factor in China's current approach towards Myanmar, which includes pipeline projects. This approach is quite distinct from China's earlier approach towards Myanmar, which was more politically oriented. A pipeline project under construction starts at the Kyaukpyu port on the west coast of Myanmar, touches on the city of Ruili in Yunnan province, and ends at Kunming City. The Chinese news agency Xinhua reported that this project will help China increase its oil imports to 22 million tonnes per year. The project has been assigned to the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and is to be completed by 2013. Xinhua also reports that the next joint China-Myanmar natural gas pipeline will be even bigger. It will run through Kunming into Guizhou Province and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region in South China. It will be 2806 km long and carry roughly 12 billion cubic metres of gas annually to China.

Currently, China imports oil and gas by three conventional modes: ocean shipping, the China-Kazakhstan pipelines and the China-Russia pipelines. The Chinese estimate that the Myanmar pipeline connection would save 1200 km of shipping and lessen China's excessive dependence on the Strait of Malacca for oil import. Myanmar has the world's tenth-largest natural gas reserves, consisting of over 90 trillion cubic feet spread over nineteen onshore and three main offshore fields. Myanmar's daily gas production is projected to almost double to 2.235 billion cubic feet from the current 1.215 billion cubic feet by 2015. China has emerged as the second-largest trading partner of Myanmar, with bilateral trade reaching $ 2.9 billion by 2009. More impressively, China had invested $ 1.8 billion in Myanmar by January 2010, which equals 11.5 percent of the country's total foreign direct investment (FDI). China is currently the third-largest investor in Myanmar.

Securing reliable supplies of energy and raw materials to sustain its economic growth is one of the daunting tasks of Chinese diplomacy today. Similarly to India, China wants to assemble sufficient foreign reserves as well as investment capital to purchase ample amounts of oil and other resources in the global markets, as well as to obtain mines and exploration rights throughout the globe in the future. The current thrust of both China and India is on the South East Asian region, with a special focus on Myanmar. The country is known for its natural reserves such as gas, oil, jade and teak. While it is reported that the Chinese have even supplied arms to the Burmese junta, India has preferred to engage economically through small and bigger transport corridor projects. Under its renewed ‘Look East Policy’, Myanmar has assumed increasing importance among the strategic communities and policy-makers in India. Even though time and again India's stance over the Myanmar military junta has invited strong debate and seems contradictory from a broader perspective, the crucial importance of Myanmar for energy resources induces India to take the country seriously, both economically and strategically.

In the last few years, the Shwe reserves in the gas field off the Arakan coast of Myanmar have attracted massive regional attention. This is after the discovery of block A-1 Shwe field and Shwepehu and block A-3 Mya fields in January 2004 and April 2005, respectively. Since 2005, eighteen exploratory and assessing oil wells have been drilled. The oil well in the Mottama offshore oil field is estimated to help boost commercial production in the dry season. With Thailand, Myanmar is implementing the Zawtika-9 oil well project in block M-9 of Mottama. Having a capacity of more than 8 trillion cubic feet and a production rate of about 300 million cubic feet per day, Myanmar's plan is to produce gas and export it to Thailand by 2012 through M-9.

Reports that Myanmar has 3.2 billion barrels of recoverable crude oil reserves has brought oil companies from China, India, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam to that country to search for energy resources. By mid-2009, foreign investment in Myanmar's oil and gas sector had reached $ 3398 billion in eighty-nine projects.
Official statistics reveal that in fiscal year 2008-9 Myanmar produced 6.89 million barrels of crude oil and 401.9 billion cubic feet of gas. Though China only entered Myanmar’s energy market in 2001, it is reported that currently China has more than sixteen stakes in Myanmar oil and gas blocks, which makes the PRC the largest foreign investor in Myanmar’s energy sector.

Major Indian stakeholders like GAIL, ONGC and Oil India are searching for opportunities in Myanmar. Previously, Indian firms had claimed blocks in Myanmar but the absence of a pipeline reduced their economic value for India. Also, China had previously beaten India in winning a thirty-year contract from General Than Shwe’s administration, and had received concessions for starting the construction of hydroelectric dams in Myanmar.

China’s dominance in Myanmar will give it the strategic advantage for the neighbouring sea route politics for energy and oil. In a way, it will provide direct access to the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) via the Bay of Bengal in the west and the strategic Andaman Sea in the south. The growing closeness in China-Myanmar relations has made India quietly reshape its policy towards Myanmar. India has even gone to the extent of offering assistance to tackle the ethnic insurgents along the India-Myanmar frontier. India is banking predominantly on the historical linkages between the two countries and is trying to convince the elder generation of leaders in Myanmar’s military administration to support India’s requirement for energy resources. In 1993 Myanmar and India signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on border tranquility. On the basis of this MoU, India resolved not to interfere in Myanmar’s internal politics while Myanmar assured India that it would not facilitate the Chinese unduly in its territory.

But China is winning the race to woo the current Myanmar administration and continues to push the military and strategic relationship. China has acquired naval bases along the critical ends in the Indian Ocean to maximize its strategic presence. There is a conviction among the Chinese leaders that maritime strength will enhance its strategic influence at the regional level. The growing Chinese naval bases across the Indian Ocean are a reaction to its problems in reaching the Indian Ocean. China’s military up-grading of facilities in the Coco Island group confirms its future designs. According to unconfirmed reports, the Myanmar junta leased Coco Island to China in 1994.

In a strong reaction to China’s increasing presence in the region, India’s Minister for External Affairs S. M. Krishna recently stated that China was demonstrating “more than normal interests” in the Indian Ocean Region. The Indian military establishment speculates that the Chinese military presence in Coco will help it to monitor the Indian naval presence and activities in the region. It is also reported that the Chinese are building a port on Ramree Island located along the Myanmar coast, which is only 100 km from southern India.

Engaging with major powers like China provides Myanmar some options to revitalize its regional posture. The multibillion-dollar oil-and-gas pipeline promises to enhance the financial vigour of Myanmar’s military command and boost its political influence in Asia. This becomes important especially when the European Union and the United States are seeking fresh means to weaken the junta. International strategies using economic sanctions to weaken the junta have so far failed. The current administration in Myanmar led by President Thein Sein is undoubtedly pro-Chinese; democratic countries like India and the West will have to find new avenues and strategies to deal with these rapidly growing Sino-Myanmar relations. At the same time, it makes sense for India and the Western world to take serious note of Aung San Suu Kyi’s approach towards China after her release from jail. If Aung San Suu Kyi decides to follow the same policy measures towards China as Thein Sein’s administration, then of course the Sino-Myanmar relationship is going to reach a different level in times to come, thereby posing a serious challenge for India and the West.

**Afghanistan**

In Afghanistan, although India has always tried to project its soft power image, the Chinese are recently emerging as the most prominent power in the region. The most impressive Chinese investment in Afghanistan so far has been $ 3.4 billion by the China Metallurgical Corporation (MCC) in the Aynak copper mine. This is the largest FDI so far in Afghanistan. This proposal calls for the construction of a freight railway, a power plant, housing, a mosque, and a hospital. The plan is also to develop the Hajigak iron ore deposit in Bamiyan province to the west of Kabul. The project will provide employment opportunities to Afghan youths and generate training facilities.
Economic assistance to Afghanistan by the PRC since 2002 has been more than 900 million Yuan ($130 million). In 2009, China announced that it would give $75 million as aid for the reconstruction of Afghanistan in the next five years. Among important projects, Chinese companies like ZTE and Huawei partnered with the Afghan Ministry of Communications to implement digital telephone switches, providing about 200,000 subscriber lines.

Other projects like the Parwan irrigation project, restoring water supply in Parwan province, reconstruction of the public hospitals in Kabul and Kandahar explain the vitality of Afghanistan in the Chinese radar. The leadership in China has constantly asked for greater international aid for Afghanistan, and advocated a coordinating role through the UN.

There is growing political trust between the two countries. President Karzai has been reported as saying that Afghanistan will follow “America’s democracy and China’s economic success”. Karzai finalized three specific deals during his 2010 trip to Beijing: (a) economic cooperation, (b) technical training, (c) granting of preferential tariffs for select Afghan exports to China.

A range of factors like the potential comeback of the Taliban, NATO’s failed counter-narcotics policy with poppy cultivation on the increase and, most importantly, the instability of the regime contribute vastly to the Chinese fear over the grim situation in Central Asia. With regard to Afghanistan, the Chinese are concerned about three security issues: (a) terrorism, (b) drug trafficking, and (c) cross-border crimes.

The Chinese aim with regard to Afghanistan is mainly to protect the conduits for its roads and pipelines passages that will transfer natural resources from the Indian Ocean Region or elsewhere. In the security sphere, China has rendered great support in training the Afghan police and military officers since 2006. It has donated $4 million in logistical and material support to the Afghan national army. Among the Central Asian states, Kyrgyzstan in particular is powerless to police its border with Afghanistan and is very much exposed to drug traffickers and insurgencies. China wants to promote the SCO as a viable medium to look after these concerns about security in the region. In order to implement this further, Beijing is in the process of adopting multilateral deals with Afghanistan rather than only banking upon its bilateral or individual engagement.

Afghanistan is India’s crucial link for trade, energy and security contacts with Central Asia. India’s current foreign policy is to maintain stability and engage itself in the reconstruction process of Afghanistan. The thrust would be on soft power, continuing to maintain a predominantly civilian, peaceful and passive approach, though the predication remains whether a hardcore military network with the region is necessary to protect its interests and investments. Both China and India seek to wield greater influence in the region, particularly in the light of their quest for regional stability and energy resources.

**MULTILATERAL COMPETITION AND PRC’S PREVAILING WEIGHT**

The discourse of history suggests that membership in various multilateral bodies is an unreliable variable for forecasting the intentions of any power or its impact on the global balance of power politics. Therefore, it is speculated that keeping up its interest in emerging multilateral dialogue processes might allow Beijing to deflect doubt at multiple levels while continuing to raise its global power and ambitions. China possesses greater ability than India to shape and form the political, economic and strategic contours of any organization due to its economic supremacy.

**Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)**

As the first regional multilateral organization of the twenty-first century, the SCO has successfully addressed various security issues in the Central Asian region. But whether it has the capability to expand its mandate and membership and venture out on that experiment will be the test of its strength and character in coming times.

SCO expansion relates to both its mandate and membership expansion. As regards expanding the SCO beyond the region of Central Asia, it is not really its constituent rules that prohibit such expansion, but the reluctance of China and Russia. Moscow perceives the SCO as a transnational and global organization, as a platform that could not only tackle transnational threats but also check Western inroads both in Central Asia and Asia. China’s approach has been economy-centric. While Russia’s proposition of combating the regional and transnational threats through SCO will help China in checking the problem in Xinjiang and the terrorism issue as a whole, caution is urged not to
project the SCO as a credible anti-Western grouping. For China, the SCO stands as a viable mechanism to oversee the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan at a certain level.

In other words, while the Russians are generally interested to promote the SCO in terms of security and focus on the “common military infrastructure” networks, the Chinese primarily focus on the SCO’s economic dimension and as a window for promoting free trade zones in the region. While apparently supporting Russia’s opposition to regional “hegemony”, Beijing has been more interested in the energy and gas resources available in the smaller Central Asian states, and therefore maintains a tactically neutral position. This persisting dichotomy is likely to have an impact on the issue of membership expansion in coming times.

Beijing’s outlook on SCO expansion can for the most part be explained by its perspective on and relationship with the existing observer members. The official Chinese stance is that the “SCO is engaged in a ‘pragmatic cooperation’ now with its observers and partners”; that “enlargement is a complicated issue which bears on the further development of the SCO. An expert panel has been set up by the SCO to have an all-round study on a series of political and legal issues including the standards and procedure of enlargement ... we believe SCO members will decide by consensus according to their own development”. The Chinese viewpoint appears to be in favour of considering all aspects of the expansion issue, consolidating its position both at the regional and global levels before taking a final call over SCO expansion.

Both Pakistan and India are “pariah states” where the SCO is concerned, since they belong to the South Asian region and the SCO is meant as a regional organization for Central Asia. This aspect apart, China’s stance over the inclusion of both India and Pakistan in the SCO is correlated, though this correlation may appear incongruous. China is cold to India’s association with the SCO but vigorously supports Pakistan’s candidature. The Chinese support for Pakistan is balanced by Russian support for India. In addition, the USA is a preeminent factor for both these two countries in South Asia in terms of their foreign policy.

The position over India is partially influenced by India’s stout Central Asia policy recently. After neglecting to take the SCO seriously all these years, India has finally started showing a serious interest in SCO membership. Pakistan on the other hand has always taken seriously the issue of SCO membership. Though India is yet to map an official policy on how to deal with the SCO membership issue, there is a feeling in India that Beijing would bargain hard over India’s SCO membership application as an opportunity for its own inclusion in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) as a full member.

UNSC

Pursuing smart diplomacy, building global alliances and promoting the cause of the developing world have been the hallmarks of Chinese global diplomacy in recent times. This is evidenced by Beijing’s advocacy for a greater share for Africa and the developing world in UNSC representation. While China’s stance on UNSC reform is closely linked to its broader dialogue of reforming the UN, its immediate policy priority is how to reduce the impact and pre-eminence of the United States and its allies, and use the UN as a forum for its global presence and objectives.

Broadly, the PRC holds that the UN is an imperative body which needs to enhance its authority for an effective global governance structure. But as to UNSC reform, China’s approach remains conservative and sceptical. It openly advocates reform, but in actual practice takes a conformist stance of not extending the weight and power of the existing P-5 nations. It advocates greater representation for the countries of the “developing world” at the UNSC without advocating or proposing the power of veto for them.

The Chinese Position Paper on UN Reform, released in June 2005, outlines five fundamentals on the issue: (a) UNSC reform should enhance the “authority and efficiency of the council”; (b) representation of the developing countries should be given priority; (c) participation on a rotating basis in the decision-making process for small and medium-sized countries; (d) geographic representation symbolizing cultures and civilizations; (e) regional groups should build a consensus on reform proposal with respect to their region and rotation method. By declaring this position, China wants to openly advocate the dialogue of globalization and multi-polarity; and asks for greater democratization of world affairs, particularly in global institutions like the UN.

The Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China at the 65th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (2010) also talks about "enhanc-
ing the authority and efficiency of the UNSC" and "representation of developing countries, African countries in particular." It also states categorically that "reform of the Security Council is part and parcel of UN reforms". Three fundamental aspects discernible in these position papers are: (a) China does not see UNSC reform in isolation and links it with UN reform as a whole; (b) it calls for reform of the working methods of UNSC along with greater representation of the African and developing world; (c) it opposes placing any specific time limit in reforming the UNSC.

Chinese scholars or strategists see the dialogue of UNSC permanent membership expansion as a "political game", having ramifications on the "redistribution of power". While the UN as an organization remains undemocratic and stays hierarchical in the existing P-5 setup, entailing US supremacy, Beijing equally endorses the current privileged status of being a permanent member and holding the exclusive veto. In the Chinese perception, a "rational" and "reasonable" UNSC reform would improve not only the "authority" and "efficiency" of the council, but also Chinese clout as a global power.

China is aware that the US does not believe in the principle of democratic accountability for its global actions. Ye Hailin and Yang Xiaoping at the Chinese Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS) think tank do not trust Barack Obama's recent rhetorical support in the Indian Parliament for India's candidature in UNSC. This suits China in not having to take a direct and open stance on the issue.

China's perspective on India's presence in the UNSC rests on some of the following parameters. First, India possesses the strength to become a global power that could eventually challenge Chinese pre-eminence in Asia. Second, India's global profile as "US supporter" is counter to China's global interests. China's discomfort in the matter was clearly demonstrated during the India-specific waiver by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Indo-US nuclear deal. Third, Washington is vocally promoting a larger strategic role for India on the world stage in response to China's rising global ambitions. Fourth, if China supports India's case, there will be a likely expansion of UNSC, and African representation has to be there in the developing-world category. As opposed to its rhetorical statements, Beijing's real intention is to act as Big Brother to the African world to exploit the oil, gas, energy and trade benefits in the name of advocating that the African world should assume a greater role in world politics, not a permanent seat at the UNSC. Fifth, China combines the issue of India's membership with the whole debate over UN reform. Experts play it safe by stating that "If India manages to get two-thirds of the UN General Assembly support, China will support India's case", but consensus is lacking in the international community on the matter. Sixth, China does not want to grant any leverage to India in the UN as it is aware of India's influence as a "peace-loving nation"; India's credibility and record in UN peacekeeping operations are impressive.

**BRICS**

India would like to keep IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa since 2010), even after the inclusion of South Africa in the latter, as separate entities. India sees IBSA as a "democratic" alliance, while BRIC is more an abstract of "four large countries with abundant resources, large populations and diverse societies." Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was quoted saying that "IBSA has a personality of its own. It is three separate continents, three democracies. BRIC is a conception devised by Goldman Sachs. We are trying to put life into it". The IBSA framework is more of a South-South cooperation of mutual concerns. Though issues like food security, social disparities and energy security remain the top concerns both in BRICS and IBSA, India views IBSA as largely a "people's project". IBSA has a special attraction for India in that China is not a part of it. India has expressed the view that Russia remains a key player in the progress of BRICS. Indian officials state that "Russia is a key state of the BRIC(S) with the participation of which the union was created and will be working further." The Chinese in their turn see BRICS as a "bloc of emerging powers ... while BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) is a bloc of developing countries." Their attempt at including South Africa in the BRICS club was successful. The Chinese view is that there should be adequate cooperation between BRICS and BASIC in order to protect the interests of developing societies. There is also great interest within the Chinese strategic communities to merge together BRICS, IBSA and BASIC to have a stronger representation of the developing world to counter the Western and European supremacy in global politics.
On the surface, both India and China appear to be the most tenable options in BRICS for future investments. Both markets have been the prime destinations for global investors. The post-Olympics Chinese market is riding a super cycle of investment, and continues to build world-class infrastructure in prime destinations. However, problems remain in the political aspect of the Chinese economic growth. Its state-dominated economy, the absence of any major political reform, a range of social instabilities and a growing urban-rural divide may derail the Chinese economic miracle. India seems to be a safer destination for investments in the longer run. India's political set-up and its democratic stability provide a good guarantee for its economic sustainability. The problem with India, however, is how to finance the modernization of its doleful infrastructure, given its high debt and ambivalence towards the global investment and privatization process.

CHINA HAS THE EDGE

The Chinese attitude of having an edge over India on various fronts is a phenomenon linked with China's vision for global power status. Randall L. Schweller is of the view that: "China has not developed into a 'jackal' state, possessive of what it currently possesses but also eager to acquire and win more power and influence, but more of a 'lion' state, very keen to guard and preserve what it has currently but unwilling to take unnecessary risks in obtaining more." It would appear that currently China wants to capitalize on what it possesses, and is content to function within a Western-dominated global system of legal order and machinery, while keeping its policy of conservatism intact.

India is a country which is very much on the Chinese radar. Neither does China want to permit India much scope in regional and global multilateral dealings; nor does it want to facilitate India much in availing itself of the resource benefits in different regions. The current multilateral competition between two of Asia’s most powerful countries is only going to expand and it will have a considerable impact on Asia in terms of global politics.

NOTES

2 Kim, Samuel S.: China’s path to great power status in the globalization era, in: Asian Perspective, 27 (1), 2003, p. 72.
5 The IPI pipeline is about 2775 km long, with a capacity of 150 million cubic metres per day. The project is estimated to cost over $7 billion. See Sen, Philip: Courting the prize in Pakistan: India, China and the geo-politics of Iranian gas, in: The Focus: Energy Security EU / Asia (The Newsletter), No. 51, Summer 2009.
6 Routing the pipeline to China through the Himalayas is going to be expensive. China may afford that, given that it has undertaken quite expensive infrastructure projects in Tibet, such as the Qinghai–Tibet Railway. But the route through the Himalayas may cause another diplomatic row between China and India. Currently, the project is only at the negotiating level.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
17 Norling, op. cit.


30 Author’s interaction with Chinese think tank scholars in Beijing and Shanghai, 13-17.12.2010. (He visited China with an IDSA delegation to interact with various scholars and experts in Beijing and Shanghai on bilateral and global issues. Among the topics discussed was UNSC reform and whether China will support India’s candidacy for UNSC permanent membership.)

31 Ibid.


34 Author’s interaction with Chinese think tank scholars in Beijing and Shanghai, 13-17.12.2010. Dr. Zhao Gancheng of SIIS represents this view.

35 Krishnan, Ananth: China doesn’t favour G4 call on UNSC reforms in: The Hindu, 15.2.2011.


38 Bagchi, op. cit.

39 India sees no BRIC future without Russia, in: ITAR-TASS, 9.4.2010, OSC Transcribed Text, World News Connection (dialog.com), 201004091477.1_9d6800283dd08e59, accession number 297151692.


41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

NON-TRADITIONAL THREATS: AN ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVE FROM SOUTH ASIA

VINOD ANAND || Non-Traditional Security (NTS), and threats to NTS, have gained much greater visibility. While NTS threats definitely qualify as a major component of security research, the scope of the term, and consequent analysis and prescriptions, are extremely wide-ranging and often nebulous. Since NTS is very closely aligned to the stages of development of a state, a society and a region, discussion of NTS and formulation of policy prescriptions may be an exercise in futility unless the term is properly defined and discussed with reference to an analytical framework. Further, in South Asia there is a degree of consensus that most of the non-traditional security threats are transnational and need to be dealt with through joint endeavours. However, some initial small steps have already taken in the South Asian region to address such threats in a coordinated manner.

INTRODUCTION

The concept of security has undergone rapid change in the period since the end of the Cold War. One dominant theme of the discourse has been the shift from security of the state to security of the individual. Adherence to this formulation of security does not necessarily have universal acceptance. The term non-traditional threats (to security) or Non-Traditional Security (NTS) has found tremendous resonance amongst the developed countries, as conventional threats have receded. The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) held centre stage for a certain period after 2001. While the threats from non-state actors remain as topical as ever, recent happenings have led to large-scale loss of human lives. Many of these cannot be ascribed directly to either state or non-state actors of any particular category. Therefore, NTS, and threats to NTS, have gained much greater visibility.

In this paper, we discuss the conceptualization of NTS, and threats to NTS, as distinct from Conventional Security (CS) threats as well as Sub-Conventional Security (SCS) threats. We develop a flexible framework for the characterization and assessment of NTS threats as well as a framework for the development of threat mitigation policies and capabilities. We demonstrate the application of this framework using preliminary findings from the Indian context and identify further areas of research.

THE DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY

CS is related to the concept of the sovereignty of a state, existing as a geographical entity. The exercise of sovereignty is through political, economic, military and diplomatic means. The objective of CS is the viability of the state and its ability to pursue its territorial and extra-territorial interests while protecting its internal assets as well as freedom of action with reference to an external environment.

Figure 1 explains this in a diagrammatic form. The territorial entity at the centre of the figure has certain attributes that require preservation. To do this it also needs access to and preservation of some or more extra-territorial interests. Thus the oval shapes at the four corners of the figure also represent entities that need to be protected. The double-headed block arrows represent access from the territorial core to the extra-territorial entities or interests.

If we use the model of Figure 1, we can identify a class of threats to the existence of the entities depicted therein and the access mechanisms between them. CS threats are based on state-based threat vectors and may comprise political structures, economic structures and military structures. State-based actors / vectors acting in concert also fall under the rubric of CS.
With state-based threats becoming less prominent for a limited period of time after the end of the Cold War, non-state threat vectors made their appearance in an enlarged and vicious form. These vectors comprise paramilitary structures, anti-political agents and anti-economic agents. The threats posed in this manner can be classified as SCS threats. It is to be noted that SCS threats can be extra-territorial but can also exist within a geographically defined state. SCS threats very often exist across state boundaries and are then referred to as transnational SCS threats.

The unifying feature of CS and SCS threats is the entity model of Figure 1, where the desired end of security provision is the protection of the defined entities and the access mechanisms. In the case of both CS and SCS, we note the concept of “agency” in the manifestation of threats – the threats are generated through the design and intentions of state or non-state actors, acting in concert with other actors of either kind or on their own. CS and SCS threats are, in this sense, “manufactured”, they do not simply “happen”. In other words, they are the first-order effects of actions of motivated threat-
causing agents. The emphasis in both CS and SCS is the preservation of the state with its various attributes. As a corollary to the above, CS and SCS are to be ensured primarily by organs of the state – the political system, the military, and the civilian government structures.

Before making observations about the nature of NTS, the threats to it and how it can be achieved, it is worth examining the concept of Human Security (HS).

HUMAN SECURITY

The concept of Human Security (HS) was introduced by Mahbub ul Haq in the 1994 UNDP Report as "freedom from fear and freedom from want". Sabina Alkire provides a comprehensive review of the concept of HS. She provides alternative formulations of a working definition of HS. The one most appropriate to this paper is:

"The objective of human security is to create political, economic, social, cultural, and environmental conditions in which people live knowing that their vital rights and freedoms are secure".

In terms of the 1994 report, "freedom from want" equates to freedom from poverty, and "freedom from fear" equates to freedom from violence. The 1994 report actually identified the following four essential characteristics of human security:

- Human security is a universal concern. It is relevant to people everywhere, in rich nations and poor.
- The components of human security are interdependent.
- Human security is easier to ensure through early prevention than later intervention. It is less costly to meet these threats upstream than downstream.
- Human security is people-centred. It is concerned with how people live and breathe in a society, how freely they exercise their many choices, how much access they have to market and social opportunities – and whether they live in conflict or in peace.

NTS: AN ANALYTICAL FORMULATION

The population of a state is comprised of human beings living within or outside the territorial entity. Therefore, CS, SCS and HS are linked to each other in a bilateral relationship. Improving CS and SCS improves HS and vice versa. Deterioration of either affects the other in a similar manner. However, human beings are not the only components of a state. The state is comprised of many systems (or sub-systems) and the state can be viewed as a "system of systems", just as it forms part of a larger international system in a recursive manner.

The Consortium of Non-Traditional Security Studies in Asia (NTS-Asia) defines NTS threats as:

"Challenges to the survival and well-being of peoples and states that arise primarily out of non-military sources, such as climate change, cross-border environmental degradation and resource depletion, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, food shortages, people smuggling, drug trafficking, and other forms of transnational crime".

According to NTS-Asia, these NTS threats have common characteristics. They are mainly non-military in nature, transnational in scope – neither domestic nor purely interstate, they come with very short notice, and are transmitted rapidly due to globalization and the communication revolution. As such, national solutions are rendered inadequate and would require comprehensive (political, economic, and social) responses, as well as humanitarian use of military force.

We note here the expansion of NTS to include peoples (the subject of HS) and states (the subject of CS and SCS). What then is the distinguishing feature of NTS compared to CS, SCS and HS taken together? The difference lies in the lack of "agency" in the manifestation of the threat. Note also that HS threats are also characterized in large part by the lack of agency; however, HS is subject to "agency" in many parts of the world, particularly the poorer regions afflicted by regional and internal strife. We therefore define NTS as:

Challenges to the survival and well-being of peoples and states that arise from unmotivated, unplanned and relatively sudden threats to the viability of the interdependent and interconnected sub-systems of the state and its external environment – NTS is, therefore, systemic and existential.

At this stage it becomes relevant to list the typical systems of the state (systemic targets) at risk, in the following manner:

- Social system
- Economic system
  - Food sub-system
  - Energy sub-system
  - Monetary sub-system
  - Industrial sub-system
- Political system
- Security system
The systemic risks arise from certain potential fault lines that may be listed in the following manner:

- Land
- Water
- Environment
- Political competition
- Education
- Health
- Governance (including corruption)
- Crime

The formulation of systemic targets and systemic fault lines is not rigid. On the other hand, it is expansive enough to define each of the examples of NTS threats given in the NTS-Asia definition and to characterize emerging and future NTS threats.

**NTS: ASIAN AND THE SOUTH ASIAN CONTEXT**

As may be seen from the preceding analysis, NTS threats could find greater resonance in developed states whose CS and SCS have improved due to the recession of state-based threats. On the other hand, poorer regions and states have to deal with NTS threats even as their CS and SCS may also be deteriorating. In either case, NTS threat causes are more often than not transnational, requiring multilateral policy prescriptions and actions. This is more so for smaller countries, located in a complex geopolitical milieu.

Unlike CS and SCS, the application of military means and potential is the less preferred method of addressing NTS concerns. Thus, as compared to CS, NTS concerns find easier acceptance in multilateral international exchanges. From the Asian perspective, examples of this are the ASEAN efforts focused on NTS, the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) and various dialogue fora like the Shangri-La Dialogue.

Speaking at the first ADMM-Plus meeting, Chinese Defence Minister Liang Guanglie said that the security situation in the Asia-Pacific remains generally stable but the region is still confronted with many traditional and non-traditional security challenges, like tsunami, earthquakes, typhoons and floods. He also stated that NTS issues pose grave challenges to regional security, economic growth and people’s livelihood, adding that NTS threats are usually transnational and unpredictable, and require a joint response. Liang said that China supports the ADMM-Plus in focusing on NTS cooperation and giving priority to tackling non-traditional security challenges which directly threaten the lives and well-being of the people in Asia-Pacific. Thus, it can be easily surmised that multilateral cooperation to address NTS threats may be easy to forge as compared to traditional security threats. However, ASEAN members would like to use the ADMM-Plus platform also to move towards discussing the traditional security concerns. But China is more inclined to discuss traditional security issues in a bilateral mode rather than a multi-lateral mode. Traditional security concerns posed by the rise of China and its recent assertive behaviour in the South China Sea and in East Asia have impacted the behaviour of some of the ASEAN states and Japan; and they are seeking to balance China through alliances/partnerships with outside powers and by revisiting their defence policies and postures.

Similarly, speaking at the second plenary session of the 9th IISS Asia Security Summit on the nature of security threats, Shiv Shankar Menon, the Indian National Security Adviser, stated that “the geopolitical consequences of the financial crisis and the economic crisis include an acceleration of past trends towards multi-polarity, while strengthening the interdependent nature of the present international, economic and political system. What this means in practice is that, to a greater extent than before, transnational peace and security can be regarded as a global public good, in the sense that no single state can deliver them on its own”. He went on to analyse the implications of this shift by stating that “… security challenges have acquired new transnational dimensions, because of recent geopolitical, technological and economic developments, and that these have to be dealt with differently from traditional security issues”. Among the challenges he listed were the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the militarization of outer space, anarchy on land and on sea empowered by new technologies, and energy security and stability. He dwelt on the issues of climate change and its adverse impacts on human security – migration, water stress, and food shortages. Another issue he highlighted was maritime security and the need to keep the sea lanes open and free. He said that “India would be happy to work with the other littoral states and naval powers in this domain to see how we can address the threats at sea from terrorists, pirates, proliferators, and organised crime.” His overall thrust was that managing the security of the global commons – outer space, the oceans, cyberspace, and global transport and communication networks: that which no one state may own or control –
requires new global partnerships involving those powers with the capacity to address these issues.

In July 2011 during a visit to Bangladesh, India’s External Affairs Minister S. M. Krishna highlighted the importance of non-traditional security threats; he observed that "We face new challenges and non-traditional security threats. The rise of religious fundamentalism, extremism and terrorism are not unfamiliar to our region. Such forces sap away the strength of our societies, threaten our state systems and are an impediment to our advancement". Of late, especially after Sheikh Hasina's government has come to power in Bangladesh, there has been good cooperation with India in fighting fundamentalist and extremist forces. In addition, it is also expected that water security issues will be addressed and an accord between India and Bangladesh may also be reached during the coming visit of India’s Prime Minister to Bangladesh.

The South Asian countries have also been striving to attenuate their security concerns through the mechanism of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Compared to ASEAN, SAARC has been far less successful in both security and non-security fields to assuage the concerns of its members. Whether one looks at conventional or sub-conventional security or for that matter non-traditional security threats, the South Asian region is afflicted by these threats in a very large measure.

Virulence of sub-conventional threats: South Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Civilians</th>
<th>Security Forces</th>
<th>Terrorists</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1,987</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>3,301</td>
<td>6,208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2,803</td>
<td>1,725</td>
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<td>3,128</td>
<td>1,503</td>
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<td>3,677</td>
<td>2,314</td>
<td>14,742</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>14,197</td>
<td>2,738</td>
<td>12,703</td>
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<td>2,571</td>
<td>844</td>
<td>6,016</td>
<td>9,431</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
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<td>1,602</td>
<td>3,510</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total*</td>
<td>29,717</td>
<td>10,598</td>
<td>48,999</td>
<td>89,314</td>
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</table>

Data till June 26, 2011. Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal

If one looks at the sub-conventional threats to security in South Asia, there have been over 89,000 fatalities due to terrorism in South Asia in the time period of the last six or so years. The table above shows the yearly figures from 2005 to June 2011.

In the half year ending June 2011, Pakistan has been the worst victim of terrorist violence with 2915 fatalities, with India in second place with 567 people killed. The next table depicts fatalities in South Asia in the first half of the year 2011.

If these figures are compared with the fatalities that have occurred during conventional conflicts in South Asia which include the Sino-Indian War of 1962, the Indo-Pak War of 1965 and 1971 and the Kargil Conflict of 1999, the total figure for these is much less than the casualties due to terrorist violence.

In addition to terrorism in South Asia, there are NTS issues of transnational crime, drug trafficking, illegal migration, money laundering and gun-running which may or may not be related to terrorism. Most
of the South Asian nations are in the process of nation-building and have similar problems regarding ethno-political, socio-economic, and communal-religious politics, corruption and governance. Threats to human security and to a certain extent to state security could arise from a single factor or a combination of these factors. On the question of cross-border terrorism, some steps have been taken by SAARC through the instrument of the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism and an Additional Protocol to the SSARC Convention, to meet obligations devolving on Member States in terms of UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) and the international Convention for Suppression of Financing of Terrorism. However, lack of trust has prevented any substantive movement on cooperation, especially between India and Pakistan. There are also SAARC Conventions to combat narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, trafficking in women and children and other transnational crimes. Regular meetings of SAARC Interior / Home Ministers, which are preceded by meetings of the Secretaries of Interior / Home Ministries, are also held on the subject of Cooperation in Police Matters.

However, discourse on environmental threats like natural disasters, climate change and pandemics has acquired increased salience amongst the South Asian nations and they have taken initial steps to cooperate with each other through the mechanism of SAARC.

### 2011*

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
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<th>Security Forces</th>
<th>Terrorists</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>Left-wing</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<td>Jammu and Kashmir</td>
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<td>567</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NEPAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PAKISTAN</strong></td>
<td>1.175</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>1.306</td>
<td>2.915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SRI LANKA</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.602</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1.354</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>1.602</td>
<td>3.510</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Data till June 26, 2011. Source: Figures compiled from news reports
Impact of environmental threats to South Asia

The South Asia geographic region remains most vulnerable to natural disasters and extreme hydro-meteorological disasters like flash floods, monsoon flooding, tropical cyclones and storm surges. According to the global database on disasters, South Asia has in the past forty years faced as many as 1,333 disasters that have killed 980,000 people, affected 2.4 billion lives and damaged assets worth US$ 105 billion. These totals are by far the highest among the recorded disasters in various geographic regions. A study of the table below brings out the vulnerability of South Asia to natural disasters. There is more than one type of hazard to which the South Asian region is exposed. Between 1990 and 2008, more than 750 million people – 50% of South Asia’s population – were affected by at least one type of disaster, resulting in almost 230,000 deaths and about US$ 45 billion in damages.

Reported natural disaster impacts in South Asia 1990-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population ('000)</th>
<th>Deaths ('000)</th>
<th>People Affected ('000)</th>
<th>Population Affected (%)</th>
<th>Damage (US$ millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>22,615</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5,410</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>69,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>143,990</td>
<td>155.3</td>
<td>145,713</td>
<td>101.2</td>
<td>12,984,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1,071,608</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>885,244</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>25,743,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>500,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>25,278</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>2,796</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>245,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>162,662</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>27,943</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>3,573,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>19,258</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>6,311</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>1,670,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,368,327</td>
<td>229.5</td>
<td>1,073,504</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>44,787,964</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Looking back at the colossal damage caused by the November 2004 tsunami in terms of men and material in India, Sri Lanka and Maldives, over 60,000 people were killed and over one million people were displaced with several billion dollars of property lost. The October 2005 earthquake in Kashmir killed at least 73,000 people, severely injured or disabled another 70,000, and rendered 2.8 million homeless in northern parts of Pakistan. The rehabilitation cost of the 2004 tsunami disaster for India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives was estimated to be US$ 3 billion. The overall cost associated with the October 2005 earthquake is estimated at approximately at US$ 5.2 billion.

SAARC has been working towards putting in place a regional and effective mechanism for rapid response to disasters to achieve a substantial reduction in loss of lives and loss of social, economic and environmental assets in times of a disaster. It is proposed to create the mechanism under the already existing SAARC Disaster Management Centre (SDMC). Final shape to the mechanism would be given at the 17th SAARC Summit to be held in the Maldives on 10-11 November 2011.

Climate change is another non-traditional security concern which has the potential to affect large sectors of the population of South Asian countries. According to several estimates, the coastal populations of the South Asian littoral are seriously threatened by rising sea levels. By 2050, the sea level along the Bangladesh coast is predicted to rise by 45 centimetres which would affect 10-15 percent of the land area and 35 million people. Similarly, the sea level along India's coast is predicted to rise 15-38 centimetres by 2050 which would negatively impact the country's growth and also result in massive migration and displacement of the population. Even Sri Lanka where a large portion of the coast is just about 1.5 metres above sea level would be badly affected. However, the most threatened would be the Maldives where their sheer survival would be difficult. In order to high-
light the threat of global warming to the low-lying Indian Ocean nation, the Maldivian government held an underwater cabinet conference in October 2009.

In addition, there are several other types of non-traditional security concerns which have impacted not only the South Asian region but also many parts of the globe. For instance, pandemics like the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) have affected large populations. Pandemics such as AIDS are some of the major concerns. These would also impact India and other South Asian countries by affecting their growth and development. The 2009 World Bank Report “HIV and AIDS in South Asia: An Economic Development Risk” observes that with 2.5 million people living with HIV / AIDS in India, there would be a loss of up to about Rs. 167 billion (roughly USD 4 billion) per month, corresponding to about 7 percent of India’s Gross Domestic Product. The Report also gives several other estimates of the impact of HIV and AIDS on the economy and development in South Asia. The gravity of the problem in other parts of the South Asian region, especially Nepal, is similar to that of India.

Water security, food security and energy security are affecting both the internal and external dynamics of many states. South Asia has witnessed many droughts and floods with a concomitant loss of lives and also property. Securing affordable sources of energy for the people has also become a mantra in South Asia, as is the case elsewhere in the world.

Water stress is being witnessed in South Asia with many upper and lower riparian states being drawn into conflict over water issues. In fact, Pakistan with which India has the long-standing Indus Water Treaty of 1960 that was seen as a model agreement has lately faced questions from many in Pakistan, including the jihadists. Even though there is an agreement on sharing the Ganges water by regulating the flow through the Farakka Barrage, there is a water dispute with Bangladesh as there are many other rivers which flow from India to Bangladesh, an accord on sharing the water of some of these rivers is likely to be reached soon. Further, there are reports of China constructing major dams on rivers flowing down into South Asia; such activity has raised water security concerns which may lead to water conflicts.

According to some estimates by water experts, in the next two decades the demand for water is expected to outstrip availability by 40 percent. And this would occur due to factors like climate change and population growth. This would also adversely affect agriculture and food security. The measures required to plug the gap between water requirements and supply would cost approximately US$ 200 billion per year.

Several regional cooperative efforts are afoot to cooperate on the above-mentioned non-traditional threats and challenges. In 2007, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Council of Ministers adopted the SAARC Declaration on Climate Change, calling on SAARC leaders to collectively assess and respond to climate change risks and impacts. In 2008, the SAARC Environment Ministers Dhaka Declaration on Climate Change included a 3-year action plan that urges the international community to promote partnership and provide additional finance to address climate change. In their 25th Jubilee Year, the SAARC Summit on 28-29 April 2010 concluded with the Thimphu Declaration on Climate Change, which sets an ambitious goal for South Asia to lead the world in furthering renewable energy, cutting carbon emissions, and reducing poverty while strengthening resilience to climate change. Thus regional and international cooperation on climate change and environmental issues is inescapable if the challenges and threats arising out of this vector are to be addressed meaningfully.

India’s approach

It is clear from the strategic discourse in India that CS and SCS remain of abiding concern due to India’s challenging geostrategic environment and the continuing intransigence of Pakistan and China towards regional cooperation. SAARC remains a largely ineffective forum for addressing CS concerns or some of the SCS threats. However, some success has been achieved in addressing NTS threats, for example the establishment of mechanisms for disaster response through SAARC.

India continues to group many SCS threats under the ambit of NTS as the impact on populations is largely similar. In the Indian context, many of the potential systemic fault lines are fairly well developed, examples being problems of governance and corruption, strains on the supply of land, water and food, and the competition generated through the first-past-the-post political system. Nevertheless, the NTS threats are finding increasing resonance through the actions of the NGOs, the media and even political structures like the National Advisory Council (NAC).
CONCLUSION

NTS threats have acquired increased importance in developed as well as developing or poor countries. The share of strategic and state resources applied to combating them depends on the level of CS and SCS threats as these are seen to be more urgent by the existing structures of state. NTS threats, being more abrupt in their manifestation, are now becoming prominent, given recent systemic failures in the international economy, the nuclear energy sector and the environmental management sector. NTS threats are characterized by their unplanned and sudden nature. They are more often than not transnational in origin and require multilateral efforts to mitigate them. In the Indian context, NTS threats have found some resonance in the policy community, but CS and SCS still drive the dominant discourse. Since India is a fairly large geographical, population, economic and cultural entity, it qualifies as an autonomous system which has its own internal dynamics driving NTS threats; these require greater empirical and causal study.

The South Asian region has been attempting to develop joint and coordinated responses to the challenges of non-traditional security threats through the mechanism of SAARC. Though a good beginning has been made in certain areas like disaster management, yet geopolitical competition and lack of trust are obstructing the adoption of a unified approach to such NTS challenges as transnational crime, drug trafficking, illegal migration, money-laundering and gun-running, besides terrorism. Water security is another area where some good examples of cooperation exist, but then this is an area where it may not always be possible to reconcile the interests of lower and upper riparian nations.

Further South Asian states – except for India – figure very high on the Failed State Index. Combined with varied kinds of traditional and NTS threats, the human security challenges faced by the region are indeed daunting. It is axiomatic that these threats and challenges have implications for peace and stability in the region. Most of the NTS threats are transnational and therefore require a common approach by the South Asian nations. Thus processes and mechanisms for cooperation under the SAARC need to be further developed and made effective in the coming years.11

NOTES

10 “Water demand will outstrip supply by 40% in twenty years”, Mail Online, 1 March 2011, http://www.daily mail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-1361374/Water-demand-outstrip-supply-40-20-years-climate-change-population-growth.html#ixzz1RFkXDMk8
11 For some of the above conclusions also see http://www.nbr.org/research/initiative.aspx?id=39

VINOD ANAND

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ASIA'S STABILITY AND THE TERRORIST FACTOR

ZHANG JIADONG | Asia is a diverse, multifaceted region with a mixture of many religions, peoples, cultures, and countries. As a result of numerous confrontations, conflicts and contradictions between the different countries and peoples, Asia is a continent facing a severe terrorist threat. In many of the regions, such as the Middle East or Western Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia, terrorism is having a significant influence on regional stability and security.

THE SECURITY SITUATION OF ASIA

Asia is a region which is subject to many international conflicts and disputes over territory as well as other issues. These include the Palestine-Israel conflict, the territorial dispute between China and India, the India-Pakistan problem, the Afghan war, the Iraq war, unrest and violent conflict in the Southern Philippines, nuclear issues in Iran and North Korea, and many others. The list of problems and conflicts in Asia is extremely long.

When compared with other regions, particularly North America and Europe, Asia is also the region that is most likely to witness a war between major powers. Traditional security issues still remain the single most important concern for many countries.

Nontraditional security issues are also seriously threatening the region. A shortage of water and energy, the effects of climate change, illegal drug trafficking and human trafficking, piracy, environmental degradation and pollution, a high rate of unemployment and a high birth rate, as well as other factors, are challenging the stability and security of Asian countries both internationally and at home.

But among all these other security issues, terrorism has to hold a special place. Firstly, the root causes of terrorism are wide-ranging, diverse, and also specific. Each country is facing a different threat of terrorism.

Secondly, terrorism is a nontraditional security threat problem in that it mainly threatens civil society and the daily lives of the common people. At the same time it is a variation on traditional security threats because it can lead to a civil war, as in the case of Sri Lanka, or to the possible risk of territorial division, such as in east India and in northwest and southwest China.

THE TERRORIST SITUATION IN ASIA

During the Cold War, the Middle East, Western Europe and Latin America were the three major scenes of terrorist activity. The world terrorist map has changed considerably since the end of the Cold War. The terrorist threat in Western Europe has been much alleviated as a result of the decline of the ideological confrontation between the Right and the Left. Conversely, terrorist activities have increased in Asia, which remains on a high alert. Particularly since the 9/11 incidents and the US invasion of Afghanistan, South Asia has become the second most important region after the Middle East in terms of terrorist incidents and casualties beyond Latin America and Europe.

Middle East, or Western Asia

Since the Middle East, or Western Asia, is the ideological and historical core of political Islam, it has long been the hottest region for terrorist activity. But since the Second Gulf War which began with the invasion of Iraq on 20 March 2003, terrorist incidents in this region have been rising fast and at one stage numbered more than half of all world terrorist incidents taken together. Currently, the terrorist threat has proliferated from Iraq to Yemen and other countries. Cooperation has emerged between terrorist groups and other violent and radical groups, such as local tribal militants in Yemen, and piracy groups in Somalia.

But terrorist activities reached their peak in 2007 and have declined since the events in Iraq, including the implementation of the US counter-insurgency strategy, the Shi'a militia ceasefires, and the emergence of Iraq's Awakening Movement. Even so, the Middle East is still a hotbed of terrorist
activity. There are 74 terrorist organizations in Iraq itself, such as the al-Qaeda Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers, the Ansar al-Sunnah Army, and Army of the Followers of Sunni Islam which are still very active.

**South Asia**

The major countries of South Asia, including India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh, are all facing or once faced a severe terrorist threat. The terrorist threat situation in India has improved somewhat. But the influence of the organizations of the Far-left is rising fast, and it is very likely that this will lead to opening up new battlegrounds in cities.

India is a country which is being severely threatened by terrorism. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) has recorded 56 terrorist organizations in India. Many of them, such as the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF), the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT), People’s War Group (PWG), and United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) are actively operating in India. Terrorist fatalities in India have been declining during the past 10 years but there was still a total of 1902 deaths in 2010 from terrorist and insurgent incidents nationwide.

Pakistan is well known as a hotbed for terrorist incidents since the US invasion of Afghanistan. Approximately 32 terrorist organizations have been recorded, including al-Qaeda, al-Qanoon, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HuM), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Pakistan also saw the largest number of terrorist fatalities, in that 7435 lives were lost in 2010. Its troubled border area with Afghanistan is the greatest challenge to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the rest of the world. This border region has become a breeding ground for growing Islamic militancy where the Taliban, al-Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and many other Islamic radical groups are operating. The Pakistan-Afghanistan issue also constitutes a considerable threat to European countries. A German jihad organization, the Deutsche Taliban Mujahideen (DTM), has close ties with IMU and the International Jihad Union (IJU).

Other countries such as Afghanistan also witnessed a severe threat from terrorism: 16 terrorist organizations have been recorded there, and thousands of people have died as a result of terrorist activity and other violent or military incidents. The country has a large number not only of indigenous militant groups such as the Taliban but also some foreign terror groups such as the Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG) and Yemen Islamic Jihad. Sri Lanka is the exception in South Asia. Since the final defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), this country is enjoying a peace dividend and no people died in 2010 as a result of terrorist incidents.

**India Fatalities in Terrorist Activities (2001-2010)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
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<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
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<tr>
<td>Fatalities</td>
<td>5839</td>
<td>3973</td>
<td>3702</td>
<td>2642</td>
<td>2519</td>
<td>2775</td>
<td>2615</td>
<td>2613</td>
<td>2231</td>
<td>1902</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Annual Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fatalities</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>863</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>1471</td>
<td>3598</td>
<td>6715</td>
<td>11704</td>
<td>7435</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia, which makes up the modern demographic core of the Muslim world, is also facing severe terrorist threats. Numerous advocates of political jihadism have been adept at exploiting pre-existing territorial and ethnic grievances and conflicts. Terror organizations such as Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and others have also been cleverly utilizing disputes and communal tensions stemming from religious difference.

Southeast Asia is a region where the three religions Christianity, Islam and Buddhism encounter each other. This has given rise to the formation of two terrorist belts: between Islam and Buddhism in South Thailand, and between Islam and Christianity within Indonesia and the Southern Philippines.

Indonesia and the Philippines have experienced more severe terrorist threats than other countries in the region. There are 13 recorded terrorist organizations including the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and Laskar Jihad in Indonesia, and 16 terror groups including the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and New People’s Army (NPA) in the Philippines.

Thailand and Malaysia also face a severe terrorist threat. The Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO), Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), and Jemaah Islamiya (JI) are operating in Malaysia, and 13 terror groups including Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and Young Liberators of Pattani are threatening Thailand’s security and stability.

Central and Eastern Asia

Compared with South Asia and Southeast Asia, the terrorist threat confronting Central and Eastern Asia is relatively low. There are also not as many terrorist organizations in Central and Eastern Asia as in the other two regions. A few terrorist organizations, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), al-Qaeda, Islamic Jihad Group (Uzbekistan), and East Turkestan Liberation Organization are operating there and have caused most of the terrorist casualties.

Other countries in Asia, such as Japan, which were once severely threatened by terrorism and registered ten terrorist organizations, are facing a moderate terrorist threat today. North and South Korea are not confronted with any terrorist threat at home. Ironically, the DPRK has been evaluated as the most secure country in the world in regard to terrorism. China is facing a more severe terrorist threat than many other countries. The East Turkestan Liberation Organization (ETLO) and the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) or the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) operate in and outside of China, and constitute a major threat to China’s stability and security.

The terrorist threat situation in China is hard to measure: according to government declarations and perceptions by the common people, China would appear to be facing a severe terrorist threat. But on the eve of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, several bus bombings and arson took place in Shanghai, Kunming, and other cities. When ETIM

declared responsibility for these incidents, the Chinese government promptly denied it. So it is clear that Beijing is in a dilemma of legitimacy: if Beijing acknowledges these terrorist incidents, it would lose its legitimacy at home; if Beijing denies these, it would lose its legitimacy to fight against terrorism in the international arena.

**THE INFLUENCE OF TERRORISM ON ASIA'S SECURITY AND STABILITY**

The terrorist threat and anti-terror efforts have played an important role in Asia’s security arrangements, international relations, economic development, and even social stability.

**The impact of terrorism on the security concept**

Preserving enemies is an ancient modus operandi of Machiavellian leaders who dominate the international politics of the moment. Without a common threat, major world powers would perceive other countries with which they do not have an alliance as enemies. Since 11 September 2001, the security concepts of leaders of the world’s major powers have undergone radical and considerable change. New concepts of security such as comprehensive security, human security, and many other security concepts related to non-state actors, for example terrorist organizations, transnational crime activities, piracy, and others, have become a more popular concept in the international political arena. The political leaders of the Asian countries are united in their view of terrorism and related issues. This phenomenon has changed traditional security concepts in three dimensions.

First, the terrorist threat has brought about a situation where it is not necessary for countries to protect their own security through targeting or damaging the security environment of other countries. Traditionally, collective security cooperation is meant to prevent member states from conflict and warfare, or to deter enemies from possible aggression. In both cases, some countries must constrain or confront certain other countries, or some countries can just improve their own security environment through weakening or damaging other countries. At least in theory, terrorism is a common threat to all countries, peoples, and nations. So for these countries to deal with the terrorist threat, they have to fight against what are non-state actors rather than their traditional state adversary.

Second, the terrorist threat has created a post-Westphalian moment for world powers that is a significant departure from traditional realist theories of alliance behaviour. This has become very clear for the US and others, particularly China and Russia, since the 9/11 incidents during the second term of the Bush presidency. Joint action rather than self-serving actions is a more effective and more efficient measure for any country to improve its anti-terrorism security. In the circumstances of globalization, the terrorist threat is creating a natural arena for broader and deeper international cooperation rather than international conflict and hostility.

Third, no country can deal with the terrorist threat by relying on military operations alone. A comprehensive, complex and balanced programme involving government sectors, NGOs, social movements, religious groups, and civil society is necessary to counter terrorism. Of course, military force is still necessary and indispensable. But following the individualization of the terrorist threat, the use of military force has also been transformed or civilianized. There has been mutual cooperation between the military and civilian sectors, and a military-civilian anti-terrorism complex has emerged in many countries.

Generally speaking, the terrorist threat is reshaping the strategic thinking and security concepts of countries, and also paving the way for more cooperation in non-traditional security arenas.

**The impact of terrorism on international relations**

Terrorism is a double-edged sword as far as foreign policy is concerned. In some cases it unites nations, but in other cases it can separate them.

In Asia, terrorism is providing a chance for many countries to join hands in order to deal with this heinous crime. Several regional international anti-terror cooperation networks have been established, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the ASEAN 10+3 framework. In addition, there are joint international anti-terror drills, training, and other kinds of cooperation. This is playing an important role not only in countering terrorism but also in improving regional governance and international relations. In particular, ties between China, Russia and Central Asian countries have progressed to the highest level ever seen.

At the same time, terrorism also remains the root cause of misunderstanding and distrust, and has caused many international disputes between different states. Terrorism and anti-terrorism issues
have been a long-term problem between India and Pakistan since numerous terrorist organizations targeting India are linked to Pakistan or are based on Pakistani soil. The Bombay terrorist incidents of November 2008 which were instigated by LeT brought the two countries to the brink of war. Terrorism is also a serious problem for India and Sri Lanka on account of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) issue; for Thailand and Malaysia because of Muslim radical organizations in South Thailand; and for Pakistan and Afghanistan because of the anti-Afghanistan terrorist organizations based on Pakistan’s border areas.

The impact of terrorism on economic development

Terrorist activities can result in a substantial loss of property and lives, both directly and indirectly. Even though some scholars claim that terrorism can stimulate increased investment in related R&D areas, it cannot be disputed that terrorism does damage the economy. The tourism industry, foreign investment to developing countries, and the transportation industry have been negatively influenced as a direct consequence of the terrorist threat in many Asian countries, such as Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Southern Philippines, and Western China including the provinces of Xinjiang and Tibet. For some developing countries, the economic impact of terrorism is a crucial factor. For example, foreign investment in Pakistan declined to $910.20 million in FY 2009-2010 from $1.4 billion in FY 2008-2009 as a result of the deteriorating security environment.

But the direct financial loss is not the most significant economic impact caused by terrorism. The greatest economic losses and waste originate from the people’s fear of terrorism and the related anti-terrorism measures that are taken in consequence of it. According to a report by The Economist on a cost-benefit analysis of counter-terrorism spending in the US, the benefits gained by tackling terrorism have been one tenth of the costs.

In order to deal with the terrorist threat, many Asian countries have invested immense resources in systems to safeguard security. For example, the Chinese government spent more than US$ 1 billion on anti-terrorism initiatives during the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games just in the city of Beijing. Shanghai and two neighbouring provinces Zhejiang and Jiangsu had to pay billions of Chinese dollars to maintain stability and security during the Shanghai World EXPO 2010. Shanghai is still deploying large numbers of security forces to investigate dangerous materials and persons in subways, railway stations, buses, airports, and others.

The impact of terrorism on social stability and happiness

In those cases where a weak state or country is unable to deal with it effectively, terrorism may well mutate into much larger-scale violence. A vicious circle of terrorism, anti-terrorism, collateral damage, popular discontent, and an ever-increasing terrorist threat is taking root in many Asian countries. This constitutes a severe threat to the social stability and social security of numerous countries, and will continue to do so in the future.

CONCLUSION

To summarize, terrorism is an important factor in the security and stability of Asia, and Asian countries are facing a more dangerous terrorist threat than other regions. Regarding root causes, separatism and religious extremism remain the most important motives of terrorism in Asia.

But what is more significant, most Asian countries currently find themselves in a transitional phase which is very sensitive to the possibility of threat. Moreover, it should be mentioned that the global financial crisis and the ensuing economic problems have made many countries more vulnerable to the terrorist threat. With their limited resources, most of Asia’s countries have to develop one section of the country at the cost of other sections, and to provide for one part of the population by the sacrifice of others. So even counter-terrorism measures need a comprehensive, balanced policy, but most Asian countries cannot achieve this goal. So it is no surprise that some Asian countries are trapped in a vicious circle.

The Arab Spring unrest or uprising in the Middle East in March through April 2011 – the so-called Jasmine Revolution – has opened the door to a more stable and more secure future as well as to a more severe terrorist threat. The root causes of the unrest are wide-ranging and different in each country, and they include demographic, political, economic, and social factors. A further underlying factor behind the unrest is the emergence of an internet and cell phone complex which is creating a new model of information gathering and distribution. The democratization and popularization of
information flow systems has challenged many Asian countries, without leading to enough effective counter-measures. Everything is double-edged. If the international community cannot handle these issues well, the world will probably witness much disturbance in Asia in the future. Such a scenario would be of no benefit to anyone.

NOTES
4 Pantucci, Raffaello: Picking Up Where the Red Army Faction Left Off: Tales from the German Jihad, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37765&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=26&cHash=f23f9eb5261b12b4285bfaf345d3f60 access at 2011-4-11.
CONTROLLING PROLIFERATION – ASPECTS OF GLOBAL ZERO

REINER K. HUBER || The term Global Zero (GZ) is both a commonly used abbreviation to denote a world free of nuclear weapons and the name of one of two major international initiatives launched in late 2008 in response to the concerns and ideas previously published by four elder US statesmen in the Wall Street Journal.1 Following a short review of the history of GZ movements, this paper summarizes principal arguments forwarded by proponents and opponents in the GZ debate, and actions taken by the US Administration to take the lead in a long-term process aimed at improving global security and stability without nuclear weapons. In conclusion it is argued that in view of the complexity of the subject matter and the uncertainties of the security environment, this process will likely be an emergent rather than a designed process.

HISTORY

Nuclear disarmament has been an issue ever since the mid-1950s when, rooted in radical pacifism and the extra-parliamentary Left, the nuclear disarmament movement formed in Great Britain to mobilize the public against the atomic bomb.2 About the same time, the German peace movement comprised of extra-parliamentary groups began to stage massive protests against government plans for NATO to deploy nuclear weapons on German soil for operation by the newly formed Bundeswehr.3 In both countries, these movements were at least partly funded by the Soviet Union through various channels, most notably the World Peace Council.4

Originating in the faith-based anti-Vietnam War protests in the 1970s, the “Ploughshares Movement” was formed in the United States to undertake “direct nuclear disarmament” by means of non-violent actions to literally “beat swords into ploughshares”. The first one was carried out in 1980 when eight Ploughshare activists entered a General Electric Plant in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, where nose cones for nuclear warheads were manufactured. They hammered on two nose cones and poured blood on documents. As of 2000, over 70 such actions had taken place in Australia, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US. In 1981, San Francisco philanthropist and activist Sally Lilienthal founded the Ploughshares Fund that pools contributions from individuals, families and foundations for funding initiatives to prevent the spread and use of nuclear weapons, influencing public opinion in the media, and building grass roots leadership.5 As in Europe, a not insignificant part of the American university student population sympathized with such ideas.6

What was presumably the first international nuclear disarmament organization was founded in 1983 by the mayor of Hiroshima. Known today by the name “Mayors for Peace”, this non-governmental organization is dedicated to spreading the gospel of nuclear weapons abolition and the need and support for requisite local actions among mayors and their constituencies around the globe.7

This kind of ongoing grass roots support for “people’s nuclear disarmament” is basically concerned with obstruction by means of highly visible events, but has so far been of limited impact on strategic planners and policy makers. In contrast, the current debate on nuclear disarmament is borne by elder statesmen and political elites who, while sympathizing with the ultimate objectives of Ploughshares,8 aim at the development of constructive agendas to help global policy makers to cope with and eventually eliminate nuclear threats in the 21st century.
PROPOSALS OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION QUARTET

This new development was triggered by the sensational article in The Wall Street Journal of 4 January 2007 co-authored by former US Secretaries of State George P. Shultz and Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of Defense William L. Perry, and Senator Sam Nunn, who were dubbed the Non-proliferation Quartet. There they presented what was in essence a summary of the proceedings of a conference organized the previous October by the Hoover Institution on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Reykjavik summit meeting between US President Ronald Reagan and Secretary-General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev. While no concrete results were achieved, this historic meeting was considered to be an enormous breakthrough that facilitated the INF Treaty signed the following year, and helped to end the Cold War. In his opening address, former Secretary of State Shultz explained the purpose of the 2006 Hoover conference "Reykjavik Revisited" thus: "Since that time, the nature of the nuclear threat in the world has changed, but the 20-year-old lessons of Reykjavik may help us achieve the goal of a modern world free of nuclear weapons."

Asking how "the promise of the NPT and the possibilities envisioned at Reykjavik (can) be brought to fruition", Shultz, Perry, Kissinger and Nunn expressed their belief that, in view of the tremendous dangers that proliferation of nuclear weapons presents, the United States should launch a major effort involving all countries in possession of nuclear weapons to turn the goal of GZ into a joint enterprise by seeking agreement on a series of urgent steps that would lay the groundwork for a world free of the nuclear threat, such as:

- changing the Cold War posture of deployed nuclear weapons to reduce the danger of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons;
- reducing substantially the nuclear forces in all states that possess them;
- eliminating short-range nuclear weapons designed for forward deployment;
- achieving universal ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT);
- gaining control of the uranium enrichment processes in conjunction with the guarantee that uranium for nuclear power reactors can be obtained at a reasonable price from internationally controlled reserves; dealing with proliferation issues presented by spent reactor fuel;
- halting production of fissile materials; phasing out the use of highly enriched uranium for commercial purposes; removing and securing weapons-grade uranium from research facilities around the world;
- re-doubling efforts to resolve regional conflicts that give rise to new nuclear powers.

A follow-on conference to the October 2006 "Reykjavik Revisited" was held one year later in October 2007 at the Hoover Institution within the framework of the Nuclear Security Project formed by the authors in the wake of their Wall Street Journal article of January 2007. At this conference options of how the steps proposed in the 2006 conference might be implemented were explored in some detail. The conclusions were again summarized by George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn in a Wall Street Journal article of 15 January 2008 titled "Toward a Nuclear-Free World". Emphasizing among others the special responsibility of the United States and Russia in promoting the idea of Global Zero, the authors address not just the ongoing reductions in the number of nuclear warheads but also near-term actions that both countries could undertake from 2008 to reduce nuclear dangers, such as:

- extending key provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) of 1991 scheduled to expire on 5 December 2009;
- taking steps to increase warning and decision times for the launch of all nuclear-armed ballistic missiles; protecting strategic command and control systems of any nuclear weapon state from being compromised by hackers;
- discarding any still existing plans for massive nuclear attacks (deterrence in terms of MAD is obsolete);
- undertaking negotiations toward developing cooperative multi-lateral ballistic missile defence and early warning systems for countering missile threats against Europe, Russia, and the United States from the Middle East as proposed by Presidents Bush and Putin at their 2002 summit in Moscow; completion of work to establish the Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) in Moscow;
- accelerate work to provide the highest possible standards of security for nuclear weapons, as well as for nuclear materials everywhere in the world, to prevent terrorists from acquiring a nuclear device.
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSALS OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION QUARTET

The momentum that was set in motion by the Non-proliferation Quartet’s two articles in the Wall Street Journal has been rather extraordinary, as shown by the response of political elites worldwide and the process of debate among them that followed in their wake. The process is characterized by US and international initiatives, numerous meetings, policy papers and resolutions that outline more or less detailed road maps toward a world free of nuclear weapons, and obstacles that would have to be overcome along the way. In this context, there are two major international efforts worth mentioning: the International Commission on Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) launched as a joint initiative by the governments of Japan and Australia in September 2008 in New York, and the initially mentioned Global Zero Initiative (GZI) launched in December 2008 in Paris by some 100 former political, civic and military leaders and diplomats from around the world.

ICNND’s purpose was to energize at the highest levels the international debate that had begun with the Wall Street Journal articles of the Non-proliferation Quartet, and in particular to assure that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference scheduled for 2010 would not suffer the failure of its predecessor in 2005. It was an independent commission of experts that consisted of former high-level government officials and military officers, and senior scientist and policy advisors from 15 countries co-chaired by the former Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Japan and Australia, Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi. Its report was published in November 2009 under the title “Eliminating Nuclear Threats – A Practical Agenda for Global Policy Makers”. Focusing on realistic, specific action plans, the report reflects the consensus view of commission members on what is both desirable and politically achievable in the world as they saw it. Accordingly, they proposed a progressive achievement of interim disarmament objectives and the resolution of associated issues (missiles and missile defense systems, space-based weapon systems, biological weapons, conventional arms imbalances) to achieve a “minimization point” by 2025 which would be characterized by:

— a world with no more than 2,000 nuclear warheads (10 percent of the current arsenal);
— every nuclear-armed state committed to no-first-use;

— credible force postures: verifiable deployments and alert status reflecting the no-first-use doctrine.

The action agenda beyond 2025 includes creating the political, legal, military, organizational and technical conditions that would eventually permit an ultimate transition to a nuclear-free world.

GZI’s signatories signed letters to US President Obama and Russian President Medvedev urging them to commit to the elimination of nuclear weapons. Beginning with significant reductions of their own arsenals, the United States and Russia should set an example, thus motivating all states possessing or planning to develop nuclear weapons to follow them. They tasked the Global Zero Commission consisting of a group of 20 mostly retired political and military leaders from ten countries and international organizations to work out an action plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons. This Global Zero Action Plan was presented six months later on 29 June 2009 in Washington – in time for the July meeting of President Obama with President Medvedev in Moscow – and described a four-phase strategy to reach a Global Zero accord by 2023 and to complete dismantling of all remaining nuclear warheads by 2030:

— 2010-2013: following conclusion of a new START Treaty, US and Russia to negotiate a bilateral accord to reduce to 1,000 warheads each;
— 2014-2018: within a multilateral negotiation framework, US and Russia agree to reduce warheads to 500 each by 2021, provided all other nuclear weapon states agree to freeze stockpiles until 2018 and reduce their stockpiles proportionally by 2021; establishment of a comprehensive verification and enforcement system;
— 2019-2023: negotiation of a Global Zero accord signed by all nuclear capable countries including a timetable for proportionally balanced reduction of nuclear warheads by 2030;
— 2024-2030: implementation of the Global Zero accord on a phased, verified, proportional reduction to zero total warheads by 2030 and continuation of the verification and enforcement system.

This action plan was disseminated for discussion at the Global Zero Summit held in Paris on 2-4 February 2010 which convened some 200 international political, military, business, religious, and student leaders. The keynote speech was delivered by former Secretary of State George P. Shultz, one of the members of the Non-proliferation Quartet. US Under
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Ellen Tauscher, addressed what the Obama Administration was planning to do in the context of nuclear disarmament emphasizing, however, that “Nuclear disarmament is not the Holy Grail. It’s only worth pursuing in so far as it increases our national security. I believe that the journey on the road to Zero is perhaps more important – than the goal itself. It’s those concrete steps (on the road) that we take that will enhance the national security of the United States and make the world a more stable place”. This quote summarizes the findings of the bipartisan commission created by Congress to examine the strategic posture of the United States and make recommendations for its long-term development as a contribution to the Administration’s upcoming 2010 Nuclear Posture Review.

**DETERMINANTS OF US NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL POLICY: STRATEGIC AND NUCLEAR POSTURE**

The commission “Strategic Posture of the United States” was created by Congress as part of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 and shortly after the Non-Proliferation Quartet’s Wall Street Journal article “Toward a Nuclear-Free World” had been published. Co-chaired by former Defense Secretaries William J. Perry – a member of the Non-proliferation Quartet – and James Schlesinger, the bipartisan commission began work in May 2008 and delivered its final report one year later, on 6 May 2009, to Congress and the White House. In it, the commission recommends that the United States maintain an appropriately effective deterrent force and its security, and lead international efforts to prevent proliferation. The principle function of the US nuclear posture is described as creating “the conditions in which nuclear weapons are never used”. It must be designed “to address a very broad set of US objectives, including not just deterrence of enemies in times of crisis and war but also assurance of our allies and dissuasion of potential adversaries”. In particular, the final report recommends:

- maintaining the strategic triad of nuclear delivery vehicles (requiring some difficult investment decisions);
- development and, where appropriate, deployment of missile defence systems against regional nuclear aggressors;
- a declaratory policy underscoring that the United States conceives of and prepares for the use of nuclear weapons only for the protection of itself and its allies in extreme circumstances;
- modernization to maintain a safe, secure, and credible (useable) posture as long as necessary, but no production of new nuclear weapons or fissile materials, and no conducting of nuclear tests;
- renewal of arms control with Russia;
- re-energizing non-proliferation (especially an active US role at the 2010 NPT Review Conference);
- undertaking steps to enable the Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty CTBT;
- supporting international cooperative projects such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).

In other words, the new strategy commits the United States to developing no new nuclear weapons while spending significant amounts of money to protect nuclear weapons and materials and to modernize the nuclear infrastructure. Also, it rules out a nuclear attack against non-nuclear weapon states which are in compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Based on these findings, the subsequent Nuclear Posture Review Report released about one year later on 6 April 2010 focused on the five key objectives of US nuclear weapons policies and posture:

- preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism;
- reducing the role of nuclear weapons in US national security strategy;
- maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at lower nuclear force levels;
- strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring US allies and partners;
- sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.

**UNITED STATES TAKING THE LEAD**

President Obama’s public speech on 5 April 2009 in Prague’s Hradcany Square less than three months after his inauguration reflected elements of both the ideas and plans described by Shultz, Perry, Kissinger and Nunn in the Wall Street Journal editions of 4 January 2007 and 9 January 2008 and the recommendations of the bipartisan commission for the “Strategic Posture of the United States”. Stating that the existence of thousands of nuclear weapons is the most dangerous legacy of the Cold War, and more nations have acquired
nuclear weapons since its end or are about to do so, President Obama announced America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, warning, however, that this goal will not be reached quickly, “perhaps not in my lifetime”.

On 24 September 2009, about six months after his Prague speech, President Obama inspired and chaired a summit-level meeting of the UN Security Council that passed Resolution 1887 which reaffirmed the Council’s strong support for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and called, among others, for:

- states not yet signatories to accede to the NPT;
- all signatories to fully comply with their obligations and set realistic goals to strengthen, at the 2010 Review Conference, all three pillars of NPT (disarmament, non-proliferation, peaceful use of nuclear energy for all);
- nuclear weapon states to continue disarming, to ratify a ban on testing them, and to agree to a treaty stopping the production of fissile material;
- non-nuclear-weapon states to, in turn, accept stronger IAEA safeguards designed to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

President Obama described the resolution as “historic”, saying “it enshrines our shared commitment to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons”.

As pledged at the Security Council meeting, the United States hosted a Nuclear Security Summit on 12-13 April 2010 in Washington that brought together leaders of 46 nuclear and non-nuclear states. It served as an important signal that the United States was once again taking the lead on nuclear and non-nuclear states.

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- recommitment of nations to the basic bargain of the NPT;
- 64 specific action plans on non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy;
- steps proposed for implementing the 1995 resolution calling for a zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the Middle East.

The action plans are drafted in such a way that they may be used as a scorecard for measuring progress and ensuring accountability at future meetings. The disarmament action plan identifies concrete steps for realizing the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, albeit without a concrete timeline. The final document calls on all Middle East states to participate in a conference on a WMD-free Middle East that will be co-sponsored by the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom, along with the UN Secretary General, in 2012. The next NPT review is scheduled for 2015. To the degree that the final document was adopted unanimously, the 2010 NPT Review Conference was considered a success. The success was mainly due to political will and flexibility shown by major states parties, in particular the United States which was determined to restore its leadership in international nonproliferation regimes.

**DISSENTING VIEWS ON GLOBAL ZERO: EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE**

The day after GZI had presented its Global Zero Action Plan in June 2009, Republican Senator Jon Kyle and former Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle dismissed the ideas of Global Zero proponents as dangerous, wishful thinking: “There is the fashionable notion if only we and the Russians reduced our nuclear forces, other nations would reduce their existing arsenals or abandon plans to acquire nuclear weapons altogether.” Referring to the findings of the Perry-Schlesinger Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (see above) they argue that “a robust American nuclear force is an essential discouragement to nuclear proliferators, a weak or uncertain force just the opposite.”
James R. Schlesinger – former CIA director, Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Energy, and co-chair (together with William J. Perry, member of the Non-Proliferation Quartet) of the bipartisan Congressional Commission on "Strategic Posture of the United States" – agrees with Kyle and Perle arguing that "the notion that we can abolish nuclear weapons 'reflects' a combination of American utopianism and parochialism", and that a world without nuclear weapons would be even more dangerous than a world with them. After all, nuclear weapons are used every day "to deter our potential foes and provide reassurance". Therefore, he demands a continued strong nuclear deterrent of the United States, in particular to retain the capability "to provide the necessary reassurance to our allies both in Asia and Europe". Referring to the unanimous conclusion of the bipartisan commission, he emphasizes the need for a vigorous modernization programme to maintain a safe, secure, and useable nuclear posture.27

The need to modernize and protect the US nuclear deterrent was also supported in the Non-proliferation Quartet's third Wall Street Journal publication in January 201028 that was considered by many as a pro-nuclear about-face. Referring to the problems identified by the Strategic Posture Commission, the authors underscore the urgent need for long-term investments to repair and modernize the nuclear weapons infrastructure and for additional resources for the three national laboratories. They argue that "Maintaining high confidence in our nuclear arsenal is critical as the number of weapons goes down. It is also consistent with and necessary for US leadership in non-proliferation, risk reduction, and arms reduction goals". Moreover, it would be in the interest of the United States to share safety and security concepts and technologies, so that nuclear weapons everywhere are made resistant to accidental detonation, and detonation by terrorists or other unauthorized users.

Most speakers at the 2010 international roundtable on "Implications of Nuclear Disarmament for Global Security"29 acknowledged that, in addition to strengthening the NPT Treaty as a cornerstone of nuclear arms control, US extended nuclear deterrence remains essential for preventing proliferation.30 In his keynote address, Prof. Lothar Rühl, former German Deputy Minister of Defence, reviewed prominent examples of nuclear arms control negotiations to illustrate the difficulties of achieving Global Zero and the risks along the road to a world free of nuclear weapons. With a view to global security he concluded that "Global Zero is a possibility in the future, but it is difficult to see how this noble aim can be achieved".

At the same meeting, Gen. (ret.) Larry D. Welch, former President of the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) and Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, reviewed the role of nuclear weapons for the US in the Second World War (conflict termination) and the Cold War (to compensate for perceived conventional inferiority and to deter a nuclear attack against the US and its allies). As to the post-Cold War period, he sees three remaining credible roles for US nuclear weapons, namely to 1) ensure that the 21st century version of a murderous tyrant does not have a nuclear weapon advantage;31 2) deter a nuclear attack against the United States; and 3) credibly fulfill these roles, through extended nuclear deterrence (END) for nations who see it in their national interest to depend on the US deterrent rather than develop their own nuclear weapons capability. The modernization of nuclear weapons is indispensable for both the confidence in protecting US interests and the credibility of END since the US is not producing new weapons and existing stockpiles are aging, and the nuclear force is getting smaller.32

In addition to a sufficient nuclear capability, the credibility of END requires trust in the US will to use or not use that capability as expressed in the form of positive or negative security assurances.

– Positive security assurances involve guarantees to other nations that their security is protected by the US, implying the possibility that the US will use nuclear weapons in the process, regardless of whether the potential aggressor is a nuclear weapon state (NWS) or a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS).33 Depending on their credibility, positive assurances can be a decisive factor for the countries under protection not to pursue their own nuclear capabilities.34 Therefore, a no-first-use of nuclear weapons policy (NFU) – as committed to by China35 and proposed for universal adoption by India36 – is incompatible with positive US security guarantees and END. Furthermore, Henri Conze, a nuclear physicist and former high-level official of the French Ministry of Defence, asserts that a no-first-use policy is facilitating proliferation because it "endows a single nuclear weapon with an exaggerated political value".37
Negative security assurances imply pledges by NWS not to use nuclear weapons against NNWS unless attacked by such a state in alliance with a NWS. With a view to the threat of nuclear proliferation, Bruce Weinrod, an attorney and public policy advisor in Washington, DC, interprets the term as a pledge by the US to "not take certain actions if a specific country refrained from pursuing nuclear capabilities". Vice versa, this implies that the US reserves the right to take "certain" actions against countries pursuing nuclear weapon capabilities. Fear of the US exercising this right – as in Iraq not so long ago – was presumably the decisive motivation for Qaddafi to give up his WMD ambitions in 2003.

While empirical evidence supports the idea that END benefits non-proliferation among the recipients of positive security assurances, it seems reasonable to assume, however, that END will work only as long as potential aggressors consider nuclear retaliation against their aggression as plausible. Nobumasa Akiyama of Hitotsubashi University believes that this would not be the case for relatively small-scale aggressions like a Chinese invasion of the islands under dispute in the South and East China Seas. "So for strategic stability and increased security of USA allies in the region, it is not sufficient that alliances only strengthen the nuclear part of extended deterrence." For reasons such as this, the Non-proliferation Quartet recently stated that "the role of non-nuclear means of deterrence to effectively prevent conflict and increase stability in troubled regions is a vital issue".

**CONCLUSIONS:**

**COPING WITH COMPLEXITY AND UNCERTAINTY**

While the principal steps to be taken toward a world free of nuclear weapons proposed by the Non-proliferation Quartet in their initial two Wall Street Journal articles of January 2007 and 2008, and by two International Commissions founded in late 2008 in response to the proposals of the Quartet, are rather similar in content, they differ considerably with regard to time horizons. Shultz et al. did not specify any time scales except for the United States and Russia agreeing on a new bargain to replace START I, scheduled to expire on 5 December 2009. In contrast, the Kawaguchi-Evans International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament proposed a medium-term agenda which included getting to a "minimization point" by 2025 (no more than 2,000 nuclear weapons world-wide; all NWS committed to no-first-use; credible nuclear force postures: de-alerting and deployment) but did not specify any time lines for the long-term action agenda to eliminate all nuclear weapons beyond 2015. The International Global Zero Commission aimed at having a Global Zero Accord and the requisite verification and enforcement system implemented by 2030. By that time, President Obama – who in his Prague speech expressed scepticism that the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons could be met in his lifetime – would be only 69 years old.

Scepticism with regard to time horizons also comes to the fore in the recent fourth Wall Street Journal article of the Non-proliferation Quartet mentioned above. Contrary to the proponents of extended deterrence, Shultz et al. blame the continued reliance on nuclear weapons as the principal element of deterrence for encouraging proliferation, thus inevitably undermining the cooperation necessary to deal with 1) the new "daunting new spectrum of global security threats" – that are largely immune to nuclear deterrence – and 2) regional confrontations and conflicts that have the potential to fuel the dynamics of proliferation. But they do support US extended nuclear deterrence to assure US allies as long as nuclear weapons exist. In fact, they argue that "there is an inherent limit to US and Russian nuclear reductions if other nuclear weapon states build up their inventories or if new nuclear powers emerge".

That "inherent limit" may be reached with the "minimization point" defined by the Kawaguchi-Evans Commission as a realistic intermediate goal for 2025, in a long-term nuclear disarmament process which addresses and attempts to resolve all relevant issues as described in detail in the commission report. However, in view of the complexity of the subject matter and the uncertainties of the security environment, this process will likely be an emergent rather than a designed process involving all major governments and maturing with the codification and implementation of the agreements necessary to assure global security and stability in a world free of nuclear weapons. Thus, it is inherently difficult to see if and how that ultimate goal may eventually be reached.

For this reason, the US Administration takes a pragmatic, if not sceptical, view on nuclear disarmament. In the same vein, Lothar Rühl proposes to start with a more realistic objective to negotiate...
“mutual balanced nuclear force reductions under the joint guidance of America, Russia and China, within a UN framework and based on international treaties centred on the NPT. Such a solution would be incomplete and could only offer a measure of security without any guarantee, but cooperation could well result in further progress”.49 However, in order to preserve security during the negotiation process, an effective global missile defence system and effective means and strategies for enforcing compliance need to be operational by the time that nuclear weapons are reduced below the level required for credible extended deterrence.50

NOTES
5 According to Wikipedia, over 60 million US dollars have been awarded in grants since the Fund was founded some 30 years ago.
6 William Broad and David Sanger speculate that President Obama’s interest in global denuclearization stems from his student days at Columbia University when he published an article (only recently unearthed) in a college magazine of March 1983 entitled “Breaking the War Mentality” (New York Times, 4.7.2009). There, Obama reports on a rally of campus groups supporting a freeze of nuclear arsenals rather than agitating for the elimination of global nuclear arsenals.
7 In 2003 Mayors for Peace started the campaign "2020 Vision" calling upon its close to 4,000 member towns around the globe to support demands for a binding international agreement for the abolition of all nuclear weapons by 2020.
8 The ultimate objectives of the Ploughshares Fund go beyond nuclear weapons, namely "to prevent the spread and use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and other weapons of war, and to prevent conflicts that could lead to the use of weapons of mass destruction" (see Wikipedia: Ploughshares Fund).
9 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: proposed in 1958 with the aim of curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and eventually eliminating them altogether, while supporting the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The treaty came into force in 1970. Considered the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the NPT is the most widely signed arms control treaty. As of today, 189 states are party to the treaty, five of which are recognized as Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), having tested nuclear weapons before 1968: US, USSR / Russia, UK, France and China. Four countries possessing nuclear weapons are not party to the NPT: India, Pakistan, Israel have not signed the treaty, North Korea withdrew in 2003. Originally conceived to expire after 25 years, all signatories agreed to its indefinite extension during the first Review Conference in 1995.
10 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: not yet in force because nine of the required 44 states that had nuclear research or power facilities when the treaty was adopted in 1996 have yet to ratify the CTBT, among them the United States.
12 For an overview on the worldwide response, see the homepage of the Nuclear Security Project: www.nuclearsecurityproject.org

13 The conference was unable to agree on a Final Document due to differences between Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and Non-nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) on how to characterize progress in achieving the treaty objectives in view of the changing security environment, in particular in relation to Article VI which states: “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

14 At this meeting on 6-8.7.2009, President Obama and Russian President Medvedev reached a preliminary agreement to reduce the American and Russian nuclear arsenals by as much as one third and to instruct negotiators of both sides that the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) would maintain the critical verification mechanisms of the landmark 1991 treaty that expired on 5.12.2009. They also agreed to explore cooperation in missile defence and to intensify talks on establishing a joint centre for early detection of hostile missile launches.

15 The commission consisted of twelve members (3 Democrats and 3 Republicans nominated each by the Armed Services Committees of the House and the Senate).


17 The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was formed to increase international cooperation in interdicting shipments of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials. The Initiative was announced by President Bush on 31.5.2003. PSI does not create a new legal framework but aims to use existing national and international authorities and international law to put an end to WMD-related trafficking. Initially 11 nations signed on the “Statement of Interdiction Principles” that guides PSI cooperation. As of August 2009, 95 countries had committed formally to PSI principles.

18 The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) is an international partnership of 81 nations and four official observers who are committed to working individually and collectively to implement a set of shared nuclear security principles. The mission of CICNT is to strengthen global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism by conducting multilateral activities that strengthen the plans, policies, procedures, and interoperability of partner nations. The United States and Russia serve as co-chairs of the GICNT.

19 The Nuclear Posture Review is a process mandated by law in 2001 to determine the role of nuclear weapons in US security strategy for the next half decade. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) represents the third comprehensive assessment of US nuclear policy conducted since the end of the Cold War.

20 In his meeting with the Non-proliferation Quartet on 19.5.2009 President Obama said that their vision “has helped inspire policies of this Administration”.


22 Presided over by President Obama whose country held the rotating Council presidency at the time, the summit was attended by 13 Heads of State and Government and the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and the Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed El Baradei.

23 Under terms of the New START Treaty signed by the two Presidents on 5.4.2010 in Prague, the United States and Russia will reduce their strategic arsenals within the next seven years to 1550 nuclear warheads and 800 carrier systems (ICBM, SLBM, heavy bombers equipped for nuclear weapons) of which at most 700 may be deployed leaving them a reserve of 100 non-deployed carriers. The verification regime combines appropriate elements of the 1991 START Treaty with new elements tailored to the new limitations as to reserves. By now, both the US Senate and the Russian legislature have ratified the Treaty.

24 In his comment on the NPT Review Conference, Henri Conze points out the paradox that, while the document targets nations which are not parties to NPT (India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea), any accusation of Iran being present at the conference was avoided (Conze, Henri: Nuclear proliferation: controversial facts and assumptions, Huber et al. (eds) ibid, pp. 57-60).

25 NTI: NPT Tutorial, Chapter 4, 2010 Review Conference, NTI (Nuclear Threat Initiative) is a non-profit organization co-chaired by Sam Nunn and Ted Turner working to reduce the global threats from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, http://www.nti.org


28 Shultz / Perry / Kissinger / Nunn: How to Protect Our Nuclear Deterrent: Maintaining Confidence in Our Nuclear Arsenal is Necessary as the Number of Weapons Goes Down, in: Wall Street Journal, 19.1.2010.

29 Conceived shortly after President Obama’s speech in Prague by this author together with Prof. Lange and Dr. McDonald, the roundtable was organized jointly by the Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSS) of Munich and the US-based Potomac Foundation of Vienna, Virginia. It took place 6-8 June 2010 at the HSS conference facilities in Wildbad Kreuth (see Huber, Reiner K. / Lange, Klaus / McDonald, Daniel F. (eds): Implications of Nuclear Disarmament for Global Security, Studies and Comments 11, HSS, 2010.

30 However, one of the speakers voiced the opinion that the NPT was not as instrumental to non-proliferation as its supporters suggest: “Several countries joined the NPT with the clear intention to go nuclear ‘inside’ the Treaty” (Rühle, Michael: “Global Zero” and the future of non-proliferation, Huber et al. (eds.), ibid, pp. 23-29).

31 This author believes that it is very unlikely that France and UK would have succeeded in convincing the UN Se-
curity Council to agree to a no-fly zone over Libya, and aerial attacks on Libyan forces on the ground, if Qaddafi would not have been compelled to give up his chemical and nuclear weapon programmes in 2003 (see Joseph, Robert G.: Countering WMD: The Libyan Experience, National Institute Press, 2009)

32 Welch, Larry D.: 65 years of international conflicts in the nuclear era, Huber et al. (eds), ibid, pp. 7-10.

33 Weinrood, W. Bruce: Nuclear weapons in the twenty-first century, Huber et al. (eds), ibid, pp. 32-34.

34 Dingli, Shen (Fudan University in Shanghai) points out that END had a mixed record in preventing proliferation among the recipients of US security assurances. It worked well among NATO allies who had not been challenged, but despite the US security commitment it did not prevent Israel from acquiring nuclear weapons. During the 1970s, Taiwan and South Korea clandestinely launched nuclear programmes for fear of US withdrawal from East Asia (Dingli, Shen: Extended nuclear deterrence: Fading fast. Contribution to The Interpreter debate "Is extended nuclear deterrence dead?" Lowy Institute for International Policy, 3.2.2011).

35 Xia, Liping; China’s nuclear strategy and nuclear disarmament policy, Huber et al. (eds), ibid, pp. 11-22.

36 Naidu, Milan: Nuclear proliferation and nuclear disarmament – a view from India, Huber et al., ibid, pp. 61-66.

37 Conze, Henri: Nuclear proliferation: controversial facts and assumptions, Huber et al. (eds), ibid, pp. 57-60.

38 Negative security assurances made by NWS in the context of the NPT regime are considered to play a central role in upholding the credibility of the bargain enshrined by NPT: NWNS agree to international verification that they will never acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for a pledge by NWS to work toward eliminating these weapons entirely (Graham, Thomas / Tomoro, Leonor: "Obligations For Us All" NATO and Negative Security Assurances. Disarmament Policy 49/2000).

39 Weinrood points out, however, that all nations that have given up their nuclear capabilities and development programmes (Brazil, Argentina, South Africa) had different motivations to do so. Thus every case is different. (Weinrood, Bruce: Nuclear weapons in the twenty-first century. Huber et al. (eds.), ibid, pp. 31-34).

40 That was apparently not the case when a North Korean submarine sank a South Korean navy ship on 26.3.2010 causing the deaths of 46 sailors, an international investigation has found.

41 See Akiyama, Nobushima: Mind the gap: Extended nuclear deterrence and the rise of conventional crises, Contribution to The Interpreter debate "Is extended nuclear deterrence dead?" Lowy Institute for International Policy, 21.2.2011.


43 In addition to the "minimization point", the ICNND’s medium-term agenda (to 2025) contains three additional objectives: 1) progressive resolution of parallel security issues (missile delivery systems and missile defence, space-based weapon systems, biological wea-
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