SDA DISCUSSION PAPER

The EU’s Africa Strategy: What are the lessons of the Congo Mission?

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Introduction

This Discussion Paper is intended to offer a snapshot of the EU’s latest military mission to Congo DRC and also aims to clarify thinking on the future development of the ESDP in Africa. With Sub-Saharan Africa now seemingly poised to become the second focal point of the EU’s defence efforts, alongside the Balkans, it seemed appropriate to the Security & Defence Agenda to ask a small group of acknowledged experts to share their thoughts on the Africa dimension of ESDP.

The Security & Defence Agenda then, on 7 March 2007, organised an evening debate between speakers who had been closely involved in the decision-making and then the command of the latest military operation. A report of that debate, The EU’s Africa Strategy: What are the Lessons of the Congo Mission serves as a preface to this Discussion Paper. Some eight speakers, who in different ways were involved, gave their views on the latest Congo mission, and also spoke of their ideas for similar missions in the future. Their lively debate took place in front of an audience of about 140.

The discussion paper itself amounts to a written debate and consists of short essays by experts from a variety of backgrounds, and aims to assess the do’s and the don’ts of increased European involvement in Africa in the years ahead.

Giles Merritt
Director
Security & Defence Agenda
The mid-2006 deployment of EU troops in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to assist UN peacekeepers in overseeing elections there drove home the point that sub-Saharan Africa will be a focal point of EU security and outreach, along with the Balkans. What lessons can be learned from EUFOR DRC and other operations in the region, and how can the EU reconcile its military operations there with its insistence that African nations must take ownership of their own security? How can we improve cooperation with UN and African Union peace efforts and are the implications of the EU’s Africa Strategy for future support missions there?

SPEAKERS

- Corneille Yambu-a-Ngoyi, Ambassador, Mission of Democratic Republic Congo to EU
- Thomas Silberhorn, Member of Foreign Affairs Committee, Bundestag, Germany
- Jean de Ponton d’Amécourt, Director of Strategic Affairs, Ministry of Defence, France
- Bruno Angelet, Counsellor, European Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgium
- Marc Van Bellinghen, Deputy Head of Unit, DG External Relations, European Commission
- Koen Vervaeke, Head of Africa Unit, Council of EU
Executive summary

EUFOR DRC - a military success

Leading off the latest SDA debate, the former Operation Commander EUFOR RD Congo, Lt. Gen. Karlheinz Viereck outlined the necessary criteria for a successful mission. These ranged from a sound moral position and good management, through to sufficient military force, and a social and human approach. He was strongly supported by the former Force Commander EUFOR RD Congo, Maj. Gen. Christian Damay, who described the EUFOR RDC mission as a “laboratory” for the ESDP. It had raised several questions, such as what could be done about the elimination or limitation of caveats, and provided some answers.

Overall, there was an air of a job well done, and this view was certainly underlined by the DRC’s EU Ambassador Corneille Yambu-a-Ngoyi. The Ambassador stressed that the EU troops had been seen as part of an overall policy, agreed by all parties, and not as a force of occupation.

Stressing the European side of the mission, Marc Van Bellinghen, Policy Officer, DG External Relations, European Commission, emphasised the EU’s partnership with the African Union. African ownership of its security problems was the objective, and the EU was providing funds to facilitate this goal. To this end, the creation of the African Peace and Security Council had been a watershed. From the Council side, Koen Vervaeye, Head of Africa Unit, Council of EU, was in total agreement with Van Bellinghen, adding that innovative solutions were being implemented.

Not that everything was seen to be sweetness and light between the Commission and the Council. Striking a negative note in that regard, Jean de Ponton D’Amécourt, Director of Strategic Affairs, Ministry of Defence, France, wanted a resolution of the bureaucratic conflicts between the Council and the Commission, and between the European Institutions and the Member States. Despite seeing the mission as a success for Europe, he also wanted a permanent European military chain of command, to reunite the strategic and operational facilities of the EU’s forces. Otherwise, he added, the ESDP’s future was in doubt.

This led to a brief flurry of questions on the subject of how the EU and NATO chains of command might interface together. That debate ended with de Ponton D’Amécourt pointing out that the EU needed an element of autonomy in its defence policy.

Thomas Silberhorn, Member of Foreign Affairs Committee, Bundestag, Germany referred to the recent guidelines drawn up by the German Parliament. He added that these had concluded that Europe should be interested in conflicts in neighbouring countries and on the periphery of Europe. However, given the geography and the size of the Congo, different arguments were needed here. The Belgian Foreign Ministry’s Bruno Angelet stressed that the Belgian strategy was one of maximum European engagement, as that was the only way to support the Congolese people - in fact, he saw the need for both bilateral and multilateral actions.

Issues raised during the debate included funding (as no development funds could be used to support this element of the EU’s development role in Africa) and communications (why had the EU’s DRC mission been under-played in Europe?). All in all, a lively debate had emphasised the success of the military operation, while introducing elements of conflict on the various political fronts. And, in terms of public relations, an opportunity missed for the EU.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

- The mission showed the need for more officers and personnel that have a common operational experience.
- Sufficient military force: there has to be sufficient military force to meet the objectives, with the political and military representatives working closely together.
- Success for missions is guaranteed if missions are seen as part of a policy agreed by all parties and with agreement of local population, and not as a force of occupation.
- The EU has to prove it has an interest in stabilising Africa’s institutions, and that it wants to send in “support” missions to help Africa find its own way forward.
- Bureaucratic conflicts between the Council and the Commission, and between the European institutions and Member States, in terms of Europe-Africa cooperation and engagement, have to be resolved.
- Europe should more often consider to secure that the overstretched UN forces throughout Africa, gets a back-up force from the EU.
- DR Congo needs increased support from the EU for its security sector reform.

DEBATE HIGHLIGHTS

- In terms of potential EU-led interventions, some Member States are more hesitant than others to give a go-ahead. The German Bundestag discussed guidelines and conditions to serve as a basis for a decision on an intervention.
- Some expressed a desire for autonomous EU operations, with a reinforced and permanent operation centre in Brussels. Strong EU operational capability is of utmost importance.
- Africa is a strategic priority for Europe, with both Congo missions showing that the military initiatives taken by Europe matched the EU’s strategy.
- The Africa-EU partnership has made a real breakthrough in the Congo, as opposed to Darfur where the international community is still trying to offer its assistance in an acceptable way.
- The EU emphasises African ownership of developments on the continent and intends to take on a supportive role with innovative solutions. Congo served a a “test-case” for the new EU-Africa policy.
- EUFOR was intended to foster the peace process in Congo and time will tell if the peace will take root.

Despite contributing $400,000 to MONUC forces, we are not able to use development funds to facilitate army reform and an exit strategy for MONUC.

Koen Vervaek
Background

The mid-2006 deployment of EU troops in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), to assist UN peacekeepers in overseeing elections there, drove home the point that sub-Saharan Africa will be a focal point of EU security and outreach, along with the Balkans. What lessons can be learned from EUFOR DRC and other operations in the region, and how can the EU reconcile its military operations there with its insistence that African nations must take ownership of their own security? How can we improve cooperation with the UN and African Union peace efforts and are there implications of the EU’s Africa Strategy for future support missions?

Military Commanders

Lt. Gen. Karlheinz Viereck, Commander Bundeswehr Operations Command, former Operation Commander EUFOR RD Congo, gave his view of the lessons learnt from the Congo mission. There were 10 in total, ranging from the military to the budgetary.

1. A sound moral position: the mission had this with the EU-Africa Strategic partnership, with executive and legislative backing.
2. Correct timing for the use of force: there had been agreement within the EU after clear analysis to preclude negative dynamic development in the Great Lakes Region; military commanders supporting control of the post-conflict situation.
3. Acceptance by the local people: winning the hearts and minds is important, strict impartiality in supporting democratic elections; assurance.
4. Sufficient military force: sufficient military force in combination with soft power tools necessary.
5. Political-Military cooperation: all players and representatives working closely together on all levels (EU Presidency, CIAT, AU, EU Commission, Commanders); very close and mutual understanding between EUSR and OPCOM.
6. A decisive and well-equipped force: Lt. Gen. Viereck said the EUFOR DRC force had been the best within a radius of 2000 kilometres, able to operate day and night; credible and deterring.
7. A social and human approach: respect to be provided, trust to be gained; backed by discipline, using minimum force during the mission; soldiers help and support (incl. CIMIC), so as to “invest in the future of Congo”.
8. Financial management: this was in place via the ATHENA mechanism, that provided a sound budgetary basis, backed by trust from the Member States to provide a good management basis for the commander.
9. Lessons to be learnt: Lt. Gen. Viereck assured the audience that lessons – both military and political – had indeed been learnt and that the process will and need be continued.

As the basis for a successful mission, Lt. Gen. Viereck underlined the need for:

Lt. Gen. Karlheinz Viereck, Former Operations Commander EUFOR RD Congo

The five EUFOR groups are on stand-by, ready and able to take on any task requested of them by the EU.

Lt. Gen. Karlheinz Viereck

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1 ATHENA is managed under the authority of a Special Committee composed of representatives of the Member States contributing to the financing of each operation, which may vary from one operation to the next.
2 Lt. Gen. Viereck said that there had been an under-spend of 5 million euros.
Giving his support to that conclusion, Maj. Gen. Christian Damay, General de Division, Former Force Commander EUFOR RD Congo, referred to the Artemis operation in 2003, which, although limited in scope, was remembered as a positive military action.

As for the latest mission, Maj. Gen. Damay said that in the five months of the operation, the EUFOR mission had aimed to create sufficient visibility and credibility in order to dissuade those parties interested in thwarting the election process. The Maj. Gen. said that there been one significant intervention, in the period 21st and 22nd August, when violence had erupted in Kinshasa following the results of the first round. He added that the Spanish troops had intervened skilfully and decisively together with the UN’s MONUC³ forces.

Maj. Gen. Damay explained that the forces actually left in December 2006, after successfully contributing to the election process and “being adopted by the local population”. He saw the success as a part of a coherent and ongoing policy package conducted by the EU. Maj. Gen. Damay concluded that the mission had been a kind of an ESDP laboratory, that had raised questions, such as, what could be:

- demanded of the soldiers of different nations in such a theatre?
- learnt about the need for standardisation of materials?
- done about the limitation or elimination of caveats?
- progressed regarding the further harmonisation of military regulations?
- learnt about communications, civic and psychological operations?

Acknowledging the need for special funding, Maj. Gen. Damay also saw the need for more officers and staff personnel that had a common operational experience in such missions.

Policymakers

Mission of the DRC to the EU’s Ambassador Corneille Yambu-a-Ngoyi, initially referred to the wars in the DRC, in 1996 and 1998, that had wrought havoc in the country, with subsequent misery for the people and destruction for the infrastructure.

³ UN peacekeeping force established in 2000 by Resolution 1291.
Ambassador referred to the “interesting” Artemis mission, that had helped restore an element of justice to the land (via the MONUC forces and the local police working together).

The mission was a success because the EU troops were seen as a part of a collaborative political action and not as an occupying force.

_Ambassador Corneille Yambu-a-Ngoyi_

The Ambassador therefore saw the need to look at the results of the Congo missions (both Artemis and EUFOR), and overall he was positive. A president had been democratically elected, together with the government, and a parliament was in place. This would be followed by local elections. Above all, the Ambassador said the success was due to the mission being seen, not as a force of occupation, but as part of a policy agreed by all parties and with the agreement of the local population. The objectives had been clear and they included protecting the local population. Now, collaboration had to continue between all parties.

Prior to the next speaker, _Thomas Silberhorn_, Member of Foreign Affairs Committee, Bundestag, Germany, taking the floor, SDA Director _Giles Merritt_ asked all speakers to consider what could be done to avoid the EU becoming the “gendarme of Africa”.

Agreeing that it was pertinent to ask what German (and other) soldiers might be doing in Africa, Silberhorn referred to the recent guidelines drawn up by the German Parliament. He added that these had concluded that Europe should be interested in conflicts in neighbouring countries and on the periphery of Europe. However, given the geography and the size of the Congo, different arguments were needed here.

_It has to be understood, that in such missions, the military aspect is only one component._

_Thomas Silberhorn_

Dismissing the argument that the failure of the elections (in the Congo) might cause mass migration to Europe, Silberhorn preferred to see the need for Germany to secure the investments that it had made in previous interventions. However, he said that all mandates had to be backed, not just by the German government but also by the Parliament.

Turning to lessons learnt, he also drew positive conclusions:

1. the focus on Kinshasa had been correct
2. the time limit had been defined and respected
3. the military aspect had been just one component of an overall strategy that aimed at the reconstruction of the Congo

As for Merritt’s question, Silberhorn said the EU had to prove it had an interest in stabilising the continent’s institutions, that the EU had a respect for human rights and that it was a “support mission” to help Africa find its own way forward. However, he added that it was necessary to strengthen the neighbouring regions, and that it might be possible to do this via helping the local police or army, before sending an international force.

_Thomas Silberhorn, Member of Foreign Affairs Committee, Bundestag_
Jean de Ponton D’Amécourt, Director of Strategic Affairs, Ministry of Defence, France, opined that the mission had been a success for the Congo and for Europe, as 17 countries had been involved. Emphasising that Africa and Europe are partners, de Ponton D’Amécourt also looked at the lessons to be learned.

A permanent European military chain of command is needed, to reunite the strategic and operational facilities of the EU’s forces.

Jean de Ponton D’Amécourt

The Belgian Foreign Ministry’s Bruno Angelet stressed that the Belgian strategy was one of maximum European engagement, as that was the only way to support the Congolese people - in fact, he saw the need for both bilateral and multilateral actions. Describing the various civil wars in the Congo, Angelet argued that the Artemis mission had temporarily stemmed the tide of insurgency. Then, following further outbreaks of fighting in 2004, the transitional process was again under threat.

Bruno Angelet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgium

In conclusion, he said that the bureaucratic conflicts between the Council and the Commission, and between the European institutions and Member States had to be resolved. Total collaboration was needed so that Europe and Africa could make progress as full partners.

• Would there be a risk of a perceived negative signal from the international community to the Congolese community?
• Would there be a perceived mistrust - of the Congolese actors - in the neighbouring countries?
• Would the force be seen as neutral?
• Wasn't there a contradiction between the aim to find a political solution and the UN's request for military back-up?

Angelet argued however that the misgivings disappeared when it became clear that EU forces would be welcomed, by political actors of the RDC. The military scope of the mission had been unclear, but after fine-tuning, the Belgians realised that it was not possible to refuse the UN's request, in face of the prospect of possible collapse the MONUC.

The general public does not know that Europe does defence.

Bruno Angelet

Turning to the EU, Angelet was not sure if the EU could be seen as a gendarme, but rather that the UN was being stretched across Africa and that it needed a back-up force. The scenario retained for the Congo could serve for other missions where the EU (neutral) force could have a light footprint in the area of operation, with a reserve force in neighbouring countries for urgent interventions if needed. In conclusion, Angelet said that the missions had been successful and that a strong EU operational capability was of the utmost importance.

Marc Van Bellinghen, Policy Officer, DG External Relations, European Commission, initially answered the “gendarme” question, and he approached this in a twofold manner, by referring to the EU-Africa partnership:

a) Africa now had a Peace & Security Architecture, and a Council existed as the main reference point for all security matters in Africa. The UN Security Council would now only intervene if the Africa Peace & Security Council agreed. He described this as a watershed, adding that the Council needed a partner, which was the African Union (AU). Van Bellinghen said that the EU had tried to support the AU with development funds, and that this was part of the African ownership process. Van Bellinghen argued that the EU was listening to its “African friends”.

b) In relation to the Congo, the policy had been developed slowly and it had materialised in the Sun City agreement. Van Bellinghen again emphasised the need for African ownership, and he added that Artemis had sent the right signals. That had been followed by the EUFOR mission, which had helped the election of a democratic government.

The creation of the African Peace and Security Council has been a watershed.

Marc Van Bellinghen

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4 The Sun City Agreement was signed between some of the warring parties in the Second Congo War, on April 19, 2002.
Therefore, rather than being a gendarme of Africa, the EU was supporting the new Congolese government in its security sector reform.

**Koen Vervaeke**, Head of Africa Unit, Council of EU, was in full agreement with the Commission’s Van Bellinghen, adding that innovative solutions were being implemented. He agreed that the Congo was a kind of laboratory for the new EU-Africa policy. The mission had been agreed, as it was good for the ESDP and for UN cooperation.

Vervaeke added that it had to be seen how the mission would help the peace process in the Congo, as EUFOR had been at the heart of the political process. In addition, there had been the question of what actions would be taken. He argued that the right choices, e.g. putting the focus on Kinshasa, had been the correct ones.

It is hard to sell success.

**Koen Vervaeke**

Looking at the overall Africa agenda, Vervaeke said that the aim to bring all actions under the EU umbrella - mainly under French leadership - was a huge task. In conclusion, he did not see the EU as a gendarme, but rather as a force that could come to Africa’s aid when necessary. Not forgetting of course, that the political will had to be present.

**Q & A session**

**The German Parliament’s guidelines**

The ICG’s **Alain Deletroz** asked if, following the EUFOR mission headed by Germany, the German Parliament would be likely to sanction a future similar involvement in Africa.

Silberhorn explained that the German Parliament had drawn up guidelines to cover all potential missions. These state the conditions under which missions might be accepted. He added that this was not simply a checklist, but had been developed to clarify discussions about such missions. In the specific case of Darfur, for example, Silberhorn noted that not all parties had agreed and this was would be against the said guidelines.

Adding a military viewpoint, Lt. Gen. Viereck added that five Operational HQs (OHQs) were on stand-by to take-on whatever task was submitted to them by the EU. All OHQ’s were ready and were confident of taking on any tasks.

**Future EU involvement in Africa**

Deletroz asked if the French representatives saw the possibility of greater EU involvement in situations, such as the ones existing in Chad or Darfur.

Replying, de Ponton D’Amécourt saw the various crises - in Sudan, Darfur, Chad - as being linked. He therefore concluded that the current talks in New York had to be aware of the size of any potential operation (+/- 15,000 to 20,000 troops might be needed). He added that local cooperation was essential. If all of this was understood, then an international force might be put together. EU forces could then play that (backup) role but the forces were already stretched so this could be difficult.

**EU-NATO, cooperation or collaboration?**

**Nagayo Taniguchi**, of Shincho news agency, asked in the event of a permanent EU military chain of command being created, how would that interact with NATO’s own chain of command.

Returning to the fray, de Ponton D’Amécourt reminded the audience that there was only
one set of forces. Explaining the Berlin+ agreement, he added that the EU needed to be autonomous. Thus, in addition to the five OHQ’s, there was the need for a permanent operation centre in Brussels - for both planning and (probably for) operational purposes.

The UK Delegation to NATO’s Paul Flaherty wanted to know if the lack of an EU permanent chain of command, as suggested, had affected the work of the two force commanders.

Lt. Gen. Vierreck looked at the military side, saying that the military operations in the Congo could be handled under the present OHQ set-up. Coming back on the same point, de Ponton D’Amécourt argued that he had not said that the FHQ and OHQ’s had experienced problems, but rather that it was necessary to create a permanent centre if the EU was ever going to be operationally autonomous.

Later, de Ponton D’Amécourt re-focused on the gap between the Commission (in the field of Justice) and the Council in regard to the ESDP. He argued that problems, such as those in Africa, could not be solved with the current situation.

**Next steps in the DRC**

Belgian Rear Admiral Jacques Rosiers asked for details of the next steps, a) for the Congolese government in terms of security, and b) in sustaining the EU’s future commitments.

Ambassador Yambu-a-Ngoyi noted that the Congolese government had two priorities regarding security, one regarding the training of the police and one regarding the unification of the armed forces following the various conflicts within the RDC. In order to secure the territory, the safety of the people and the country’s investments, there needed to be a unified army and a well-equipped and well-trained police force.

Vervaeke emphasised the need for further engagement in the Congo, but there were several challenges. One was how any intervention was financed; as the Council was not able to use development funds to, for example, support army reform. He added that it was ironic that although the EU Member States paid +/- $ 400 million in support of MONUC, it could not easily find expenditure to develop a good exit strategy for those MONUC forces.

In terms of resources, the challenge was to pull all the bilateral engagements together. Vervaeke wanted a team to be built - the Europeans and the Congolese - and he wanted “to go for it”. Van Bellinghen agreed with the perceived irony of the situation, adding that the EU was there in a development role but could not use development funds.

**Communication problems**

MEP Jürgen Schröder wanted to talk about things that did not work so well, for example, the lack of communication as there had been insufficient awareness of the EUFOR mission throughout Germany.

Lt. Gen. Vierreck did not agree, as the military had embarked on a clear-cut information campaign. This had focused on the Congo, within the country, and the campaign had been a success.

Intervening, Merritt asked if the EU had received full value from the success of the EUFOR mission. Vervaeke thought that the EU had not received sufficient kudos, as the main target of the communications policy had been Africa rather than Europe. He also mused that it was perhaps hard to sell success.

Angelet looked at the EU’s communication polices in general, arguing that many people did not know that the EU was involved in defence. Giving an example of the EU’s successful engagement in Aceh (Indonesia), he said that hardly anyone knew about this. However, he saw the future improving once the roles of the External Relation Commissioner and the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy were brought together.

Winding down the debate, Merritt said that the EU had to seize the imagination of the public if the ESDP was to be a success. He therefore suggested that the European institutions and national governments had to think seriously about the lessons learnt from EUFOR, and then develop a policy to take the message to the public. However, time was of the essence, the institutions could not afford to wait for the next mission before taking the benefits of the EUFOR initiative.
SDA Director Giles Merritt and speakers before the debate

Participants at the Bibliothèque Solvay

Cocktail

The Congolese Ambassador shares his thoughts

Speakers during the panel debate

Networking

New insights during cocktail

French-Belgian networking
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INTRODUCTION: The EU’s Africa Strategy raises wider questions over ESDP’s outreach

In his book “The Utility of Force” which he presented at the Security & Defence Agenda just over a year ago, General Sir Rupert Smith argues that in the current strategic context, political and military activities can no longer be analysed in isolation. This is clearly reflected in this Discussion Paper on the EU’s Africa Strategy. The latest military operation of the EU in the Democratic Republic of the Congo provides the starting point for an intensely political discussion on the institutional outlook of the ESDP and the role of the military instrument in the EU’s foreign policy.

Karl von Wogau, MEP, Chairman of the European Parliament’s Security and Defence Subcommittee, lists a number of lessons-learned. He calls for effective parliamentary scrutiny over ESDP missions. His warning over problems with interoperability of equipment serves as a reminder that the EU Battlegroup concept demands a harmonisation of equipment and armaments for it to be effective. His reminder that the success of the Congolese elections remains a monumental achievement provides a counterweight to Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja’s assessment that the EU mission provoked strong anti-European feelings in Kinshasa. But not everyone accepts von Wogau’s assertion that military operations to ensure peace and stability can make sense in a long-term development strategy.

Cornelis Wittebrood, European Commission ECHO, emphasises the need for caution not to endanger the ‘humanitarian space’ by politicising humanitarian aid. This is precisely what happens when military interventions are associated with humanitarian considerations. While acknowledging that European interventions are well-intentioned, George Nzongola-Ntalaja warns that they may be no more than quick-fixes that are unable to address complex political situations. He labels the 2006 mission “just the kind of operation that should not be promoted as part of the EU’s Africa Strategy”.

In Berlin, only two months ago, NATO’s Secretary-General jokingly compared EU-NATO relations with a frozen conflict. Maybe surprisingly, the essay of his colleague Ambassador Maurits Jochems reads “cooperation between NATO and the EU, both at headquarters and theatre level, has been close and successful”. We can conclude that pragmatism may prevail on the ground, leading to good synergy between EU & NATO officials, but that the troubles are located on the political level. It is therefore interesting to read in the paper of Richard Gowan of New York University, that there still remains plenty of room for institutional flexibility for deploying European troops. By comparing the mission in the Congo with the European contribution to the expanded UN Interim Force in Lebanon, Gowan forcefully argues that creative thinking and adapting to facts on the ground can be most helpful for mounting effective peace operations. Yet, the discussion is bound to stay sensitive, as he points out that Europeans remain vulnerable to the charge that they only get involved in ‘privileged’ operations under Western command structures.

Which framework is best suited to true command of European forces overseas is poised to remain the big political question confronting those involved in the making of European security policy. It is intimately related to the conclusion drawn by Egmont’s Koen Vlassenroot, Sven Biscop and Hans Hoebeke: apart from coordinating all available policy instruments, the political objectives of the EU need to be translated into a realistic level of military ambition. French Defence Ministry official Jean de Ponton d’Amécourt’s essay offers some provocative answers. He identifies Africa to be nothing less than a strategic priority for the European Security Strategy. Furthermore, he calls for a major institutional development, namely the establishment of a permanent European chain of command. However, the discussions on the floor in the Bibliothèque Solvay made clear this remains a highly divisive issue across the English Channel.

Both in this Discussion Paper, as during the debate, the general feeling is that there exists a real future for ESDP. The success of the EUFOR operation can be used as valuable PR material. However, this should not obscure the fact that the most crucial debate must be how to coordinate the various strategic visions held by the different European member states as well as by the different Allies. The SDA continues to offer itself as a platform for this debate.

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LESSONS LEARNED FROM EUFOR RD CONGO: SUCCESSES AND CONCERNS

Karl von Wogau

Karl von Wogau studied Law and Economics in Freiburg, Munich and Bonn. He obtained a doctorate on the constitutional history of Vorderösterreich. Diploma Insead. From 1971 - 1984 he was manager at Sandoz Ltd. in Basel. Since 1984, he is a partner in the law firm of Graf von Westphalen Bappert & Modest in Freiburg. He is a Member of the regional executive committee Südbaden of the CDU. He is Chairman of the "Kangaroo Group", an association aiming at developing the internal market into a home market for European citizens and companies. Von Wogau is MEP since 1979. From 1994 until 1999, he was Chairman of the Committee on Monetary and Economic Affairs. Currently, he is the Chairman of the Subcommittee Security and Defence, and is a Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. He is also a Member of the Advisory Board of the Security and Defence Agenda.

It is in the interest of the European Union to promote the long-term stability of the DRC. It is the key to achieving peace in the whole region as well as an essential precondition for sustainable economic development. Peace, stability and the rule of law are the most important preconditions for the successful transition and reconstruction of the country.

There are two ongoing civilian missions of the European Union in Congo: EUPOL (launched in April 2005) and EUSEC (launched in June 2005). The European Union supports the training of Congolese police officers, the integration of the various militias into a unified Congolese army and the setting up of a functioning judicial system, which so far does not exist. With the elections in 2006 the transition period in the DRC was entering a crucial phase. At the request of the United Nations, the European Union decided to send a reserve force to the DRC to assist MONUC during the election period. This operation, EUFOR RD Congo, was concluded on 30 November 2006. The European Parliament and its Sub-Committee on Security and Defence closely followed the whole process. Parliament Delegations were sent to Kinshasa and to the Operation Headquarter in Potsdam, before, during and after the election period. These provided the European Parliament with the necessary information to assess the role of the European Union's military operation in Congo.

Above all, it has to be stated that the EUFOR operation and the elections were a success. Eighteen million Congolese voted in some 50,000 polling stations, a turn-out of around 70 per cent in the first free and fair elections in two generations. The troops of the European Union acted as a force for stability, prevented larger escalations of violence and played a key role in creating the necessary conditions and secure environment to ensure a successful outcome of the election period. They demonstrated their professionalism when responding rapidly and effectively to the outbreak of violence on August 20-21, which was the most serious incident during their deployment. Militant supporters of President Kabila attacked the headquarters of his rival candidate Bemba. The European soldiers acted rapidly to stabilise the situation and re-establish peace. In particular, Spanish and Polish soldiers made an important contribution to this success.

The EUFOR operation provides an opportunity for a lessons learned exercise as well. First, a key lesson is that short-term military operations to ensure peace and stability during a crucial period of time can make sense, but only if they are part of a long-term strategy for the development in the region. The presence of the European Union in the DRC is an example for the European Union's emphasis on strengthening civil and military cooperation in crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction.

A second lesson concerns the interoperability of standards and equipment - including secure communications. In theory, the use of NATO Standards should help avoiding problems of
interoperability. However, the reality of integrating different national contributions into the small EUFOR mission proved more difficult. It was suggested that a prior training period for all troop-contributing states would help to overcome a lot of the interoperability problems. This would avoid unnecessary difficulties in theatre. Moreover, the use of different – and often incompatible – equipment and armaments by the participating units led to extra costs and reduced efficiency. We should therefore promote measures to harmonise equipment and armaments with a view to optimising resources and the effectiveness of multinational operations. We should ensure that the EU Battlegroups get common or at least compatible equipment.

Thirdly, EUFOR was for certain services supported by a private contractor (incl. lodging, food etc). If this is going to be a repeated feature of ESDP operations, then it will be important to clarify the status and the protection of the personnel working for such private contractors.

A fourth and final lesson learned from the DRC is that we have to ensure effective parliamentary control over ESDP operations. The Council of the European Union decides when to launch and end an ESDP operation but there is no collective body of parliaments, neither the EP nor EU national parliaments, with the collective power to approve or put an end to an ESDP operation. There is an acute problem of parliamentary scrutiny over ESDP civilian and military operations. In order to ensure appropriate scrutiny, we have to establish a close cooperation between the European Parliament and the parliaments of the Member States.
PROTECTING THE HUMANITARIAN SPACE IN AFRICA

Cornelis Wittebrood, Head of Unit, Africa, Caribbean, European Commission (ECHO)

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Africa is emerging from the dark into the limelight of international politics. What was once called the “lost” continent has become the “last” to join the global community through enhanced development and trade as well as economic and political integration. Africa has come to realise its strategic importance, and in 1999 decided to unite - transforming the powerless Organisation of African Unity into a more ambitious African Union. Not only the US and the EU but also emerging economies like China and India have started to recognize Africa’s huge potential, and are rapidly developing their trade and investment and expanding their access to the continent’s vast resources and markets.

These developments have spurred the EU to raise its traditional cooperation with Africa to a more strategic partnership. In 2005, the EU adopted a common strategy with a set of instruments and tools to promote peace and stability, regional integration and sustainable development in Africa. These instruments relate in particular to development cooperation under the European Development Fund (EDF), economic integration through economic partnership agreements (EPA) and conflict prevention, crisis management and peace-making under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

DRC, Burundi and Sierra Leone are recent examples of how Europe has gradually developed and applied these instruments in the African context. In DRC, EU actions like Artemis and EUFOR have contributed to relatively successful crisis management and peace making. As the EU seems to be keen on further developing these efforts to create peace and stability, it should not overlook the impact this may have on another instrument in its own tool-box - humanitarian assistance.

More than any other continent Africa is affected by conflicts, crises and disasters. Coming on top of the structural deficiencies that exist in many failed states, the result is humanitarian needs on an unprecedented scale. Few countries in Africa have the means or capacity to address these needs and they therefore depend on international assistance to save lives and reduce suffering of their people. The EU is playing an important role in this regard. It is, in fact, the largest donor of official humanitarian aid. If it wants to continue to play this role and to project its core values of humanity and solidarity to the people of Africa, the EU needs to make major efforts to protect the “humanitarian space” in which relief organisations and workers can provide their vital assistance.

Experience in Africa has shown that there are major challenges to this humanitarian space originating from crisis management and peace making cooperation with military and civil defence forces; integrated missions and humanitarian military interventions.

The genuine aim of humanitarian aid is not to resolve conflicts or crises like those in the Great Lakes region, Darfur, Somalia or Côte d’Ivoire but to alleviate the suffering of civilians solely on the basis of their needs. It is given without discrimination and without taking sides, keeping its full autonomy from political, military or any other objectives or vested interests. In short, humanitarian aid is provided in accordance with the basic
principles of international humanitarian law: humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. 

Humanitarian aid has a limited, modest yet vitally important ambition to ensure that the most vulnerable are not forgotten or sacrificed in times of crisis or disaster. If the allocation of humanitarian aid were to be made according to geopolitical or foreign policy considerations rather than genuine needs, it would quickly be dismissed as a political tool and this would discredit the instrument and undermine its effectiveness. If, in a context of crisis management and peace-making, belligerents believe that humanitarian assistance is provided to one side in a conflict and not to the other, they may be tempted to consider humanitarian operations as a legitimate target. By attacking humanitarian organisations, their workers and their assets, in the end they deny access to victims. This is a real risk of the so-called “win the hearts and minds” strategies of military forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In recent years we have witnessed increased involvement of the military in relief operations. This process has raised concerns about the politicisation of humanitarian aid and its subordination to political and military strategic objectives. This has led to a dangerous blurring of roles and problems of perception. Humanitarian agencies in Sudan and Eritrea have been viewed as instruments of foreign policy and the number of security incidents against humanitarian organisations and their staff has increased as a consequence.

Civil defence and military forces have specific mandates and operating procedures that are different from those that apply to conventional humanitarian actors. As a matter of principle, the former should not carry out humanitarian tasks as this can only lead to a dangerous blurring of roles between humanitarian and military/civil defence personnel. Such a development will be detrimental both to the afflicted populations and to the security and safety of humanitarian workers;

This does not mean, however, that in specific and well-defined situations, cooperation is not possible between the political, diplomatic and military actors on the one hand and the humanitarian operators on the other. In some circumstances, recourse to the use of military and civil defence assets (MCDA) may be necessary for logistical, access or security reasons. In such cases, the use of MCDA should be based upon requests made by the humanitarian actors and should be undertaken in full recognition and respect of the international rules and mandates governing humanitarian assistance. That is why the EU supports the relevant UN Oslo and MCDA Guidelines that deal with this issue.

Experience in African countries like Liberia and DRC has shown that integrated missions also pose a challenge to the humanitarian space. Integrated missions are one of the symbols of improved and broadened coordination within the UN. The EU has accepted the concept as a more coherent and efficient approach to crises. However it is clear that such missions carry the risk of humanitarian action being perceived as part of a larger political agenda. Integrated missions have to be organized in such a way that there can be no misunderstanding about the independent, impartial and neutral character of the humanitarian component.

Another threat to the humanitarian space comes from the new concept of “humanitarian interventions”. This arguably involves a contradiction in terms since the military and political character of the “intervention” flies in the face of what is commonly considered to be “humanitarian”. Examples from Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and the DRC highlight that these interventions are neither neutral, impartial nor independent. It is not appropriate to apply the “humanitarian” label to such interventions. No matter how important they are to solve a political crisis with major humanitarian consequences, as in the case of Kosovo, they are first and foremost military actions. They address humanitarian consequences indirectly rather than directly as they target principally the political, ideological and military causes of the conflict. And in the process they can put traditional humanitarian action at risk.

Conclusion

To protect the humanitarian space in which relief assistance can be provided in an impartial, neutral and independent manner, European action in Africa needs to observe the following basic guidelines. First, it needs to respect clearly the humanitarian rules of engagement. Humanitarian principles must guide the delivery of assistance to crisis victims and they must be respected by all stakeholders. Second, it needs to ensure it is fully compatible with the conventional
humanitarian response: stakeholders should all aim to stick to their respective mandates and responsibilities. Finally, it should ensure effective coordination between all relevant activities. In avoiding overlapping and creating synergies, Europe can maximize the impact of all the instruments at its disposal in the interests of the people of Africa.
NATO’s CONTRIBUTION TO THE ASSISTANCE BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN DARFUR

Ambassador Maurits Jochems, NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General, Operations Division

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In April 2004, the African Union (AU) deployed a mission to the Darfur region of Sudan in order to monitor the conflict. International partners were requested to assist the AU in these efforts.

NATO and other international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU), as well as individual donor nations, responded positively to this request and have been supporting the AU in its efforts to put an end to the violence and improve the humanitarian situation in Darfur.

Framework

Following a request from the AU to consider the possibility of providing logistical support, the North Atlantic Council agreed in June 2005 on the detailed modalities and extent of Alliance support to the AU Mission in the Sudan (AMIS). This represented a landmark decision for NATO given that this was its first contribution to a mission in Africa.

Since then, NATO has made available resources and capabilities to support the AU to deal successfully with the crisis in Darfur. As requested by the AU, NATO’s North Atlantic Council has authorised the current assistance to AMIS be provided until June 2007. As part of its support to AMIS, the Alliance has so far:

- helped to provide air transport for over 16,000 peacekeepers, as well as over 500 civilian police from African troop contributing countries into and out of Darfur;
- provided staff capacity building workshops to 184 AU officers at the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) in Addis Ababa and at the Force Headquarters in Darfur. These workshops have helped the AU to develop capabilities to address the challenges presented by the complex situation in Darfur. The different workshops have covered a wide range of topics such as information management, peace support operations, operational planning and media relations;
- contributed to the organization of an UN-led map exercise (MAPEX) in August 2005 to assist the AU in building its capacity to manage operations.

Following a Note Verbale sent by the AU on 25 August 2006, NATO has been temporarily training and mentoring AU officers in the Information Assessment Cell of the DITF. Moreover, again in response to an AU request, NATO is currently assisting the AU in establishing mechanisms for collecting and analysing lessons learned from AMIS and provides a tailored Lessons Learned process to the AU utilizing the train-the-trainer concept.

Coordination arrangements

In all its efforts, NATO works under the leadership of the AU in full consultation, transparency and cooperation with the UN, the EU, and all other donors to serve the common end.

NATO and the EU are synchronizing their assistance to AMIS, particularly in the areas of strategic deployment and Lessons Learned.
and they work hand in hand to avoid a duplication of efforts.

At the political level, coordination takes place mainly in the form of joint informal meetings of the Alliance's North Atlantic Council and the EU’s Political and Security Committee. There are also regular staff level meetings that cover operational issues such as movement coordination, as well as individual contacts at all levels. I myself also ensure that contacts and consultation are maintained regularly with all headquarters and theatre counterparts, including the EU.

Military cooperation takes place primarily through the respective Military Committees of NATO and the EU, and has been further enhanced through the establishment of a permanent EU cell at NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and the NATO permanent liaison team at the EU Military Staff.

At theatre level, NATO’s Senior Military Liaison Officer, based in Addis Ababa maintains relationships with the AU and other relevant international organizations and donor nations. All partners attend regular Partners’ Technical Support Group meetings to discuss current AMIS issues. Key partners also meet weekly with the DITF leadership in a Liaison Group meeting.

In the specific case of strategic airlift, coordination between NATO and the EU starts at an early stage of the process. On receipt of a request by the African Union, NATO, the EU, as well as representatives from the contributing member states, meet in strategic airlift coordination meetings to agree on a consistent airlift movement plan which can then be forwarded to the AU as a common response to the request.

The AU’s Joint Forward Based Movement Cell (JFBMC), which is supported by NATO and EU staff officers and situated at the AU’s Headquarters in Addis Ababa, oversees and tracks the troop rotations as well as the movement of incoming and outgoing African troops and civilian police personnel on the ground in Darfur. The JFBMC is directly linked to NATO’s Allied Movement Coordination Centre located at SHAPE in Mons, Belgium and the European Airlift Coordination Centre in Eindhoven, The Netherlands.

The NATO/EU mechanisms put in place to support the AMIS deployment have proved effective and cooperation between NATO and the EU, both at headquarters and theatre level, has been close and successful. This success story has enabled this relationship to develop further, enhancing the view that there are clearly areas of common interest between the two organizations where cooperation is meaningful.

Way Forward

At the NATO Riga Summit in November 2006, NATO Heads of State and Government committed themselves to continue Alliance support to AMIS and declared their readiness, following consultation with and the agreement of the AU, to broaden that support. NATO is also prepared to consider possible assistance to a follow-on mission in Darfur if requested. Furthermore the Alliance is committed to sustained coordination with all actors involved, in particular the AU, the UN and the EU. Such cooperation and coordination between the AU and all its partners is essential for the success of the AU’s efforts to stop the fighting and bring sustainable peace to Darfur.
EUFOR RD CONGO, UNIFIL AND FUTURE EUROPEAN SUPPORT TO THE UN

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In 2006, the European Council gave its approval to two military operations to reinforce the UN. The first was EUFOR RD Congo. The second was the urgent deployment of European troops to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) from August onwards.

Although the Lebanese mission was not an ESDP operation, it showed that EU governments can find the political will and military means to handle major crises. Using their own logistical arrangements rather than those of the UN, European ground and naval forces moved rapidly into the theatre - in the third quarter of 2006, UNIFIL looked like an EU-led multinational force with a UN logo, not a traditional UN mission. The Council congratulated itself on achieving “a leadership role for the Union in UNIFIL.”

This innovative arrangement upset a number of assumptions about the future of European military support to the UN. Since the success of Operation Artemis in 2003, many analysts appeared to believe that EU-UN cooperation would now take the form of “Artemis II”, “Artemis III” and so forth. That meant ESDP missions that would (i) be in Africa; (ii) involve a brigade-strength force with a robust mandate; (iii) deploy for a fixed period of three to six months; (iv) operate firmly outside UN command structures.

These projections became the new orthodoxy in ESDP circles, encapsulated in the Battle Group concept. And they were reasonable assumptions: up to 2006, four-fifths of the UN’s deployments were in Africa - and recurrent crises in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Côte d’Ivoire underscored the UN’s need for rapid reaction forces.

If EU members are interested in providing those forces, most seem allergic to putting their troops under UN command in Africa. As of January 2007, there were nearly 10,000 troops from EU states in UN missions worldwide - but 80% of these were in Lebanon. By contrast, fewer than 3% of the UN’s troop deployments in Africa came from the EU.

But the presumption that EU forces will not wear blue helmets in Africa obscures the variety of mechanisms by which European troops have contributed to UN operations there in recent years. These include the Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), which involves elements from thirteen EU members and three non-EU countries and facilitates new UN deployments. This has been deployed to Ethiopia and Eritrea, Liberia and Sudan. And in Liberia, an Irish-Swedish Quick Reaction Force (QRF) provided a robust reinforcement capacity under UN command from 2003 to 2006.

While EUFOR RD Congo provided reinforcements for the UN mission in DRC
last year, the UN Secretariat hoped to shift the 500-man QRF to other trouble-spots: Côte d’Ivoire and Darfur were both considered. The failure to negotiate a UN deployment to Darfur meant that the unit was eventually repatriated - but it should be a reminder that there are ways for EU states to reinforce UN missions other than repeating the Artemis model.

Indeed, if EUFOR RD Congo is an interesting precedent for future EU-UN cooperation, it is because it bore some resemblance not only to Artemis, but also (much less remarked upon) to the QRF. Artemis was an emergency force, deployed to hold ground, protect civilians and shoot bad guys in the midst of a crisis in the eastern DRC that had run out of the UN’s control. By contrast, EUFOR RD Congo was a deterrent force, intended to offer extra firepower alongside pre-positioned UN forces in and around Kinshasa - forces that, although limited in reach and unpopular with the public, were still in control.

In this, EUFOR RD Congo played a role analogous to that of the QRF: a reinforcing element in the strategic framework of a functioning peace operation, rather than a response to that framework’s collapse. While the EU and UN had separate lines of command, the EU presence required close coordination with the UN mission (MONUC). In this it improved on Artemis, during which EU-UN coordination in the field was poor.

That does not mean that EUFOR–MONUC cooperation was perfect. At the planning stage, there was frequent frustration over the lack of formal coordination structures. Irritations arose over issues such as sharing documents. In the field, a particularly worrying problem arose from the fact that the two missions generated independent threat assessments - creating differences over precisely when deterrent action was necessary.

But the ad hoc collaboration that emerged proved reasonably effective. In Kinshasa, it was helped by good chemistry between the senior officers on both sides. When, in late August, it looked like militia fighting in the city might explode, EUFOR and MONUC troops mounted an effective joint action to contain it. At times, EUFOR seemed to be constrained less by the UN than the range of national caveats among its own contingents.

EUFOR RD Congo thus proved that an ESDP operation can operate within the strategic framework of an existing UN deployment. It also suggests some fairly obvious ways to enhance future co-deployments: the development of standard joint operating procedures for coordinating operations at the strategic and tactical levels, and in particular methods of generating joint threat assessments to act as the basis for joined-up decision-making.

But it should also be noted that just as EU and UN officers were learning to collaborate in DRC, their political masters were debating how European troops should be commanded in Lebanon. Prior to 2006, UNIFIL was commanded from UN Headquarters like any other mission (even if it was one in which certain EU members had a special interest).

But in enlarging the force, European negotiators insisted that it should be commanded through a new multi-national Strategic Military Cell in New York. Although this reports to the UN’s Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping (and so to the Secretary General), it gives the troop contributors significant control over the mission. Of the twenty-seven officer-level posts in the cell, nineteen were initially assigned to EU member-states.

So while EUFOR RD Congo was being inserted into a UN framework on the ground, a European element was being inserted into high-level strategic decision-making at UN Headquarters. To some critics (both in the South and the UN Secretariat) these are both proofs that EU members get to run “privileged” missions under the flags of their choice, in contrast to the African and South Asian countries that provide the bulk of UN forces.

But another important test of inter-institutional flexibility has now emerged in Africa. While the EU has been supporting the African Union presence in Darfur financially and operationally since 2004, the AU and UN are now moving towards a “hybrid” joint deployment there. The EU and NATO are considering how best to help sustain this new amalgam - potentially drawing them into another complex relationship with the UN.

8 Although the UN had over 16,500 troops in DRC during EUFOR RD Congo’s deployment, most were concentrated in the east of the country. A November 2005 survey for the UN found that is forces were popular in the east, but that clear majorities in Kinshasa and western DRC wanted it to see them depart.
Such relationships lack the simplicity of the Artemis model. The Battle Group concept is now a reality, and there will be a need for an “Artemis II” sooner or later. But even good models need updating. Eufor RD Congo and UNIFIL – like the QRF and SHIRBRIG before them – suggest that the EU’s members are likely to contribute most effectively to peace operations not through fine concepts, but to adapting to facts on the ground.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE ARTEMIS AND EUFOR OPERATIONS IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

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On the surface, the two EU operations in the Congo, Operation Artemis in 2003 and EUFOR in 2006, were guided by very good intentions: protecting the civilian population from armed conflict in the city of Bunia, and supporting MONUC in ensuring that elections were held peacefully in the DRC, respectively. However, like Opération Turquoise, in which France was authorized by the United Nations Security Council to provide security to victims of the Rwandan genocide of 1994, a full appreciation of these operations cannot be made without looking at the general political context in which they were undertaken as well as their consequences, particularly the unintended ones. While the valiant efforts of French troops in caring for and burying the victims of cholera and other illnesses in Eastern Congo must be applauded, it is evident that the Turquoise Opération made it possible for the Rwandan génocidaires to transfer nearly all their military equipment and supplies from Rwanda to the former Zaïre, thus creating the root causes of the Rwanda invasion of 1996 and the beginning of the current crisis in the Congo. Had the United Nations taken the robust action required by the Convention against Genocide to deal with the events of April 1994 in Rwanda, the French intervention two months later would not have been necessary.

Likewise, Operation Artemis, which was also French-led, would have been unnecessary had the United Nations Security Council acted in accordance with the Lusaka Accord of 1999. This agreement called for a UN intervention under Chapter VII in order to help the DRC government disarm the negative forces whose presence on Congolese soil had given Rwanda and Uganda the pretext to invade, occupy and plunder their giant neighbor in 1998. It was the continued presence of wealth-seeking Ugandan military officers in northeastern Congo that fueled armed conflict between Congolese rebel factions.

Here again, while Artemis did secure Bunia and thus saved thousands of lives in this city, the situation in the rest of the Ituri district remained insecure. The operation did leave in place a security infrastructure in the form of a police and judiciary apparatus capable of providing intelligence information on the militia to MONUC. Unfortunately, Artemis was too limited in space (Bunia) and in time (only 3 months) in order to have long-lasting effects with respect to peace and security in the region. It did not reinforce MONUC’s capacity to deal with the activities of armed factions and bands in the whole area of eastern Congo. Less than a year after Artemis, MONUC seemed powerless when dissident Congolese army officers, General Laurent Nkunda and Colonel Jules Mutebushi, attacked the city of Bukavu in June 2004. Many Congolese wonder how MONUC, with its force of 17,000 troops and a budget of nearly 1 billion U.S. dollars, is still incapable of bringing security to Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, and North Katanga.

Let us now look at EUFOR. This is precisely the kind of operation that should not be promoted as part of the EU’s Africa strategy. Almost all the assumptions on which it was based have proven to be either incorrect or badly formulated. It was based on the postulate that making the elections peaceful...
would contribute to restoring stability in the DRC. EUFOR and MONUC may take credit for preventing the country from plunging into civil war as a result of the attacks initiated by Joseph Kabila’s presidential guard against Jean-Pierre Bemba’s militia on 19-21 August, following the first round of the presidential election. But peace is still elusive, particularly in the very part of the country where President Kabila is supposed to have brought it. On 6 December, the very day of his inauguration as President of the Third Republic, MONUC for once did intervene quickly and in a robust fashion with combat helicopters to prevent Nkunda from threatening more towns in North Kivu. This proved temporary: a few days later, he was reportedly receiving more arms through Bunagana, on the border with Uganda. Meanwhile, rebel groups continue their activities in Ituri. The FPRI of Peter Karim, ironically promoted colonel recently, and the MRC of M. Ngunjolo, are continuing to recruit new members.

It is thus an illusion to believe that the elections as such will have a stabilizing effect. In addition to elections, the EU should do what it ought to have done since 2003, namely put in place a vigorous and clear strategy of putting an end to the militias, both politically and militarily. Without a police mandate, EUFOR was incapable of preventing numerous acts of violence during the electoral campaign, and its troops stood by as Kabila’s praetorian guard pounded Bemba’s residence for two days before intervening on the 3rd day, when there were ambassadors to protect. Recently, the Congolese security forces opened fire on people demonstrating against vote-buying in gubernatorial and senatorial elections in Lower Congo, killing over 130 persons.

As the largest donor for the DRC transition, the EU had the possibility of influencing reforms in the security sector that would have rendered operations like EUFOR unnecessary. It would be interesting to calculate the costs of EUFOR and to compare this with the cost of the restoration of the judiciary system and the creation of a unified national army. With the sentiment by many Congolese that EUFOR was sent to ensure Kabila remained in power, the operation has unnecessarily contributed to nurturing strong xenophobic and anti-European feelings in the DRC, particularly in Kinshasa.

* The views expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not represent the views of the United Nations Development Programme.
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been a test-case for a more pro-active approach of the European Union in protracted crises. During the last 5 years, acting through its first two pillars, the role of the EU in the DRC has continuously broadened. This evolution reflects the huge advances in CFSP and ESDP since 2003. The Congolese crisis has functioned as a political testing ground for the EU to design new forms of intervention. The increasing role of the EU in the DRC is a clear demonstration of the increased coordination between the EU and the UN in crisis management. It included two military operations (Artemis & EUFOR RDC) in support of the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) as well as two Security Sector Reform (SSR) missions (EUPOL & EUSEC). In addition, the EU developed into a crucial political and financial partner in the national and regional initiatives that support the DRC peace process and promote regional stability.

This role of the EU comes in addition to the important role played by several individual EU member states through their bilateral relationship with the DRC. The most visible of these are France, Belgium, the UK and the Netherlands. The regional spillover effect of the decade of conflict in the DRC clearly demonstrated the need for increased cooperation between EU countries. A key moment in this recognition was the Franco-British ‘Saint Malo meeting’ in December 1998, where both countries decided to harmonize policies towards Africa. Another key mobilizing element is the reinforced international interest in the challenges and threats emanating from fragile or failing states, non-state groups and transnational issues, such as crime and terrorism and the recognition that these require an agile and multi-faceted response. As reflected in the European Security Strategy, this recognition strengthened the perception of the need for reinforced coherence and coordination between policy areas. Currently the EU, combined with its member states, is by far the biggest player in the DRC.

Perhaps surprisingly, in view of the sheer number of different European players in the DRC, the facts about the EU intervention in the DRC seem to indicate a large degree of common interest between the EU institutions and the bilateral policies pursued by the member states. Over last years there has been a widely shared common strategic focus...
on the electoral process. And although this issue has been even more sensitive, the experience in the field of SSR also indicates an increasing common understanding between actions pursued by the Commission and the Council. In an important development the GAERC, in its meeting of 15 September 2006, demonstrated a clear willingness of the EU to assume a coordinating role in the vital area of SSR in the DRC: “in view of the need for a comprehensive approach combining the different initiatives underway, the EU would be ready to assume a coordinating role in international efforts in the security sector, in close coordination with the UN to support the Congolese authorities in this field.”

However, even if the implementation and the coordination of the EU actions in the DRC have been largely successful, it is too early to conclude on the results of these actions for the country and its population. The direct elections (Parliament, provincial assemblies and President) have been very positive; the indirect elections (Senate and Provincial Governors) have indicated key weaknesses in the Congolese political culture. The nature of the political system in the DRC remains neo-patrimonial. Urgent efforts in improving governance are required to safeguard the positive dynamics of the electoral process. Furthermore, the violence following the first and second tour in the elections provided clear evidence of the need to finalize the DDR program and start with real SSR initiatives. Both the capacity and governance of the security actors are a major cause for concern. Successful SSR is a major precondition for redeployment of MONUC.

A critical dialogue with the new authorities should create the conditions for the development of a long-term vision for EU development action in the DRC. So far, most interventions had a short-term orientation (the elections), which explains why some successes could be achieved. But these achievements should not be seen as guarantees for longer-term successes. The future development of the political process in the DRC will depend on a number of variables of which the EU involvement is only one. Internal developments in the DRC, the wider region and involvement of other international actors are likely to influence and limit the impact of the EU in the DRC. But most of all the successful ad hoc coordination in the DRC between the EU actions cannot hide that additional efforts are needed to streamline EU crisis management structures and enhance civil-military coordination.

Obviously, a synergy between ESDP and Community instruments is essential and should be enhanced with a goal- and result-oriented approach. But many hard-security questions need further debate. What should be the budgetary and geographical scope of the ESDP? How should it relate to NATO and UN missions? Which capacity should be retained for territorial defence and which forces should be available for rapid response crisis management and long-term peacekeeping, respectively? In short, the political objectives of the European Security Strategy should be translated in a realistic level of military ambition of the EU27. Through top down coordination and the pooling of resources the EU can avoid useless duplication and generate more ‘useable’ forces within the limited budgetary framework available for defence. If spent wisely, the €180 billion of the 27 combined should be more than sufficient to finance the global ambitions of the EU.
THE EU’S AFRICA STRATEGY: WHERE DO WE COME FROM AND WHERE DO WE GO?

Jean de Ponton d’Amécourt, Under-Secretary for Policy and Strategic Affairs, French Ministry of Defence

Jean de PONTON d’AMECOURT is Under Secretary for Policy and Strategic Affairs of the Ministry of Defence in Paris. After graduation from the Ecole Nationale d’Administration – which trains the elite of France’s public service – he joined the French Foreign Ministry in 1974, dealing with European economic affairs, before being posted to the Ministry’s Policy Planning Staff. He then served as a First Secretary in the French Mission to the United Nations in New York, before taking up a Counsellor position at the French Embassy in Washington. He then spent four years in the private sector, in a senior management position in Saint-Gobain, the glass-making industrial group, before returning to the Foreign Ministry in 1986 to be Deputy Assistant Secretary for Disarmament. From 1986-87 he worked in the Ministry of Defence as Diplomatic Adviser to the Minister, and from 1988 he was the Executive Secretary General of the Paris Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. In 1989, Mr d’Amécourt moved back to the private sector, taking a series of high-level management positions with International Distillers and Vintners, including that of Managing Director for Europe, before becoming Chairman and Chief Executive of Grand Metropolitan Foods, Europe, then Director of Roland Berger Strategy Consultants, and eventually Managing Partner of the French subsidiary of the Harvard-based strategic consultancy, the Monitor Group.

Things are changing in Africa. We now understand the situation there better. In turn, the continent has been giving durable signs of its endeavour for change. The birth of the African Union and of NEPAD, the strengthening of the role of regional economic communities and the emergence of a new generation of national leaders have changed Africa and its relations with Europe.

In Europe, we have acknowledged the fact that the European Union’s relationship with Africa has for a long time been far too asymmetrical. There have been large gaps between the definition of policies and their implementation. Differences among bilateral and European multilateral cooperation have been numerous. Contrasts between policies carried out by the Commission in the field of trade cooperation and development aid and the Council’s activities in the field of peace and security have been legion. Yet in December 2005, the Council adopted the European Union’s Strategy for Africa, which from then on provided a basis to guide our actions. The next step will be a joint African-European approach to be adopted at the Lisbon EU-Africa Summit during the Portuguese Presidency next semester.

Africa and Europe are partners. This is also the case in the field of peace and security. Drawing lessons from the EU’s actions in the Congo is an important case in this regard. Our policy there is multidimensional. It has included two autonomous military operations. It will carry on with two civil-military missions, started a while ago, one in the field of security sector reform and another one in the field of police. From both types of operations, I would draw three lessons learned.

Regarding the two military operations, Artemis and EUFOR DRC, these are the following. First, Africa is a strategic priority for Europe. Those two missions have shown that the military responsibility taken by the European Union in Africa matches the European Union’s vision of Africa as a strategic priority in its Security Strategy. In addition, the autonomous character of the operations (as opposed to Berlin Plus) emphasizes the requirement for the EU to play its role on the international scene with appropriate foreign policy attributes, including military means.
Second, the African-European partnership established in this context has constituted a breakthrough. In contrast, consider the situation in Darfur, which, unfortunately, has been dramatic. The international community is still bargaining with the local authorities to be allowed to offer its assistance. In the meantime, it is not able to protect thousands of victims from being considered as instruments of warfare. In the DRC, we have been saved from such a danger because from the start, the local authorities have acknowledged their need for assistance and cooperation with the international community. We see the results now. Security and stability is at hand for both continents, Africa and Europe.

The third lesson is purely European. It calls for a permanent European military chain of command. So far, we have been lucky. Artemis was a mission mainly carried out by France in the service of the European Union. EUFOR DRC was a truly European multinational mission, with all its operational drawbacks. The distance between the strategic, operational and tactical headquarters have induced hazard and risk in the mission. We need to reunite permanently strategic and operational facilities of the European Union. Otherwise, we risk loosing the ESDP, this instrument of peace and stability that we have created for ourselves and in the service of international crisis management.

Equally, EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC DRC, the civil-military missions, offer three lessons. First, I wish to acknowledge the strong European will to reinforce African security and stability structures. This goes together with demands from Africa to engage in this process and to benefit from experience and cooperation in this field. The two missions have produced results and progress. We now have a police-training centre that will be able to train personnel to ensure local security. Regarding security sector reform, 14 brigades - totalling 46000 soldiers - have already been mixed, trained and integrated, out of 18 planned in the national strategic plan for army reform. Second, I want to underline our commitment to a long term Africa-Europe cooperation. It is known to everyone that one doesn't manage the profound reform of a war-torn country overnight. Both local authorities and Europe are engaged in this field until the reforms are anchored in the hearts and minds of all. Third, we need to solve the bureaucratic rivalries between Council and Commission and between Europe and Member States. The future rests on an integrated security sector reform mission that includes the Commissions’ activities in the field of administration and justice as well as those of the Council in the field of army and police reform. There is no other way.

Africans and Europeans have in the DRC adopted and followed a strategy that is comprehensive, responsible, and achievable. Today it shows results, both in emergency stabilisation and long term development. In general terms the EU-Africa cooperation is based on a strategic partnership between the EU and the regional organisations in Africa, in particular the African Union. Key to this partnership is the provision of support to the development of sustainable capabilities for conflict prevention, management and resolution by those organisations and their Member States. Our European Concept for strengthening African capabilities for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, adopted in November 2006, paves the way for true cooperation in this field. I call for a wide participation of all European Member States in the implementation of this concept as well as its inclusion in the next Lisbon summit declaration.
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The Mission of the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung

"In the service of democracy, peace and development" – this is the motto that the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung applies to its work and mission. The motto applies not only for its commitment in Germany, especially in Bavaria, of course, but also abroad.

Former German Federal President Roman Herzog once said that "education towards democracy" was the "permanent and real responsibility of political foundations". He stated that this education helped "citizens of an open society to participate in the developmental process of a democracy with as much knowledge as possible".

The understanding of a democracy must be newly acquired in each generation.

Political connections must be made very clear – especially to young people. Only then can they be motivated to commit themselves and to take on responsibility. To make it short: democracy requires political education.

Besides this conviction effort for our democracy and the free, legal and social order, the fundamental principles and norms of our community must also be ensured and firmly anchored in the conscience of all citizens. The fast paced and far reaching changes our country is currently facing increases the need for values, for reliable structures and comprehensible order. In other words: the increasing pressure on state and society, economy, science and technology to be innovative makes it even more necessary to remember our historical roots and our intellectual and cultural fundamentals.

Since its establishment on April 11, 1967, the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung has been practicing political education work with the aim of supporting "the democratic and civic education of the German people with a Christian basis" – as the foundation's statutes say. Hence, the political education work of the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung is based on a human ideal that includes both free personality development and autonomy as well as social responsibility and solidarity. Today, this mission is more important than ever, since requirements for more autonomy, a new "culture of independence" and an "active society of citizens" are increasingly evolving.

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- the promotion of the North-South dialogue and of democratic social and political values and the strengthening of their capacities in developing countries, in particular ACP-countries and Asia;
- the consolidation of democracy, of the rule of law and of social market economy in Eastern Europe.

The HSS Brussels office was established in 1982. Since then, the office has successfully maintained a comprehensive network of contacts with decision makers, policy experts and multipliers in the EU institutions and other Brussels based organisations. A wide range of contacts with political players and important organisations in Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg has been built up as well. The Brussels Office further co-operates with other political foundations and Think Tanks and provides know-how regarding European policy issues. It organises visits of international delegations in order to offer them a first hand insight into the work of the EU through direct contacts with representatives of the European institutions. In February 2004, the Brussels Office has moved to its new offices at the Residence Palace, which also houses the International Press Centre.

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