It has been widely accepted that South Africa has a “manifest destiny” to lead its region and Africa as a whole towards peace, good governance, democracy and human rights. Yet questions have been asked about whether the South African government is a “reluctant hegemon,” hesitating to accept this considerable responsibility. This paper argues that Pretoria does indeed wish to be Africa's leader but lacks the political will and, increasingly the economic and military capacity, to play the role properly. It suggests the Ramaphosa administration has a chance to correct this and assert South Africa's continental leadership, for South Africa's sake and that of Africa.
What can President Ramaphosa do to establish South Africa as a viable African power?

Peter Fabricius

Mandela warns his African peers that South Africa is going to be on their case.

The question of South Africa’s leadership (some call it “hegemony”) in its region – both Southern Africa and Africa as a whole – has preoccupied and perplexed politicians, analysts and diplomats ever since the dawn of democracy. “Leadership” here would mean exerting South Africa’s considerable political, economic and military power and moral authority to expand peace, democracy, human rights and general good governance across Southern Africa and the continent. It entails, among others, the building and maintenance of institutions to inculcate those values and disciplining of states which deviate from or otherwise undermine them. The new ANC government assumed office already bearing a widespread assumption, both at home and abroad, that it had a “manifest destiny” to rescue Africa, i.e. to harness the powers of Africa’s largest economy and military, to pacify and develop what was then still a Continent largely racked by conflict and bedevilled by dismally-poor governance and poverty.

Democratic South Africa’s first President Nelson Mandela evidently had no problem accepting that responsibility. Barely one month into his presidency, he told his fellow African leaders at the OAU summit in Tunis, in June 1994, that with apartheid South Africa finally off the OAU’s agenda, it was time to discuss what South Africa’s contribution now should be “to the making of the new African renaissance.”

“Africa cries out for a new birth,” Mandela said, before bluntly telling his new peers that “where there is something wrong in the manner in which we govern ourselves, it must be said that the fault is not in our stars, but in ourselves that we are ill-governed.” Mandela took up his own challenge early on, intervening diplomatically, in Lesotho in 1994, to persuade the main political actors there to peacefully reverse the so-called “royal coup” and to restore constitutional government. In 1997 he and Deputy President Thabo Mbeki mounted an ambitious attempt to mediate a peaceful resolution to the civil war which had just erupted in Zaire, by bringing together Mobutu Sese Seko and rebel leader Laurent Kabila on board a SA navy ship offshore. Mandela and Mbeki failed, Kabila took power by force, but South Africa remained on the case.

In 1998, still on Mandela’s watch, South Africa conducted perhaps its most controversial regional intervention, dispatching troops to Lesotho to abort an incipient coup carried out following opposition rejection of parliamentary election results. The invasion unexpectedly provoked a furious military reaction from Lesotho and in the ensuing fighting and rioting, nine South African troops, over 50 Basotho soldiers and several civilians died and much property was destroyed in rioting and looting. But the coup was prevented and South African mediators remained to help Lesotho devise a more representative electoral system, though, 21 years later, it is still on the case as the tiny country is still prone to political instability.
Mbeki institutionalizes the African Renaissance

After taking office in 1999, Mbeki institutionalized the African Renaissance vision which Mandela had disclosed at Tunis. “Acting against the apartheid era presumption that South Africa was ‘an island of European civilization’ on the continent” Mbeki replaced it with a vision of South Africa being integral to Africa, as Chris Alden and Maxi Schoeman have pointed out.²

Mbeki mobilized the support of other strong continental leaders, notably Nigeria’s Olusegun Obasanjo, to transform the moribund Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the more dynamic African Union in 2002 – with a mandate to uphold democracy and human rights and to intervene in the affairs of fellow African states, even forcefully, to curb atrocities. Mbeki also conceived accompanying institutions such as the ambitious pan-African New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad), the African Peer Review Mechanism – an instrument for African leaders to critique each other’s governance – and the Pan African Parliament.

Mbeki returned to DRC, hosting the Sun City peace talks which eventually ended the civil warfare – the so-called “Second Congo War” - in 2003 and ushered in the first democratic elections since 1960, in 2006.

South Africa backed up its mediation efforts by deploying a contingent of over one thousand troops to the first UN peacekeeping mission in DRC, from 1999. In 2013 Pretoria intensified its military contribution by giving its UN peacekeeping contingent a robust combat mandate as part of the newly-formed Force Integration Brigade, tasked with neutralising armed rebel groups in eastern DRC. South African troops, including pilots of South Africa Rooivalk attack helicopters, were decisive in defeating the M23 rebels backed by Rwanda.

Meanwhile in 1999, Mbeki deployed first ex-president Mandela and then later Deputy President Jacob Zuma to mediate the Arusha Peace Agreement between Tutsi-minority Burundi President Pierre Buyoya and mainly Hutu armed rebel groups – and also deployed South African troops to Burundi in 2003 to back up the peace deal. SADC also appointed Mbeki as its mediator in the Zimbabwe crisis where he brokered a power-sharing deal between President Robert Mugabe’s ZanuPF and Morgan Tsvangirai’s Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 2008.

In 2004, the AU appointed Mbeki as mediator to try to end the civil war in Cote d’Ivoire where he made some progress before peace talks bogged down.

Mbeki also took the lead in representing Africa to the wider world. Starting with the G8 summit in Okinawa in 2000 he helped establish an African dialogue with this club of the world’s wealthiest nations. This persuaded them to provide more development support and debt relief for the Continent – in large part by offering Nepad and the APRM as guarantee that Africa would do its part to ensure the aid was well spent.

Zuma continues the Africa policy, but less enthusiastically

Mbeki was abruptly and prematurely “recalled” from office in 2008 by the ANC under Jacob Zuma whom he had fired in 2005 because he was suspected of corruption and who had then defeated him in a contest for the presidency of the ANC in 2007.

History will remember Jacob Zuma’s presidency, from 2009 to 2018, mainly for “state capture”, the astonishing way in which he allowed his business associates, particularly the notorious Gupta brothers, to take over much of the running of the state, including deciding on key appointments to the cabinet and state owned enterprises. Zuma’s preoccupation with self-aggrandisement and with avoiding prosecution for corruption distracted him greatly from the proper responsibilities of government. His administration did however continue some of Mbeki’s African diplomacy, though Zuma’s backing for Nepad and the APRM significantly declined. But South Africa did maintain its mediation role within SADC, as Zuma accepted the role of the regional body’s mediator in both Madagascar, where a crisis erupted in 2009 when President Marc Ravalomanana was ousted in a coup led by
Andry Rajoelina, and in Lesotho where a coup attempt by troops loyal to his predecessor forced Prime Minister Tom Thabane to flee to South Africa in 2014. In Madagascar, South Africa's mediation – bolstered by other international organisations – did lead to new elections in December 2013 which resolved the immediate crisis. In Lesotho, South Africa's mediation also defused the immediate crisis, though it has continued to simmer.

Zuma continued Mbeki’s role in Zimbabwe, mainly by trying – in vain, as it transpired - to ensure that Zanu PF created a level political field for the 2013 elections. It was also on Zuma’s watch that South African troops were deployed along with soldiers from Tanzania and Malawi into eastern DRC as the Force Intervention Brigade with a robust mandate to “neutralize” armed groups such as the Rwanda-backed M23. It was also on his watch that 15 South African soldiers died in a clash with Seleka rebels in Central African Republic in March 2013, on a mission that was never properly defined or explained.

Pretoria also played an active role in increasing economic integration both in SADC and the AU. It took charge of the SACU-Plus-Mozambique bloc in its negotiations with the EU for the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and has played a leading role in advancing the Tripartite Free Trade Agreement and the African Continental Free Trade Agreement, the latter of which will create a market of some 1,2 billion people with a combined GDP of US$2,24 trillion.

And it was also during Zuma’s presidency that South Africa was invited to join the G20 group of “systemically important” economies and also BRICs – the Brazil, Russia, India and China forum of large emerging economies - which then became BRICS. South Africa immediately gave BRICS an African mandate, inviting several African leaders to meet the BRICS leaders at the first summit Pretoria hosted, in 2013, with a view to their possibly tapping into the huge development-financing resources of China in particular.

Zuma’s other notable diplomatic gambit was to lead Algeria, Chad, Tanzania and Uganda in establishing ACIRC - the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises - an apparently temporary rapid-response military force comprising battalions of the five member countries, to intervene swiftly in continental crises before more formal forces could be mobilised. The Zuma administration also announced the imminent establishment of the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) which would channel South African development assistance mainly into Africa, sometimes in conjunction with traditional donor countries. Zuma also formally articulated the widely-held notion that South Africa was an economic “gateway to Africa,” a base for foreign investors and traders to do business with the continent.

Ramaphosa raises hopes of a return to Africa which remain to be fulfilled

Ramaphosa has continued the seemingly interminable Lesotho mediation efforts - for which he became SADC special envoy while still Deputy President – and South African troops remain in DRC.

Yet, after what seemed a hopeful moment early in 2019 where he looked as though he might join some other African leaders in calling out the clearly-rigged elections in DRC, Ramaphosa then slipped back into line, accepting Felix Tshisekedi’s election victory as a fait accompli. And he has joined the regional chorus regularly blaming Zimbabwe's continuing economic crisis on a few remaining targeted Western sanctions. Viewed as a whole, this has been quite an energetic record of African activism by Pretoria, though not without qualification. Alden and Schoeman have noted, in another paper, that this African Renaissance campaign, mostly conceived and executed by Mbeki (though continued by his successors), as well as the aggressive drive into Africa by South African companies – an important component of South Africa’s soft power on the continent – set the stage “for the exercise of substantive South African structural power over the rest of the African continent.”
This had led to a populist acceptance of the notion of South Africa as an African hegemon/regional power, with many scholars concurring. The two authors cite many such scholars describing South Africa in terms such as a “benign hegemon” in Africa, or a growing middle power acting as “bridge-builder” between Africa and the world. “Indeed, South Africa’s elevation in 2009 and 2010 as Africa’s only member of the G20 and BRICS seemed to confirm its unique status,” they observe.4

South Africa: “reluctant hegemon?”

Yet Alden and Schoeman contend instead that, on closer analysis, “the case for South African hegemonic dominance over the continent is challenged by a number of issues”.5 These include the relative decline of South Africa’s “anemic domestic economy” to the point where it now produces less than 25 per cent of sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP – versus over 50 per cent in 1994. More recently, one should add, Nigeria has overtaken South Africa as the continent’s largest economy. This economic decline raises doubts about the affordability of an activist African agenda. Alden and Schoeman also cite as evidence of the weakness of South Africa’s claim to hegemonic status its “limited ability to translate many of the key features of South Africa’s putative economic, financial and military preponderance over the rest of Africa into solid foreign and economic gains in cases as diverse as Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo and most recently the Central African Republic”. In particular they mention “the failure of South Africa to successfully exercise influence over other African regimes which deliberately act against its core interests, best represented by the case of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe where Pretoria had substantive economic leverage at its disposal but also visible in Swaziland where South African economic dominance is even greater.”6 The dwindling South African economy may also explain why, nearly a decade after SADPA was conceived, it has still not been established.

One should add, as further evidence for South Africa’s declining potential as a regional power, that South Africa has also lost the “institutional memory” of its own transition model, which it earlier exported to other transitions in Africa, with some success, such as in DRC, as Liesl Louw-Vaudran has noted, and she adds that “(r)esearchers and commentators agree that South Africa no longer has the military capacity it possessed at the time [of Mbeki]”.7 “The momentum behind South Africa’s peacemaking efforts on the continent, epitomized by former president Thabo Mbeki’s African Renaissance, seems to have been lost. The political will to mobilize resources to this end is no longer as strong as before.”

Louw-Vaudran also observed that with China in particular aggressively expanding its commercial presence in Africa, and working directly with individual African countries, South Africa was no longer much needed as an African gateway.8 Even within South Africa’s own foreign policy establishment there has been sharp criticism of South Africa’s recent foreign policy performance. After President Cyril Ramaphosa ousted Zuma to become national president in 2018, his new International Relations and Cooperation Minister Lindiwe Sisulu commissioned a review of foreign policy lead by former deputy foreign minister Aziz Pahad. It concluded that, during the Zuma administration, “Because both South Africa and other countries that used to play leading roles on the African continent, such as Nigeria, had, for various reasons, vacated the political leadership on the continent, there emerged other countries that occupied that vacuum, and thus being able to lead on many issues on the African continent as well as with relations with outside regions and countries.”9

This development was “an indictment on South Africa”. The Panel recommended a host of measures to return South Africa’s Africa policy to the – supposedly – golden Mbeki era, including re-instituting an Africa multilateral division within the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (alongside the existing Africa bilateral division).
Notwithstanding that the panel, comprising mainly Mbeki supporters, was inclined to mythologize his foreign policy, it is certainly true that Pretoria's political capital in Africa did diminish during the Zuma years. This was aggravated by a sense that he was more motivated by personal commercial and political interest than any altruistic vision for the continent. The aggressive, head-butting campaign which South Africa launched to get former Home Affairs Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma elected as AU Commission chairperson in 2012 was presented as a measure of Pretoria's commitment to the continent. And it came at a price. The hard campaign lost South Africa many friends on the continent. In the end, though, the suspicion persisted that getting Dlamini Zuma into the AU chair was more about domestic than African politics. For despite paying that high price for the job, Dlamini-Zuma didn't even run for a second term in 2017, instead going home to stand (unsuccessfully) for ANC president. This reinforced perceptions that Jacob Zuma had simply "parked" his ex-wife in Addis Ababa for a few years, removing her as a possible political rival until the time was opportune for her to succeed him as party and national president.

But if it's true that Zuma was not a genuine Africanist, it is also true that, even under Mbeki, South Africa failed to wield its considerable political and economic clout in the wider interests of the African people by putting pressure on other African governments to stop undemocratic behaviour, the violation of human rights and the general abuse of their citizens.

His biggest failure was surely Zimbabwe where he backed Zanu PF to the hilt, regardless of its quite glaringly undemocratic and indeed inhumane behaviour. Mbeki apparently condoned all of Mugabe's wrongs, because he believed that Britain was using the MDC as a front for its own interests in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwe scenario has played out in several other countries since, most notably in DRC and South Sudan where Pretoria has usually taken the side of the incumbent in election disputes or civil war. The way it effectively held South Sudanese vice president Riek Machar under de facto house arrest for a year, supposedly to facilitate peace in his country, was a glaring example.

Why has South Africa's Africa policy been so disappointing to so many?

Some analysts have suggested this might be because South Africa doesn't really desire the role of "hegemon" after all. The German scholar Sandra Destradi has offered South Africa as an example of what she calls "reluctant regional powers", or reluctant "rising powers"- countries which have all the power to influence regional and global politics but which somehow don't. She cites Germany, India and Brazil as other examples.10 As testimony of South Africa's supposed reluctance, she invokes Abel Esterhuysen who has written that "In terms of economic and military strength, Pretoria should be Africa's 'natural' guide yet "South Africa's reluctance to sometimes act decisively in its capacity as a leader raises questions. South Africa often seems to steer away from the dictum that to be in charge you need to take charge."11

Destradi defines "reluctance" as comprising mainly "hesitation" and "recalcitrance". "Hesitation", in her definition, includes not taking the initiative – for instance on the UN Security Council; delaying taking action and flip-flopping between different positions on issues, often because of varying opinions among different government agencies. "Recalcitrance", Destradi defines as ignoring or rejecting the demands or requests of other countries to take action.

Reluctance - or incapacity?

Is South Africa really such a reluctant regional power?

Alden and Schoeman think not. They have asserted strongly, that, "Far from being a reluctant hegemon, South African history is marked by a drive to fulfil an ambition predicated on its 'manifest destiny' as Africa's leader."12 And certainly Mandela's forthright "mission statement" to the OAU in 1994, Mbeki's ambitious African Renaissance pro-
ject, even some of Zuma’s African mediations, even if much less systematic than Mbeki’s; and the Pahad panel’s appeal for a return under Ramaphosa to the active interventionism of the Mbeki years, suggest strongly that for the most part the ANC government is still hearing the call of that manifest destiny. Nonetheless one can see elements of reluctance, as Destardi defines it, in Pretoria’s foreign policy behaviour over the years and in the more immediate past.

Flip-flopping or inconsistency has been evident in several South African positions. Perhaps the most notorious example was in its vote on the UN Security Council for military intervention in Libya in 2011 and then its later condemnation of the military intervention and its vow to support no Security Council resolution which even so much as mildly criticised the subsequent gross human rights abuses by the Syrian government in the civil war there. Another inconsistency has been South Africa’s strong condemnation of Morocco for its occupation of the Western Sahara, while it has turned a blind eye to so many other human rights abuses on the continent, in Zimbabwe, South Sudan, DRC, Swaziland and elsewhere. Or in the way Pretoria has so often resisted calls for intervention in crises such as those just mentioned, and yet recently, at the UN Security Council, joined the two other African members, Cote d’Ivoire and Equatorial Guinea, in insisting that Sudan should be suspended from the African Union until the military junta which had ousted Omar al-Bashir handed power over to a civilian government. In doing so South Africa seemed to blindside its BRICS allies, China and Russia, which doggedly pursued their usual policy of “non-intervention in the internal affairs of member states.” Another recent inconsistency that has been observed in South Africa’s behaviour has been its adherence to a human rights agenda at the Security Council on some issues – such as the Sudan vote and its support for Germany’s resolution on opposing sexual violence – while at the same time apparently ignoring rigged elections in DRC, for example. Or a litany of misgovernance in Venezuela.

Some of this one could ascribe to clashes between different foreign policy objectives. In the case of the UN SC Resolution 1973 vote for example, the clash was apparently between South Africa’s human rights ambitions and its anti-imperialist, Africa-first agenda.

South Africa is not hesitant but independent

Pretoria would no doubt defend its African policy on the grounds that it is not a reluctant, hesitant or inconsistent regional power, but merely acts independently of all greater powers. And so it would claim it has resisted the pressure of Western powers to intervene in some African crises such as Zimbabwe, while also resisting the pressure of rival powers such as China and Russia, not to intervene in say, Sudan. Thus it would insist it has pursued a “consistent” independent policy. It is hard though, not to discern a certain anti-Western bias at times in South Africa’s Africa policy on the ground.

For instance, no matter how eloquently the ANC might defend its Zimbabwe policy in theoretical terms, in the end, its failure to exert any real influence there has resulted in an economic cripple, a failed state on South Africa’s doorstep, which is also sending large numbers of refugees into South Africa, to increase the burden on an already overburdened state as well.

As Stephanie Wolters of the Institute for Security Studies has written, by repeatedly siding with the Mugabe government in moments of crisis, SADC, and in particular South Africa “have facilitated the destruction of the economy and the pauperisation of the Zimbabwean population.” Some analysts suspect that South Africa’s invocation of the reluctant Big Brother argument is really a mask for the fact that it has lost the ability to really play the role of Big Brother anyway, for the mainly economic reasons cited above. One could add that South Africa has also faced scepticism from other African countries, especially other continental powers, such as Nigeria, about its ambition to be an African leader. More recently, ever more frequent eruptions of xenophobic – or “Afrophobic” – violence as it has been
dubbed, targeting other Africans in South Africa, have further diminished South Africa’s influence across the continent.

Some have suggested that South Africa’s influence now hardly extends beyond the four other members of the Southern African Customs Union, which are bound to it by a free trade agreement ironically dating back well into the apartheid era (in fact to 1910).

South Africa: a symbolic leader of Africa?

Alden and Schoeman have more recently offered the novel idea that South Africa has now become a mere “symbolic hegemon” (or perhaps a representative hegemon) in Africa. They arrive at this conclusion by noting that despite South Africa’s clearly diminishing influence on the continent, the international community still accords it the status of Africa’s representative in global forums, by granting it membership of such organisations as the G20 and BRICS.14 The two authors note that many analysts have predicted that South Africa will decline – or indeed already has begun declining – as a regional power, from the heyday of the presidency of the global icon Mandela.

“Yet, early in its third decade as a democracy, the country has retained and expanded its reputation as an emerging power, playing an active role in global summits through its skillful usage of the notion of “African representivity,” they write.15 Perhaps that is a sign, one might add, of how desperate the international community is for an African country to respectfully fill the role of continental representative.

Whether that will remain true, as other African countries like Nigeria continue to rise, might become the story of South Africa’s Africa policy during the third decade of the 21st Century.

For South Africa, under the Ramaphosa administration, to really sustain its position even as Africa’s unofficial representative leader, but more than that, to make a real impact on the Continent, it will have to accept that leadership is not a popularity contest.

Going beyond representivity

It has been suggested that Pretoria is trapped in a Catch 22; that if it really confronts other African governments about their unacceptable behaviour, it will risk losing the African support on which its representivity in forums like the G20 and BRICS precisely depends. The counter to that argument, though, is that such representivity will remain merely symbolic – and therefore rather meaningless – unless South Africa can really influence the behaviour of those other African governments.

Alden and Schoeman have acknowledged that “(t)his symbolic representivity of the region introduces substantive constraints on South Africa’s ability to lead and has induced a number of strategies by the government aimed at off-setting these limitations. These are manifested variously as a preference for unobtrusive foreign policy actions and consensus-building strategies that underscore collective African support.”16

The suggestion here seems to be that by increasingly taking “unobtrusive foreign policy actions” and seeking consensus, Pretoria is in effect making a virtue of necessity, since it lacks the ability to enforce its will anyway.

Louw-Vaudran has written that South Africa badly needs to revive its role as a “norm entrepreneur” – in effect “exporting” values such as democracy and human rights to the rest of the continent.17 She believes “it would be strategic for South Africa to regain its status as champion of peace and democracy in Africa, as it could have positive spin-offs domestically. Peace and prosperity on the continent will directly benefit South Africa’s own economic interests, given that it is one of the biggest investors in Africa.”18

As a society South Africa certainly has proved itself capable of producing the right norms, notably those emanating from the Constitution. The country’s courts overturned several decisions by the Zuma administration in which it had put its African relations above the demands of the Constitution. These included Pretoria’s granting of diplomatic immunity to Grace Mugabe on assault charges in 2017, failure to arrest then Sudanese Presi-
dent Omar al-Bashir on behalf of the ICC in 2015, its withdrawal from the ICC in 2017 without parliamentary approval and its participation in SADC’s suspension of the SADC tribunal from 2012.

Well into his presidency, Ramaphosa had still not implemented the December 2017 ANC policy decision to withdraw from the ICC anyway. A good sign.

Now another interesting legal case – which may yet prove to be a case study in South Africa’s African foreign policy – is currently unfolding where the Ramaphosa administration is showing signs of going further in putting South Africa’s Africa policy on a sound constitutional footing. South Africa’s justice minister Ronald Lamola has just successfully petitioned the Johannesburg High Court to overturn a decision by his predecessor Michael Masutha, to extradite former Mozambican finance minister Manuel Chang back to his home country, supposedly to face charges of massive corruption arising from a fraudulent shipping loan scheme. Masutha chose to send him to Mozambique rather than to the US which had also requested his extradition to America for the same crimes. Lamola’s lawyers argued in court that Masutha’s decision was invalid because it was based on the assumption that Chang no longer enjoyed immunity from prosecution in Mozambique. In fact he still did enjoy immunity and it seems the Mozambique government deliberately concealed this critical legal fact from the South African courts and legal authorities. Lamola now has to decide whether to extradite Chang to Mozambique or to the US, based on all the facts – which have changed somewhat since Masutha’s decision because Chang has apparently resigned from Parliament and therefore no longer enjoys immunity. Mozambique civil society nevertheless suspects that Maputo has no real intention of prosecuting him for fear of what he may reveal in court about the complicity of other senior Frelimo officials in the bribery scheme. Pretoria probably shares those suspicions of civil society. But will Lamola – i.e. the Ramaphosa administration – go as far as defying and annoying a SADC ally – and a fellow member of the Former Liberation Movement club to boot- in the name of Justice? This could prove to be a big test of Ramaphosa’s Africa policy.

Recommendations

The South African government should implement the Pahad Review Panel’s recommendations to strengthen Africa policy.

But it should go further than the Panel did, by examining also the flaws of Mbeki’s “quiet diplomacy” in Africa and drawing cogent lessons.

One of these lessons should be that an African policy – and indeed a global foreign policy grounded in South Africa’s exemplary Constitution – does not come cheap. It carries costs, both economically and politically. But it also brings long-term net rewards. South Africa and SADC should look to ECOWAS which in 2016 bluntly demanded that Gambian President Yahya Jammeh step down after stealing another election. When he hesitated, the regional body deployed troops on the border.

Ramaphosa should extradite former Mozambican finance minister Manuel Chang to the US – where he will definitely face justice – and not to his home country of Mozambique – where he probably won’t. Ramaphosa should further demonstrate the legal basis of South Africa’s African - and global - foreign policy, by permanently shelving the December 2017 ANC policy decision to withdraw South Africa from the ICC.

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ANMERKUNGEN

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16  Alden/Schoeman (2015)
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