Len Ishmael

EU-Africa Relations

Energy and the Green Transition in an Era of Crises
A New Model of Cooperation

PREFACE

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The EU and Africa are putting their cooperation on a new footing. At the most recent Summit between the European Union and the African Union on 17-18 February 2022, leaders declared a "joint vision for 2030". A key aspect of this common approach foresees greater investments in the domain of energy and the green transition in the framework of the Africa-Europe Investment Package of up to 150 billion euros, as part of the EU's Global Gateway strategy. These efforts build on the European Commission's Africa strategy of March 2020, which proposed closer future relations based on five partnerships:

1) for green transition and energy access

2) for digital transformation

3) for sustainable growth and jobs

4) for peace and governance and

5) on migration and mobility. The present study deals with the first domain, i.e. the green transition and energy.

Since the 2022 EU-AU Summit, however, the world has changed dramatically. Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has fundamentally disrupted global energy markets. While Europe is ending its decade-long dependence on Russian fossil fuels, it is entering new partnerships with other actors, many of them in Africa, to secure energy supplies. Africa has the richest solar resources worldwide and holds enormous capacities for green hydrogen. For African countries, renewed interest from Europe in both fossil and renewable fuels and greater possibilities for investments in the context of the green transition offer significant potential – a desired path to industrialisation and the creation of green jobs.

However, important challenges remain. The war in Ukraine has added yet another crisis to the already difficult context of a global pandemic, combined with a climate crisis underway, with Africa paying a disproportionate part of the price. African needs must be considered on an equal level. For example, almost half of all Africans lack electricity access in their homes and energy poverty is an issue that must be addressed. Furthermore, intra-African diversity requires a more differentiated approach to understand and address existing challenges and opportunities.

In an increasingly fractious geopolitical landscape, Africa and the EU need each other. In this context, the present study provides valuable background information and suggestions. It analyses the needs and interests of both the EU and Africa, discusses existing policies and instruments, and provides numerous recommendations as to how to adapt and develop them in order to better cooperate in climate and energy policy, unlocking mutual benefits.

I wish you an interesting read.

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Executive Summary

Report Objectives

This report presents an analysis and recommendations regarding EU-Africa relations with a focus on the green transition and energy, the first priority area of the EU's Comprehensive Strategy with Africa. It aims at identifying the areas in climate and energy policy in which jointly owned cooperation is possible, and how the partnership, ultimately, can unlock mutual benefits. Specifically, the report examines global challenges presented by this particular period of unprecedented climate, economic and geopolitical crises against which policies aimed at supporting the green transition in Africa and the EU are being implemented, and the effects of these on EU-Africa relations.

The report explores the different paths by which Africa and the EU seek to attain a low carbon future, and the reality of a variable transition in African countries which must be both managed and supported. The challenges and risks which the EU Green Deal pose for Africa, and how these might be managed while observing principles of climate justice and equity, are also discussed; so too are the perceptions of the relationship and the challenges which must be navigated in the process of resetting the partnership in this era of particular volatility and change. The report's main findings and recommendations are presented below.

Main Findings

1. Conditions have changed considerably since July 2019, when the European Union first unveiled its ambitions for the European Green Deal (EGD) charting the bloc's transition to a low carbon future. Three years later, implementation of actions relative to the EDG face a very different contextual landscape, imparting a sense of urgency to both parties. For the EU, urgency in securing energy supplies away from the decades-long reliance on Russia is an imperative. For Africa, there is urgency too. Countries face dire economic conditions after three years of pandemic and war. Many are debt distressed. The green energy transition holds the promise of a future which the continent has long desired, that of a clear path to comprehensive industrialisation. But, they are weary; all too often, the wealth of the continent's resources has been stripped away without securing the development which Africans need and want.

2. Energy poverty in Africa is a reality and must be equated the same level of attention and urgency as Europe's energy security. Nearly half of all Africans lack electricity access in their homes; 80 percent of African companies face regular disruptions to electricity supplies. Should current trends continue, more people will be without access to electricity by 2030 than at present. Investments of $500 billion are needed between 2015 – 2030, but that target remains elusive.

3. The EU's renewed interest in African fossil fuels is at odds with its policy to accelerate the transition to green energy. This poses a perception of conflict in the minds of African partners resulting in charges of EU hypocrisy and double standards. It has also raised concerns in Africa on the matter of stranded assets. In addition, rising oil and gas prices are creating distortions in the energy market, and concerns have been raised that they will further incentivise investments in fossil fuels and reverse, rather than accelerate, the path towards a decarbonised future.

4. Several new EU policies, including the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and Farm to Fork coupled with already existing EU subsidies to farmers, disadvantage Africa, not least because of the effects on African countries' preferential access to the EU market which is vital, given the value of agriculture to African economies. But these also come at a time when Africa is being pursued as a partner in the EU's search for additional supplies of fossil fuels to aid its energy security, perpetuating the impression of unequal treatment of EU interests versus Africa's. In addition, the €150 billion investment package EU-Africa Global Gateway (GG) has come in for much criticism from both European and African stakeholders alike, as lacking in transparency and inclusion, and failing to provide clarity with respect of projects which have been or are being funded.

5. While Africa's carbon footprint is small, African countries are on the front line of the effects of climate change, yet low income countries requiring higher levels of grants and concessionary financing are discriminated by European Investment Bank (EIB) procedures, and greater shares of EU climate finance are being integrated into official development assistance (ODA).

6. Supporting Africa's ambitions to a low carbon industrialised future, is a strategic win for the EU. Led by US efforts, decoupling from China continues, and companies are increasingly exploring opportunities to engage in "friend shoring". Africa's proximity to Europe provides opportunities in this regard. Investments in Africa will support EU climate

action objectives and enhance EU decoupling from China in strategic industries, while aiding competitiveness versus US firms. A stable and prosperous Africa serves African and EU interests. However, the EU will need to move from rhetoric to action in meeting African ambition and expectations of a genuine partnership.

Recommendations

1. Redefine the EU-Africa GG development mandate, publish lists of projects and financing allocated, enhance transparency in governance arrangements and enable equal ownership which includes European and African stakeholders.

2. Incentivise investments in mineral rich African countries by EU companies as part of the EU's countermeasures to the US Green subsidies contained in the Inflation Reduction Act. Ensure Africa's inclusion in discussions around new technologies, early stage research and standards setting. Deploy EU climate research funds such as the €95.5 billion Horizon Europe Programme to seed green technology research and skills training, adapted and suited to Africa's environment and development priorities.

3. Develop a framework of differentiated policies and strategies for the green transition in Africa specifically targeted to the varying resource endowments, needs and capabilities of the continent.

4. Increase the share of grants and concessionary financing, and review the lending policies of EIB and ERBD to support the climate-related needs of low-income countries in Africa. Consider mechanisms to leverage private sector capital for nature and ecosystem management. Finance programmes for green growth SMEs and jobs with a focus on youth, women and girls. Support African Countries Nationally Determined Contributions and Adaptation Plans.

5. Complement EU efforts with a multilateral approach to Africa's development. Support an African-led comprehensive framework for enabling the green transition supported by the UN, World Bank, IMF and other multilateral institutions and Africa's other global partners. Align multilateral cooperation in international finance to standardise risk mitigation instruments for currency and off-taker risks, and the use of capital markets to channel institutional investments to support Africa's transition to green energy.

6. Support creation of a multilateral Green Bank built on the Bridgetown Initiative with seed capital from the IMF and windfall taxes on oil companies to support the Loss and Damage mechanism agreed at COP27.

7. Champion a Climate Related and Justice based Global Tax on airline travel, and heavy oils used in shipping with contributions from carbon taxes (such as CBAM) to augment the pool of financing available to countries for adaptation and resilience building solutions, and the transition to a low carbon future.

Part I: Setting the Stage

In this era of polycrises, a global pandemic and a war in Europe against the backdrop of the climate crisis already underway, one gets a sense of urgency for both parties to the European Union (EU) – Africa Partnership, around the issue of energy and the green transition. For the EU, there is urgency in securing energy supplies away from the decades-long reliance on Russia – while at the same time accelerating the pace of transition towards a low carbon future. This urgency has pitted long-term goals against short-term imperatives, and has raised concerns in Africa. Africa too, faces this era of discord and disruption with urgency and weariness: urgency, because the green energy transition holds the promise of a future which the continent desires – that of a clear path to industrialisation and with it, the creation of "green" jobs to meet the demand of a growing labour force – and there is a sense that this moment must be seized.

But this requires that Africa's partners, including the EU, are aligned with both that vision and the actions required to support it. Hence the reason for weariness. Too often, the wealth of Africa's resources has not translated into the development which Africans need, and Africa remains the world's most underdeveloped continent. One senses, though, an Africa seized with greater resolve regarding the future that it needs and wants, and the opportunities which lie ahead. The quest for the EU's energy security underscores and deepens the urgency of responding to Africa's enduring energy poverty. Accommodating mutual wins for Africa and Europe will test the relationship, but this new period of relations, and the conditions within which it plays out, holds the potential to reset the partnership to one which is genuine, and fair. In this fractious geopolitical landscape Africa needs all of its friends, so too, does the EU.

1. Pandemic, War and a Fractious Geopolitical Landscape

Few could have anticipated the looming disruptions to all aspects of everyday life in July 2019, when the EU first unveiled its ambitions for the European Green Deal (EGD). The EU's quest to play a leading role in addressing the climate crisis, was presented in a raft of initiatives ranging from new standards for energy, resource use and efficiency; the development of new technologies, and the creation of future markets. Together these chart the EU's transition to a low carbon, sustainable future, and represent the EU's vision for its future and the quality of the relationships which it supports through various partnerships. Policies and instruments will permeate all aspects of EU economic life, and that of its citizens. These will affect, not only the EU's internal markets and way of life, but, some, such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), will affect the partners with whom it trades. In its external dimension the EGD, de facto, sets guidelines for Europe's relations with Africa around the green transition and energy, one of the pillars in the EU's (2020) Comprehensive Partnership with Africa.

Some three years later, the conditions within which the EGD is to be implemented are considerably altered. A global pandemic, commencing as 2019 drew to a close, followed by a war in Europe as a result of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, have converged to create multiple shocks to the global economy. Global supply lines have been disrupted; for many countries inflation is at an all-time 40-year high; energy and food security are in peril. The World Bank (WB) has identified the world's three largest economies, those of the US, China and the EU, as having "stalled" during this period of crises.[1] Forecasts for global economic output were reduced to 3.2 percent in 2022, and to 2.7 percent in 2023.[2]

In several parts of the world, particularly the Global South, issues of sovereign debt and increasing poverty, loom large. This issue of debt is important given the considerable implications for the conditions within which the green transition is to take place. Before the Covid-19 pandemic, most African countries had fiscal deficits of over 3 percent,[3] a situation which has deteriorated further as a result of both the pandemic and the war in Ukraine. Three years of soaring debt leaves little fiscal space within which to manoeuvre in the face of competing priorities including debt repayment, a continued response to managing the pandemic, and delivering on climate commitments linked to the Paris Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

African countries, while encouraged by the WB and International Monetary Fund (IMF) to borrow to finance COVID-19 recovery plans, received significantly less support than was needed, or expected. Instruments such as the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) did not scale up to the levels needed. A group of 69 low, and middle-income countries, many in Africa, have made payments "of $62 billion on public debt this year, a 35 percent increase from 2021."[4] Their combined debts have grown from $767 billion in 2019 to $948 billion in 2021.[5] Vital resources are diverted from critical spending on health, education, safe water, housing and social protection, putting vulnerable groups at greater risk.[6] By the autumn of 2022, the WB estimated that nearly 60 percent of low-income countries were "at high risk of debt distress or already experiencing it."[7]

Africans view the war in Ukraine for which they are paying a disproportionate price, as not in their interest. It comes on the heels of the pandemic during which the widely anticipated leadership and support from rich, Western countries, did not materialise. Instead early support in the form of essential medical supplies and vaccines was provided by China, India and Russia, while European efforts, for instance in the context of the COVAX facility, came late. Disruptions to global value chains have only deepened further during the war, exacerbated by Western sanctions on Russia. For the EU, the US and Western allies, the war in Ukraine has catalysed a rejuvenated, values-based alliance against a common enemy. Most of the rest of the world, however, including the majority of countries in Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Middle East, have refrained from implementing sanctions on Russia. They are choosing – not to pick a side – in a conflict in which they have no part. Even the G20 is evenly split on this matter, along a North-South divide.[8]

The decision not to pick a side is also strategic. While the EU and US's share of global wealth and output continues to decline,[9] that of the rest of the world – including Asian giants China and India, and regional actors such as Brazil, Indonesia, Turkey, South Africa and others, continues to expand. These countries are transforming economic wealth into political power on the global stage, providing a wider menu of choice for countries of the Global South.[10] The latter are focused on balancing and accommodating bilateral and multilateral relationships in a manner which serves their own interests. "To hedge their bets and protect their interests, they are deepening their alliances in distinctly non-western multilateral groupings including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the BRICS originally comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, but now expanded in a BRICS+ configuration."[11]

The world is being fragmented into two blocs aided by the effects of war and sanction regimes against Russia. In the process, globalisation, for decades the corner stone of global prosperity and stability, is being rolled back, as "de-swifting" and "friend-shoring" become part of the new reality. The EU-Africa partnership is not isolated from the geopolitics of the day. The fractious and discordant state of relations between the West and much of the rest of the world, and the continent's enduring underdevelopment, have set the stage for Africa to be clearer about its interests in discussions with the EU on the matter of the green transition.

2. Africa`s Challenges: Agenda 2063 and the Paris Agreement

There is widespread agreement on the need to consider adaptation, resilience and mitigation efforts in response to the climate crisis, at the same time as planning for the green transition and a decarbonised or low-carbon future world. This implies a "whole economy" approach involving economic activities, infrastructure development, the use of land and raw materials, biodiversity and ecosystems, and the transition to energy efficient and resilient urban environments.

This approach is in keeping with that of the EU's EGD. For Africa, this is an opportunity to reconstruct its development paradigm away from the current status quo of heavy dependence on resource use and extraction, to one which is underpinned by principles of intergenerational sustainability, as well as ideals of equity, justice and inclusion. This requires that initiatives in support of Africa's future development are aligned with the continent's priorities. It also implies changes in the quality of the relationship between Africa and its partners, including the EU, away from a focus on purely extractive industries, towards those in which value is added. In preparing for this new era of industrialisation, Africa will need to act proactively in order to negotiate with its partners in a bid to secure its interests.

2.1 The Scale of the Problem for Africa

Africa is one of the world's regions most vulnerable to the effects of changing climate. This is due to the "continent's biophysical characteristics and diverse ecosystems, landscapes and weather systems" which are compounded by a series of socio-economic characteristics which exacerbate the continent's vulnerabilities.[12] With more than 17 percent of the world's population, Africa's contribution to greenhouse gas emissions is less than 4 percent. The President of Kenya, in his capacity as Coordinator of the Committee of the African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC), noted: "Africa's special needs and circumstances must be recognized and must inform climate support to our region. We need a quantum increase in climate finance and that finance must be easier to access. We need a greater focus on adaptation, including financing for adaption."[13] The African Development Bank (AfDB) has projected that Africa will need investments of $3 trillion to meet mitigation and adaption targets set in the continent's Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC's), by 2030.[14]

The UN State of the Climate in Africa Report (2019) estimates that climate change is costing the continent $40 billion each year, until 2030.[15] The death rate from climate change "is 60 – 80 percent higher than in the next vulnerable region (Southeast Asia) due to existing vulnerabilities and the weakened ability of Africa to adapt to the impacts of climate change."[16] The continent is also challenged by the effects of its high dependence on natural resources for development, a high degree of dependency on rain-fed agriculture, widespread poverty and inequality, high degrees of informal sector activity, lack of alternative livelihoods, low levels of education and skills, inadequate access to basic health care, and inequitable access to credit and financial resources.[17] Sixty-five percent of the population depend on subsistence agriculture in food production; 54 percent of the projected increase in undernourishment globally will be in Africa.[18] Africa's population is also burgeoning. By 2050, the continent will hold 25 percent of the world's population. Productivity in agriculture will need to increase by 50 percent to meet the food requirements of the population by 2050.[19]

The African Union (AU) Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan (2022-2032), (CCRDS), identifies sustainable domestic energy consumption and renewable energy generation as being key to achieving a low emissions and climate resilient future. While access to reliable and adequate electricity services is vital for economic development and securing social wellbeing and welfare, "nearly half of all Africans lack electricity access in their homes; 80 percent of African companies face regular disruptions to electricity supplies. Outside of South Africa, total energy generated must more than triple by 2030 to meet demand."[20] While renewable energy sources are vital in meeting demand, and the continent has a wealth of renewable stocks, wind, solar, biomass and geothermal stocks contribute only 1 percent of supplies. Hydro generates 22 percent of supply in Sub-Saharan Africa, and while there is scope to scale up in this sector, investments of $500 billion are needed between 201 – 2030.[21] Biomass – mainly charcoal and wood – is the main source of domestic energy consumption across the continent, deepening environmental degradation effects and compromising health, especially in rural areas.

The AU's CCRDS is aligned to several global frameworks including the UN's Agenda 2030, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and the UN Convention for Biological Diversity. It is also aligned to continental frameworks including Africa's Agenda 2063, and protocols, including the African Agricultural Development Programme, the Programme for Infrastructure Development, the Science, technology and Innovation Strategy for Africa, the Continental Free Trade Area (AFCFTA), the Accelerated Industrial Development for Africa Initiative (AIDA), the AU's Green Recovery

Action Plan, and others.[22] CCRDS also builds on initiatives contained in several regional plans and emphases the need for regional cooperation and more effective international partnerships. It is an integral pillar in support of the continent's vision for "an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens, representing a dynamic force in the international arena," embedded at the heart of the continent's Agenda 2063.[23]

Importantly, CCRDS emphasises principles of climate justice, African-led and African owned innovation, social and cultural values, leveraging natural endowments, unleashing renewable energy potential and the creation of transformative industrial pathways, in a people-centered approach, "which is inclusive, looks out for the most vulnerable, with equal access to the green economy economic opportunities."[24] The AU's Green Recovery Plan launched in July 2021, is also part of the policy framework which seeks to guide the continent's transition to a green economy. It focuses on the need to increase climate financing in support of the energy transition, sustainable approaches to biodiversity, land, forest and oceans management, resilient agriculture, and green and resilient cities.

2.2 Attaining SDG 7

Dealing with the climate change crisis, shifting to a low carbon future, attaining SDG7 targets,[25] and closing the gap with respect of the energy poverty faced by most of Africa's people, requires that this new era of industrialisation is harnessed fully in supporting the continent's priorities with respect to developing new industries, building new skills and jobs, and accessing appropriate technology. Despite its great natural wealth, Africa's resource endowments have not contributed to the level of development commensurate with African aspirations and well-being. Much of the country remains underdeveloped. Many African children are malnourished; in 2020, 58.5 million suffered from stunted growth.[26] Africa remains the only region of the world in which poverty is growing. There are actions which the continent must undertake to ensure that the Green Transition and Energy Pillar delivers for the African people.[27] While some of these, presented below, are more of a statement regarding what Africa must do for itself, they are presented here since they provide additional avenues for EU technical and other initiatives in support of African efforts, and are complementary to more substantive discussions contained in Part IV of this report.

Managing Variable Effects

The green energy transition will result in variable effects across the continent. While this issue is discussed in more detail in subsequent sections of this report, managing a series of regional specific effects, should be the focus of a Pan-African Plan aligned with Africa's principles of energy justice, equity and inclusion. North African countries and others which are fossil dependent, rich in critical raw materials (CRM), or in which energy poverty is most prevalent – will all require different instruments, actions, and platforms in managing the transition to a low carbon future and reaping its benefits.

Designing a Blueprint for Energy Transition

While regional communities such as ECOWAS, for example, have been successful in supporting the building of regional blocs and internal markets, African-wide aspirations captured in the African Mining Vision, Comprehensive African Development Programme on Agro-Ecological Threats, the Pan-African Agenda on Ecosystem Restoration for Increased Resilience, Agenda 2063 and other continental and regional initiatives identified previously, need to be aligned with Africa's plans to manage the green transition and energy to ensure a "whole economy" approach.[28] Sector-specific policies in agriculture, mining, biodiversity, and the circular economy will also require review.[29] Updating surveys of CRMs and other strategic minerals and ores are also needed to identify areas for foreign direct investments (FDI).[30]

Regulatory Architecture for CRMs and Renewables

Appropriate laws covering new, energy efficient industries, will be needed across the continent. Refining local content laws, regulations and policies to reflect the specifics of CRMs and the transition towards low carbon industries have been identified as areas requiring review.[31] Review of the various systems regarding international contract law to ensure best practices are in place, is also needed to provide confidence to foreign and domestic investors alike, and to ensure that African interests are secured.

Private Sector Engagement

This is an opportunity for the African continent to undertake a manpower audit to map the skills and jobs required to support new green industries. Private sector collaboration between African and EU business groups would be useful in this regard. Public-private sector dialogue regarding the investments and new financing instruments required, can be coordinated by the African Development Bank and Africa's Import Export Bank, with private sector consortia, to ensure the latter's input in the design and promotion of new policy instruments and financing platforms.

Engaging African Citizenry and Business

Reports suggest that "the average national climate change literacy rate in Africa is only 39 percent, with large variations within and between countries."[32] This has been identified as an impediment to embracing the potential of the green transition in benefitting Africans, and in the development of bankable projects. African Think Tanks, universities and Chambers of Commerce, NGO's and civil society, all have important roles in the discourse required around the process of transition, ensuring that it stays true to African values, norms and traditions, how it relates to external partnerships, and benefits Africans.

Part II: EU-Africa: Green Transition and Energy Policy Framework

1. The Green Transition Policy Framework

The perception of inequality remains in the asymmetric power relations within the EU-Africa partnership,[33] and the EU has been accused from time to time of falling into "might is right" mindset, and exhibiting a lack of political ambition in supporting Africa's desire for greater capabilities in manufacturing and industry.[34] However, the transition to the green economy provides an opportunity for a resetting of the relationship towards one which is more equal, responding to the priorities of both partners. The EU needs access to the abundance of resources in Africa, its nearest continental neighbour, in support of its green transition, a factor of heightened importance given current supply chain disruptions. Africa needs capital investments with which to unlock the potential of its raw wealth to secure its future and engineer the structural transformation of the continental economy. A new era of industrialisation towards low carbon industries provides a solid opportunity for wins on both sides, but plans for the future need to be carefully laid out, jointly agreed, equitable and fair.

In addition, the EU-Africa relationship is expressed through different frameworks. One is through the AU-EU configuration which involves Sub-Saharan African countries, the other is through the EU's relationship with the mostly Arab countries of North Africa in the configuration of the Middle East and North-Africa (MENA) Framework. EU-Africa relations are also expressed through the Team Europe approach, including the EU and its member states, inclusive of the latter's development banks and implementing agencies, and the EU's European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Redevelopment (EBRD). For all African countries, while the relationship with the EU and its member states cannot be isolated from the current geopolitical landscape and the tensions around one of the most conflicted periods since the end of the Cold War, the partnership is an important one. However, an overriding concern for countries, whether in North Africa or Sub-Saharan Africa, while pursuing regional or bilateral interests within the partnership, is that they "don't want to compete with each other and undermine African interests."[35]

1.1 The AU-EU Partnership

Both the (2020) EU Comprehensive Strategy with Africa with its Green Transition and Energy pillar, and The Joint Vision for 2030 adopted by leaders on February 17-18, 2022, at the Sixth EU-African Union (AU) Summit, have identified climate and environmental issues as key elements in their cooperation. During the latter, leaders announced the "Global Gateway" (GG), a €150 billion Africa-Europe investment package to support energy and the green transition, and a common ambition for 2030 and AU Agenda 2063.

The aims of the partnership are "solidarity, security, peace and sustained economic development and prosperity for the citizens of the two Unions, today and in the future."[36] The Joint Vision also aims to promote common priorities, and eliminate inequalities. Elements of the agenda linking climate change effects, the green transition and sustainable communities were further fleshed out at the September 7, 2022, Africa-EU Energy Partnership's (AEEP) Second Meeting in a bid to "advance the Green Gateway between Africa and Europe" before COP27.[37]

On October 14, 2022, the EU and the US agreed to increase their collaboration to boost sustainable energy in Sub-Saharan Africa by "unlocking more of the continent's abundant renewable power generation potential and improving local access to affordable green energy."[38] The collaboration envisages supporting projects such as the African Continental Power System Master Plan and a number of flagship projects to mobilise public resources and leverage private sector investments.

Increasingly, climate issues, energy and the building of more resilient communities are being considered together and inseparably, and the Africa-Europe Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs has been identified as key in supporting Africa's progress towards a green and circular economy. Closing the energy access gap in Africa, and the NaturAfrica initiative to work towards biodiversity conservation and creation of jobs in green sectors, are also areas of focus. While many African countries have adopted Green Growth Strategies, and green jobs[39] activities are currently implemented notably in eastern and south-eastern African countries, most notably in Malawi, Kenya, Mauritius, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, efforts are required for scaling up across the continent.[40]

1.2 MENA-EU Framework

EU cooperation with Northern African countries takes place through the MENA framework as well as the Southern Neighbourhood platform via the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). North African countries, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, representing a diversity of energy assets, consider themselves as bridges in the African-EU relationship. Morocco, for example, invested considerably in augmenting port and ancillary infrastructure at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic to enhance its status as a "gateway" to Africa. Launched in 2008, the UfM includes the northern, eastern and southern regions of the Mediterranean. It promotes economic cooperation and integration and includes the EU 27, plus fifteen countries (among them the African countries mentioned previously). The goal is to create an integrated Mediterranean energy market around regional energy platforms for natural gas, electricity markets, renewable energy and energy efficiency.[41]

The MENA Europe Future Energy Dialogue inaugurated in June 2022, adds another layer to initiatives around the Mediterranean on energy cooperation. It is a joint initiative of the Jordanian Ministry of Energy and Germany's Federal Ministry of Economy and Climate Protection to deepen energy policy cooperation between the entire Mediterranean, Middle East and Europe by bringing together high-level participants from the worlds of politics and business, and other stakeholders.[42]

The war in Ukraine is seen by North African countries as a "golden opportunity for North African oil and gas to step in," and as a valuable tool for enhancing bilateral cooperation in the long run.[43] On October 18, 2022, in advance of COP27, Morocco and the EU signed "green partnership" deal valued at €115 million to bolster cooperation in renewables and support the former's agricultural and forestry sectors.[44] Israel, Egypt and the EU signed a trilateral MOU to increase natural gas exports to the EU via Egypt's natural gas infrastructure in line with the REPowerEU plan. Italian officials have recently signed new gas deals with Egypt to increase LNG supplies (and have undertaken several visits to Angola and the Republic of Congo).

African countries question the longevity of the requests by EU member states to increase supplies given the differences in time horizons against Europe's own net zero targets. In exchange for stepping up supplies at this time of Europe's need – they view this as the optimum period within which to secure their interests through "enhanced financing in renewables and hydrogen, development of low carbon supply chains in the region and new energy infrastructure partnerships."[45] Algeria, for example, has recently signed 15 agreements and MOUs with Italy to support energy transition, industrial and technology cooperation, energy infrastructure, start-ups and pharmaceuticals.[46] Algeria is the EU's third largest supplier of natural gas, and the EU is its largest market.

This region is not without risks for the EU given the geopolitical entanglements in the wider area, and the continuing tensions among North African neighbours including Morocco and Algeria over the Western Sahara, and lingering Spanish/Moroccan tensions. Illegal migration remains a flashpoint in the relations between the EU and Africa around the Southern Mediterranean, aggravated recently by the perception of differences in the reception provided to refugees from Ukraine, and the continuing war in Ukraine, which comes at a high price for Africa and other developing countries.

2. The EU Green Deal

The European Green Deal (EGD) recalibrates the EU's response to the effects of climate change and its various challenges.[47] As a global leader and standard setter in the arena of climate change policies, the EU has pledged to develop a stronger "green deal diplomacy" focusing on "convincing and supporting others to take on their share of promoting more sustainable development; [by] setting a credible example, and following up with diplomacy, trade policy, development support and other external policies, the EU can be an effective advocate."[48]

Implicit in the EGD is a new growth strategy with the overriding objective aimed at a net zero emission outcome by 2050, a decoupling of economic growth from resource use and placing the EU economy on a sustainable footing. Additional goals include conservation of the EU's natural capital and the protection of EU citizens' wellbeing and health. Commitments have been made to ensure that no citizens are left behind, that the risk of "energy poverty" is adequately addressed, and a "Green Oath to Do No Harm," is realized.[49] The level of ambition is high, and goals are laudable.

The EU acknowledges that "the challenges are complex and interlinked."[50] The EGD includes a raft of climate-related policy instruments including the Emissions Trading System (ETS), as well as regulations on land use, land use changes and forestry as a means of ensuring effective carbon pricing across the EU economy. The bloc's energy taxation policy will also be affected to ensure coherence with climate change objectives. On July 14, 2021, the EC adopted intermediate proposals to reduce greenhouse gas levels by 55 percent against 1990 levels, by 2030. These targets are contained in the bloc's Fit for 55 suite of policies, and are estimated to require €260 billion in additional financing to meet the climate targets of 2030, representing 1.5 percent of the EU's 2018 GDP.[51]

The EGD also focuses on energy efficiency and a redoubling of efforts aimed at renewables given the reality that "the production and use of energy across economic sectors account for more than 75 percent of the EU's greenhouse gas emissions."[52] The clean energy transition and other initiatives within the EGD have implications not only for EU businesses, economic sectors and citizens, but also for those who do business with the EU, including African countries. In an effort to reduce the potential for carbon leakage and to ensure that EU firms can compete effectively and are not encouraged to relocate to lower ambition jurisdictions, the EU has established CBAM which may be challenged in its ability to be World Trade Organisation (WTO) compliant.

3. The EU Green Deal: Challenges and Risks for Africa

The effects of the EGD for Africa are mixed. There will be winners and losers. Declining demand for fossil fuels will have direct implications for energy giants in both North Africa, as well as Sub-Saharan Africa including Angola, Nigeria, Libya, Egypt, Republic of Congo, Gabon and Ghana, especially in the context of declining prices, more so after 2030. The continent is already facing a reduction in investments in fossil fuels by private and public sector investors as well as development agencies.[53] On the other hand, the transition to cleaner forms of energy provides opportunities for other African countries including Morocco, South Africa, The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Guinea, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Ghana which are rich in the nickel, cobalt, magnesium, graphite, lithium and other minerals and rare earth elements required to support long-term energy transition in Africa, the EU, and elsewhere.[54]

Increasing demand for CRMs aligned with a low carbon future is set to increase significantly by 2030 and there is a sense that this era of "friend shoring" and "local for local" provides an opportunity for Africa to replace some Asian supply chains, given the continent's proximity to the EU. Europe's demand for decarbonized gas also offers a short to medium term windfall for African producers, since the continent's prominence in gas production with average growth rates of 5.6 percent annually, is expected to make Africa a significant global supplier by 2025.[55] Increasing demand for green hydrogen is already catalysing EU-African partnerships "to produce 40 gigawatts of hydrogen from non-EU countries by 2030" through the Clean Hydrogen Alliance.[56]

The EU-Namibia Memorandum of Understanding signed at the COP27 in 2022, is an example of the strategic partnerships possible "to ensure the development of secure and sustainable supply of raw materials, refined materials and renewable hydrogen to support the green and digital transformation of the partner's economies," with the potential to produce mutual benefits.[57] It is projected that European FDI in green hydrogen sourced in Africa could reach €75.6 billion by 2030.[58]

There are concerns, however, that new green growth industries will provide further opportunity to yet again increase Africa's dependencies on foreign technology, continue value-added leakage, create another missed opportunity in Africa's struggle for a clear path to industrialisation, deepen environmental degradation, exacerbate labour issues and contribute to compounding a host of other issues – if the transition is not managed equitably. The EGD also holds multiple implications for Africa across a number of sectors, including those related to trade, new technologies, the circular economy, agriculture, biodiversity, energy, CRMs and finance.[59] The new EU agricultural standards introduced by EU Farm to Fork policies, for example, introduce new sets of (higher) standards which might qualify as non-tariff barriers to accessing the EU market and may well be none-WTO compliant. These and other critical challenges are discussed in Part III below.

Part III: Risks and Challenges – Policy Conflicts put Relationship at Risk

Partnerships, including that which exists between Europe and Africa in the area of green transition and energy, are predicated on the premise that the interests of each partner will be considered in decisions taken and policies made. The EU-Africa partnership around this pillar, while holding much promise, is one which has also raised questions and thorny issues which are discussed below.

1. Africa's Energy Poverty versus EU's Energy Security: Same Urgency, Equal Treatment?

Africa is a continent of extreme energy poverty. "People need power in Africa and if they don't have power, it will be difficult to lift people out of poverty."[60] The continent faces an inherent policy and economic conundrum in attempting to secure the energy needs of its population, while at the same time phasing away from fossil fuels. While the EU has identified the issue of energy poverty of some EU citizens as a concern, energy poverty in Africa stands a world apart. For many, it is the reality of everyday life and is defined as "an absence of sufficient choice in accessing adequate, affordable, reliable, clean, high quality, and safe energy services to support economic and human development."[61] Women and girls are disproportionately affected, especially in rural areas. They bear the brunt of the work involved in fetching fuelwood, drawing water and processing food.[62]

Sub-Saharan Africa's share of the global population without access to electricity rose to 77 percent from 74 percent before the pandemic,[63] and inadequate access to energy is a reality for over half of the African population who enjoy four hours of electricity per day, sometimes less. A genuine partnership between Africa and Europe requires that Africa's energy poverty and the EU's energy security are afforded equal treatment and dealt with the same urgency.

2. Africa and Europe: Different Entry Points to a Low Carbon Future

Europe and Africa are continents at different stages of development; the entry point in attaining a low carbon emission future, is different, and the path along the energy transition will vary markedly. The new 1,440 km

East-Africa Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP) being developed by Uganda and Tanzania highlights important differences. Despite the International Energy Agency's (IEA) caution regarding the need to stop new fossil fuel projects if global climate targets are to be achieved, the two African countries have emphasised the priority given to their economic interests through construction of this pipeline financed by two external partners. Total Energies, an EU, French energy giant, commands a 62 percent stake, while CNOOC, a Chinese energy firm also holds shares in the $5 billion project.[64] While the EU intervened, citing environmental, climate and human rights abuses as reasons why the project should be stopped, local governments have resisted, underscoring the divide between rich, developed countries and those still seeking to grow their way out of poverty.

The bulk of the oil will be for export, mainly to Europe. "They are insufferable, so shallow, so egocentric, so wrong,"[65] Uganda's President is reported as having said in reference to the EU. According to the International Renewable Energy Agency, 92 percent of Uganda's energy is generated through renewable sources (hydro); renewables account for 84 percent of Tanzania's requirements and only 22 percent for the EU.[66] While Africa has abundant wind and solar stocks, the infrastructure to harness these is not available, since the requisite investments have not been forthcoming. Africa's energy transition will require access to different forms of energy until countries can establish the economic foundations and institutional requirements to make a full transition.

3. Policy Conflicts and Stranded Assets

The EU's renewed interest in fossil fuels since Russia's invasion of Ukraine is perceived as being at odds with its policy to accelerate the transition to green energy. This poses a perception of conflict in the minds of African partners resulting in charges of EU hypocrisy and double standards: "the problem is that these same governments are not only encouraging developing countries to accelerate their phase-out of fossil fuels but are also committed to killing demand for these products in the years ahead in the quest for decarbonisation."[67] A stark example of this is playing out as the EU seeks to shore up its energy security by seeking additional supplies of fossil fuels from Africa. This raises several awkward questions: the first is that African energy companies, in response to climate change factors and the EU's well publicised phasing-out plans, have already being experiencing upstream constraints in investments in the industry.[68] Yet, EU officials and those of its member states, have been urging companies in Africa to increase fossil fuel production.

Reports cite German Chancellor Scholz's visit to Senegal in May 2022 to discuss plans for a new gas field to commence operations in 2023, and visits by various EU and member states' officials "to Nigeria to discuss providing gas exports to the EU, and Italian discussions with Angola, Nigeria and the Republic of Congo to boost natural gas exports."[69] More to the point is that "while the renewed quest for fossil fuels may be argued as a short- term fix to an urgent situation, the fact is that it carries long term consequences given the nature of investments in the energy sector."[70]

Thus, while African oil and gas producers stand to benefit from short term gains as demand for fossil fuels expands – they are reported to be constrained by limited additional capacity to respond quickly. Mozambique, Mauritania, Senegal, Tanzania are among the countries in which increases in production will not materialize until 2024 – 2030.[71] African countries share a high concern about the risk of stranded assets once this period of crisis has abated. In addition, rising oil and gas prices are creating distortions in the energy market, and concerns have been raised that they will further incentivise investments in fossil fuels and reverse, rather than accelerate, the path towards a decarbonised future.[72]

4. Inadequate Financing for Renewables

Despite the urgency of the energy transition more financing is still being pumped into fossil fuels than renewables. When available, financing for renewables comes at a higher cost. "While Europe has urged African countries to move away from fossil fuels, it has failed to accelerate funding for green projects that could provide alternative energy sources. This has prompted many African leaders to denounce what they see as energy hypocrisy and a double standard that perpetuates the West's exploitation of the region."[73] A senior advisor on Climate Diplomacy and Geopolitics for the African Climate Foundation frames the issue similarly: "African countries are not receiving the financing required for the green transition. That's why we see countries turning to fossil fuels as a way of generating income. The financing of fossil fuels is three times higher than for green energy, that's $30 billion to $9 billion for renewables."[74]

There is also a view that investments in fossil fuels support exports which continue to fuel wealthier countries while renewable energies at the moment can only be used to service local populations, as being the reason for this disparity. Some view this as part of a concerted effort to strip Africans of their resources, leaving local communities bereft of the resources needed to support development in a manner which takes care of future needs when non-renewable stocks are exhausted.[75] The point is also being made that the EU, the US and other big economies like China, are already ahead in making the transition to renewables. Other developing countries such as Indonesia are engaged in the transition, and the real fear is that the risk for African countries "in 20, 30, 40 years [is that] they will find themselves with assets that are not a good return on investments."[76]

5. CBAM in the Face of EU "Green Diplomacy"

The EU's CBAM is complex and innovative. It is a trade mechanism which seeks to further environmental objectives. In a recent book on the effects of the war in Ukraine on the Global South,[77] CBAM is labelled: "Amid Global Tensions: A Recipe for Disaster."[78] CBAM provides an array of challenges for Africa, not least because of the effects on African countries' preferential access to the EU market.[79] The application of cross border taxes on goods from Africa, given the dire economic conditions which countries have faced over the last three years, comes at a bad time for the continent. It also comes at a time when Africa is being pursued as a partner in the EU's search for additional supplies of fossil fuels to aid its energy security, giving the impression that EU interests matter, Africa's do not. "CBAM is not an isolated example of complex legislative proposals hitting the Global South disproportionately in a negative way. India, one of the world's biggest emerging markets, perceives CBAM as discriminatory for emerging economies. Australia, a fully industrialized economy, called CBAM protectionist and discriminatory."[80]

The Land Use and Land Use Change and Forestry Regulation, the Renewable Energy Directive, the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive – are all cited as pursuing goals of sustainability while containing elements of protectionism. "If poorly implemented, these will guide European businesses away from countries mainly in the Global South leaving space for other dominant economies with less ambitions when it comes to sustainability and respect for human rights. This would not only lower the economic output for countries in the Global South, but would also not be helpful when it comes to improving human rights, health, labour and environmental standards in these countries."[81] CBAM, allegedly rushed through during the French EU Presidency, without sufficient consultation with either member states or trading partners, has drawn negative comment from rich as well as developing countries.[82] In the relationship with Africa, CBAM is a thorny issue.

6. EGD – Problems for Agriculture

The EU provides a significant market for Africa's agricultural exports and there is an incentive for African countries to scale up to EU standards especially given the importance of the sector to Africa's economy, generating "two-thirds employment, representing 30-60 percent of each country's GDP, and approximately 30 percent of all exports."[83] But EU standards are increasingly difficult to comply with and policies within the EGD will impose additional nontariff barriers which countries will struggle to meet, in a system which already discriminates against them.[84] "The EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) for example, provides EU farmers with up to 50 percent of income as direct payments, a system which has boosted EU agriculture and given EU farmers a boost versus African counterparts."[85] New regulations such as Farm to Fork under the EGD, and others such as CBAM, coupled with CAP subsidies, will further discriminate against African farmers who are already paying a high cost to meet EU standards.

All this comes at some time when they can least afford the costs of additional levels of compliance. There is a suggestion that in return the EU can support efforts at mitigating land degradation by partnering with Africa in its Comprehensive African Development programme which also is meant to support farmers in meeting new standards. But in a partnership which alleges to be close, more is required to provide a level playing field especially given the scale of importance of agriculture to Africa's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employment.[86]

7. Technology Sharing and Transfer Frustration

Technology sharing and transfer remain areas of both frustration and scope for development. Despite efforts by delegations from the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and African negotiators at the recent COP27, technology sharing and transfer remains bedevilled by obstacles. While African countries updated their Technical Needs Assessment Plans, financial resources remain lacking.

8. Climate Financing and Official Development Assistance need De-Linking

The allocation of climate financing to developing countries from the European Commission (EC) and the EIB, has remained at the same levels as 2018, at approximately €5.7 billion. It has been focused mainly on mitigation rather than adaptation and resilience, and on middle income countries.[87] The three African countries which have received climate financing from the EU have been all middle income countries: Morocco (€429 million), Cameroon (€82 million) and Egypt (€208 million).[88] More to the point is the fact that while grant financing for climate change has been declining, what is available has been increasingly finding its way into the EU's ODA. In addition, an increasing share of EIB climate finance is being offered as loans, at market rates, with less than 8 percent being concessional.[89]

The current climate crisis, compounded by the war in Ukraine and three years of a global pandemic, have increased the hardship faced in Africa, and the issue of country debt is significant. The lending policies of the EIB and development policies of the EC should be reviewed with respect of support for low income countries. Increasing the volumes of concessionary finance and grants is vital. In addition, many countries in Africa face difficulties in securing financing for climate change related and green transition projects, and producing bankable projects. Procedures are cumbersome, extensive and long. Reports by the Green Climate Fund (GCF) suggest that only 39 percent of projects submitted by Africa received approval, the lowest of any region in the world.[90]

9. LNG: Increasing Environmental Pollution Costs

New research shows that Europe's growing reliance on liquefied natural gas (LNG) comes with a high price tag. Significantly increased import volumes, up by 65 percent in the first nine months of 2022 due to disruptions caused by the war and sanctions on Russia, are registering high environmental costs. Production and transport of LNG cause ten times the carbon emissions compared to pipeline gas.[91] While the emissions from burning gas are reportedly the same, whether piped or in liquid form, the difference lies in the significant increase in energy required in making and transporting the liquid to Europe. An official from the Norwegian Research firm Rystad Energy, notes: "For piped gas from Norway, we see around 7kg of CO_2 per barrel; for LNG imports into Europe, we estimate the average is over 70, so around 10 times lower for piped gas versus LNG."[92]

The same source suggests, that, if additional gas is to come from LNG in the absence of Russian gas in 2023, "we will see an additional 35 million tons of imported upstream CO_2 emissions compared to 2021 … the equivalent of adding around 16 million cars to the UK roads for 2 years."[93] Plans to build twenty new LNG terminals in Europe deepen concerns. To make these terminals viable, "countries have to agree to very long contracts to bring in the gas, and the terminals can last up to 40 years, which means a long lock-up effect for those fossil fuels that we are trying to get out of."[94]

These plans send conflicting signals to the EU's African partners regarding the commitment to accelerating the push to a low carbon future even while they are being pushed in that direction.

10. The Importance of Dialogue in "Green Deal Diplomacy"

In these times of tension and division, EU policies and regulations which impact partners should be subjected to more dialogue, not less, especially given the EU's pledge to develop a stronger "green deal diplomacy". This is certainly the case on the matter of CBAM: "CBAM could seriously harm access to the EU market, displace or destroy value chains and thereby negatively impact revenue and labour in the Global south. The fact that the EU is somewhat aware, but seemingly unwilling to address these issues [...] demonstrates that the European Union is currently detached from economic and diplomatic realities and is most likely going to understand the consequences of that detachment the hard way."[95]

11. The Global Gateway – Less Rhetoric Real Action

An investment package valued at €150 billion under the EU-Africa Global Gateway was highlighted as the cornerstone of the Sixth EU-AU Summit of February 2022. It forms part of the EU Global Gateway launched in December 2021 involving €300 billion of investments offered as a "true alternative"[96] to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While clearly the potential exists for good outcomes, the measure has come in for criticism from African partners as well as European NGO's and Civil Society groups, among others.[97] There were grumblings in Africa that sufficient consultation was not made before the announcement at the summit. Disappointment was expressed after the EU failed to deliver on promises made at the summit, leaving the AU President to note: "This leaves a bad taste in our mouths. I am a bit disappointed, to be honest."[98]

Critics point to the GG as being merely a "re-badging exercise", re-packaging of old money, and that none of the €300 billion is new but represents a "combination and repackaging of existing commitments from European development institutions"[99] broadly similar in scope to previous initiatives such as the European Fund for Sustainable Development and the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument, (NDICI), implemented under the Team Europe approach.

The situation of debt for African countries is particularly precarious as they deal with both historic debt levels and the effects of global food and energy crises. Yet, the GG's relatively low level of grants (€18 billion), with remaining investments incurring debt – has been identified as particularly egregious.[100] Others point to a lack of concrete results, "so far GG has delivered plenty of hype, but little in terms of concrete projects."[101] Concerns have also been raised regarding a lack of transparency with respects to the operations of the GG and the need to "publicly disclose the complete list of projects…[and] the mandate and activity of the proposed new Export Credit Facility and that of the new Business Advisory Board."[102]

A joint assessment by European civil society and NGO entities Eurodad and Counter Balance[103] concludes, "the reorientation of the EU's international development agenda to merge with a geopolitical and commercial strategy is a risky endeavour which can impact EU's credibility as a global development actor […] although the Gateway is premised on a "partnership" offer to recipient countries, the official documentation is overwhelmingly focused on the role of EU institutions, private sector and diplomatic presence including the creation of a business advisory group and a potential EU Export facility."[104]

Part IV: Recommendations for Resetting the Partnership: Opportunities in an Era of Volatility

During the November 28, 2022 meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council in its Development configuration, the EU's High Representative underscored both the importance of the relationship with Africa, and the geopolitical context within which the relationship continues to evolve. "The geopolitical situation of the world is quite different from one year ago, but in spite of the war in Ukraine, we have to continue engaging with Africa. Africa is our partner of choice. It is high on our agenda especially in this case when food crisis and energy crisis are hitting severely the continent. We have to invest quicker, more, and smarter in Africa."[105] This exhortation requires that the EU review the strategies deployed in its relationship with Africa on a number of fronts. This provides an opportunity to address a perennial criticism of the EU's partnership with Africa, as one low on consultation, and failing to resonate with Africa's development priorities, particularly in charting a path to sustainable industrialisation.[106] A missed opportunity in the green transition would be a strategic loss for Europe in safeguarding its long-term interests given the presence of other Great Powers, including China, who are important investors in Africa.

In reviewing the relationship and the cooperation around the green transition and energy, consideration should be given to two principles: extending the EU "Green Oath to Do No Harm", to Africa, and promoting energy justice.

EU policies should not undermine the capacity of Africa to secure the development of its people. This is an overriding principle which should extend across all facets of the relationship and sectors. In the same way that the EU has pledged to do no harm within Europe – it must consider the manner in which policies such as CBAM and new agricultural policies affect Africa, especially during this period of acute economic hardship and concurrent crises, and find ways to remove or mitigate their most egregious effects.

Secondly, the principle of energy justice is one which should be addressed within the framework of the partnership. "Should current trends persist more people will be without access to modern energy in Africa by 2030 than at present." Africa's energy poverty should receive the same level of importance and urgency as the EU's energy security.[107] As a global champion of the movement to a low carbon future the EU should also be a global actor in championing support for energy equity for Africa. This would be consistent with the EU's own climate justice approach. Innovative approaches such as South Africa's Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (REIPPPP) have been identified as models in providing investment opportunities through smart policy frameworks. These operationalise energy justice frameworks which integrate energy indicators, impact investing and renewable energy solutions and provide a useful model for replication.

The recommendations which follow highlight initiatives to both advance EU objectives of a low carbon future, while supporting Africa's green transition and development of new green industries.

1. Reposition the Global Gateway

While EU development funds play a unique role in support of developing countries, such funds are scarce and need to be managed in frameworks which are transparent, inclusive and well targeted. While the GG has been cited for its role in developing financing and de-risking instruments as a means to attract additional private sector investments, it has come in for criticism in other areas, from several groups both in Africa and among European stakeholders. Critics suggest that recalibration of the GG is required to ensure that the EU's credibility as "a key development partner" is not compromised.[108] Recommendations include:

- De-linking the mandate of the GG from that of an "alternative" to China's BRI and focus more on the development objectives of the projects to be supported. The BRI has a head start of 10 years (2013) with investments totalling $932 billion at the end of 2022.[109] Presenting the GG as an alternative to the BRI is unrealistic and does not increase its competitiveness or attractiveness. The EU-Africa GG should be presented as another tool in support of African development.

- Establishing a clear development rationale for the GG to make a meaningful contribution to the climate change agenda, poverty reduction and inequality in recipient countries.

- Developing a participatory and inclusive process to inform the GG strategy to ensure that resources are not diverted from development objectives, but focuses on a people centred approach to human welfare, decent jobs, local economic development and poverty reduction through enhanced contributions of grants and concessionary finance.

- Increase transparency in GG operations and publish lists of projects and funding allocated.

- Enhance the governance model to ensure ownership and meaningful participation of stakeholders in partner countries and in Europe, inclusive of the European Parliament and civil society. Include developing country representatives in the governance of the GG to enhance ownership.

2. Incentivise Investments in Africa

The EU is considering a response to the US $369 billion Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) which offers companies billions of dollars, mostly via tax credits, to accelerate the pace of new technologies and create a new economy of green jobs in the US while reducing reliance on China, and putting the US on track to meet its targets in the Paris Accords.[110] Both companies and consumers benefit, but products, such as electric cars and battery makers for example, need to ensure that specific components are extracted or processed in the US or in countries with trade agreements with the country. In contemplating countermeasures to the US green subsidies, the EU has an opportunity to include countries in Africa as “friendly countries” eligible to receive and benefit from tax breaks and subsidies accorded to European companies. This will respond to the criticism of insufficient support being given to renewable energy development and technology sharing, in Africa.

- Incentivising investments in Africa’s mineral rich countries carries a bonus in that it is strategic, for the EU, on multiple fronts. First, it decreases the jeopardy of replacing dependence on one supplier, Russia, for fossil fuels, with another, China, in new green industries. Concerns are being raised by the level of dependence on China as the industry shifts to electric vehicles (EVs). By 2031, China is projected to have more production capacity in Europe – the world’s second largest market for EVs – than any other country.[111] Chinese brands including BYD and Great Wall, are also expanding sales in Europe resulting in more assembly plants and battery plants likely to use Chinese technology.[112] While the IRA prevents the use of American made cars using foreign technology, the EU has no such measures in place. There are warnings that there will be “significant dependence of the western world on Asia,” and EU decarbonisation rules have been branded as “naïve and dogmatic.”[113]

- Secondly, partnering with Africa and ensuring the continent’s inclusion in discussions around new technologies, early stage research and standards setting will also secure another objective: That of ensuring EU responsiveness to the African context and needs, and in scaling up capability across the continent. Battery and solar PV manufacturing plants are among those industries in which mineral-rich African countries are seen to have a comparative advantage.[114] While new green technologies will be initially costly, "EU-African collaboration on new technologies with the help of EU climate research funds such as the Horizon Europe with its €95.5 billion envelope to be spent over 2021-2027 could seed green technology research and skills training adapted and suited to Africa's environment."[115] IEA's Africa Energy Outlook 2022 suggests that Africa can produce as much as 5000mt/green hydrogen per year – which is more than the total which is produced currently – for less than $2/kg.[116] The EU-Namibia Agreement signed at COP27, is worth replicating. EU-African collaboration is a win for Europe in the long run.

3. Adopt Differentiated Policies and Strategies for Africa's Green Transition

Africa is a continent with countries at different stages of development. The continent also has different resource endowments, needs and capabilities. There are countries whose economies are fossil fuel dependent, others which are CRM rich, some who have invested in renewables, and others whose principal economic activity is agriculture. Few economies have attained high levels of diversification. The speed of energy transition, and the variable and divergent conditions across Africa will need to be both managed and supported. There is no one-size-fits-all in this scenario, and a multi-pronged framework of policies and actions specifically targeted to varying situations will be required. A variable policy mix approach includes:

- A public-private sector partnership approach to support energy transition and economic diversification in Fossil Rich Countries. Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, Egypt, the Republic of Congo, Gabon and Ghana all face the prospects of declining receipts for the energy sector which will have a destabilising economic effect. They will require financing to support their green energy transition and economic diversification. Consideration should be given to:

  a) Applying windfall taxes on global energy giants to support investments in fossil dependent economies to assist in their structural transformation. While the EU has recently introduced such a tax as a temporary measure, it should champion the initiative in the G20, G7 and UN to advocate for this modality within multilateral frameworks.[117]

  b) Italy's bilateral programme of support to Algeria's efforts at diversification could be scaled up as a Team Europe Approach.

- Support R&D and incentivise investments in CRM Rich Countries. The latter require partnerships which move beyond extraction in sourcing CRMs and Energy supplies.

  a) A worthy example of establishing industries and supporting R&D adapted to Africa's conditions is the partnership between Germany's Federal Ministry of Education and Research and that between two of Africa's Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the Economic Community of West Africa States and Southern Development Community (ECOAS and SADC respectively), in exploring green hydrogen production potential.[118]

  b) Provide technical support in preparing the legislative and regulatory frameworks, and mapping required to prepare for FDI to shore up perennial capacity issues.

- Support Scaling up Capabilities in Countries in Transition: Morocco, for example, has significant investments in solar production. Such countries are seeking investments in infrastructure and require support in scaling up renewable capability, storage and distribution in conjunction with other African countries. The Morocco EU Green Partnership Agreement (2022) dealing with climate and energy, the green economy and the environment, is a model for the cooperation which is possible.

- Use the EU climate justice approach and support measures to respond to the particular challenges of vulnerable and marginalised groups in Energy Poor Countries. These countries require a mix of support aimed at increased adoption of low-cost energy saving technologies which could be scaled up for larger impact. Supporting households in reducing energy poverty, developing programmes tailored to girls and women to reduce their energy poverty and health risks; and the training of community activists equipped to disseminate information to households, especially the rural poor, regarding more sustainable and energy just solutions, are among the menu of small but impactful initiatives which merit consideration by EU responsiveness.[119]

4. More Concessionary Finance and Innovative Instruments by EIB and EBRD

The challenges facing Africa's development have been previously documented, and the increasing cost of capital exacerbates a difficult situation.[120] Rich countries borrow at approximately 2-4 percent while for developing countries the range is upwards of 12-14 percent. Financing for climate-related adaptation interventions for African countries also face several obstacles, not least the fact that return on private investments is low, requiring more by way of public financing. Given the challenging economic and fiscal environment experienced by Africa, the need to supplement public finance with external public and private finance is vital.[121]

- Review instruments and lending policies of EIB and EBRD: In 2020, just 10 percent of the climate finance from EIB and 14 percent from EBRD went to climate adaptation[122] and external public finance in this sector has been provided mostly by way of loans which is challenging, given that many countries have been identified as debt distressed. In addition, the EIB discriminates against low income countries by its lending focus on middle income countries.[123] Increasing the levels and mix of grants and concessionary financing to ease the cost of the green transition in Africa, is vital.

- Finance Programmes for Green Growth SMEs and Jobs with a Focus on Youth, Women and Girls. The recent OECD Forum on Green Finance and Investing suggests that larger multilateral development banks such as EIB have a role to play in mobilising private finance; "there should be a multiplicity of financial instruments developed to finance the sustainable transition, beyond debt financing, such as through export credits, equity, guarantees and local currency financing."[124] Climate finance mechanisms and development funds from the EU and EIB are well suited to supporting and mobilising additional financing via African countries Nationally Determined Contributions, National Adaption Plans and Technical Needs Assessment Plans.

  Africa's Continental Water Investment Programme (AIP) is also a programme ready for financing. It integrates water resources, SDG7 investments, climate resilience, gender-transformative action and transboundary water cooperation in one financing entity.[125] Water efficient technologies and small-scale water harvesting are among the approaches which offer practical, small scale investments to spur private sector business development inclusive of financing aimed at grassroots organisations. Such initiatives benefit the most vulnerable communities and ecosystems in Africa.

- Support Africa's Catastrophic Risk Pool Capacity (ARC): The AU's catastrophic risk pool aims to cover climate related disasters. In four years, ARC has disbursed $36 million in support of drought afflicted countries.[126] However, climate associated risk finance available to Africa is inadequate, and the new Extreme Climate Facility has been established to support blended private and public sector funds targeted at countries most in need of enhanced adaptation measures. This provides an African-specific instrument which merits support.

- Develop partnerships between EIB and Global Non-Profit entities: Such partnerships provide credit guarantees to enable countries to reduce borrowing costs allowing savings to be ploughed into ecosystem management and stocks at risk through climate change, supporting livelihoods and local communities. A solid example of such a facility is the Barbados Blue Bond Initiative. In October 2022, Barbados issued the world's first government bond with a clause allowing for the suspension of payments in the event of another global pandemic. Debt clauses also cover natural disasters such as flooding, tropical storms and earthquakes. The Barbadian bond will be repaid over a 15-year term. While payments can be suspended twice if needed, for as long as two years, the debt cannot be cancelled outright.

Credit guarantees provided by The Nature Conservancy and the Inter-American Development Bank allows Barbados to reduce its borrowing costs by as much as $40-$50 million compared to the bond which it replaces. These savings will be earmarked to protect the island's marine ecosystems which play a significant role in the country's premiere industry, tourism, representing 40 percent of the country's GDP and employment.[127] In announcing its inauguration, Barbadian Prime Minister Mia Motley noted the utility of such bonds in providing developing countries with some measure of breathing space during the ongoing pandemic and the rash of climate related disasters, including recent large scale flooding in Pakistan and droughts in Africa which cause much devastation.

- Provide technical Support to African Countries: Green, social, sustainability and sustainability-linked (GSSS) bonds have gained both popularity and market share rapidly, but are heavily concentrated in developed markets. While these have great potential in helping countries meet SDG targets, only 6 percent are issued in ODA recipient countries.[128] Constraints cited include the lack of bankable projects, high levels of up-front costs, and technical capacity.

- Finance Mechanisms to Leverage Private Sector Capital for Nature: The WB has identified a number of investment opportunities which allow climate change targets to be met through environmentally and socially sustainable investments (ESGs) in natural landscapes and ecosystems. Given the scale of need against the current economic landscape, African countries have little by way of fiscal space to fund initiatives which invest in sustaining and protecting ecosystems, unaided. Private capital has an important role to play in bridging the financing gap. A number of case studies provide viable prototypes for scaling up, across different parts of Africa: These include: Debt for Nature Swaps (Seychelles) in which the country's foreign debt was refinanced in exchange for investments in marine protection. Proceeds of debt conversion have been distributed to NGO's involved in marine conservation with special attention to engaging women. The Cubango-Okavango River Basin Fund (Angola, Namibia and Botswana) is a multiple country ecosystem project blending donor and impact investment funds to fully integrate ESG's with income finance interventions to enhance ecosystem resilience and rural livelihoods.[129]

5. Champion a Multilateral Approach to Africa's Development

Africa's development challenges are beyond the scope of that of any single partner to adequately support, and Africa needs all of its friends in augmenting its own efforts. At the height of the COVID-19 pandemic there were calls for a "Marshall Plan for Africa". Today, a Marshall Plan for Ukraine, is being considered. The quantum of Africa's need today is more, not less, than at the height of the pandemic, and Africa's transition would benefit from a comprehensive plan to guide a robust process of change to a low carbon continent while safeguarding vulnerable groups. While the continent's partners all support a varied typology of investments and development cooperation, more leverage could be achieved if Africa's partners supported the continent's efforts at green transition and low carbon industrial development through multilateral frameworks complementary to bilateral and regional efforts. Initiatives meriting consideration include:

- Supporting a region-specific, comprehensive framework, designed by Africa. Jointly spearheaded by the EU and the AU, coordination for such a framework could be supported by the UN and specialised agencies, the Bretton Woods institutions, the AfDB, EIB, and the Asian Development Bank.

- Expanding EU-US cooperation on energy transition in Africa. The template of the EU-US MOU signed in October 2022 on cooperation in support of projects such as the African Continental Power System Masterplan could be expanded to include other actors .[130]

- Aligning Multilateral Cooperation in International Finance: The green transition also provides an opportunity for the EU and other members of the international community to align their support and cooperation in the area of international finance. Key areas required include standardisation of risk mitigation instruments for currency risks and off-taker risk, and the use of capital markets to channel institutional investment. Innovative examples include: The Energy Transition Mechanism with the Partnership Trust Fund established by the Asian Development Bank and country members in Asia and the Pacific, in a partnership with developed countries including Germany, supports member countries in making the transition from coal to clean energy. South Africa's transition from coal the REIPPP programme[131] is also being supported by an international partnership. Both models have utility in supporting other countries in the transition from fossil fuels.

- Scaling up the prototype of The Just Energy Transition Partnership involving the EU, France, Germany the US and the UK in supporting South Africa's transition away from coal includes a mixture of grants, concessionary financing, and risk sharing instruments to leverage private finance, is another model of multilateral cooperation worth replicating. It covers the energy sector as well as electric vehicles and green hydrogen. The "just" approach aims to ensure that those most directly affected by the transition from coal, including workers, communities, women and girls, are not left behind.[132]

6. Support a Multilateral "Green Bank" Built on the Bridgetown Initiative

"To meet climate goals, the countries of the Global South (outside of China) will need to spend more than $1 trillion per year by 2025, and more than $2 trillion per year by 2030, on adaptation and mitigation – between 4 percent to 7 percent of their GDP."[133] While African governments already invest an average of 3.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on adaptation action, including agricultural support and drought relief programmes, more is needed.[134] The idea of a "Green Bank" is one which is being discussed in various forum. It envisages the creation of a multilateral institution to develop green projects, mobilise financing and support project implementation across Africa and other developing countries. The institution would include governments and private shareholders, voting rights would be equitably distributed with financing available only to green projects.

The proposal develops initiatives contained in the Bridgetown Initiative launched by Barbados at COP27. The plan, championed by Barbados's Prime Minister, maintains that countries should not have to choose between paying their debt and pursuing development goals: “in the same way that the UK was able to take out long term loans to finance their stake in WW1, and only paid this off in 2014 because they could not handle the repayment, amidst other spending priorities, low income countries should likewise not be forced to sacrifice their development goals for climate spending.”[135] The proposal earmarks a one-off payment of $650 billion from the IMF to seed a trust fund to be leveraged into $1 trillion worth of low interest climate financing for developing countries. The initiative advocates a windfall tax on oil companies to contribute to COP27-agreed Loss and Damage Funds to be used to finance reconstruction grants to developing countries after a climate related disaster, with a pause on debt repayments for a period of time. This initiative is being refined for final presentation to the WB and IMF Spring Meetings (2023) in Washington DC.[136]

7. Consider a Climate Related and Justice Based Global Tax

The EU, as the global standard bearer with respect of its own policies aimed at achieving a low carbon future, can lend its considerable heft in this area, by championing a climate related and justice based global tax as a means of raising climate finance. There is a growing call to earmark windfall capital gains from the agents of the polluting fossil fuel industries (among other initiatives), to augment the pool of climate finance available to countries as they search for adaptation and resilient building solutions to current crises, and support the transition towards a low carbon future.

The UN’s Secretary General emphasises: “the fossil fuel industry is feasting on hundreds of billions of dollars in subsidies and windfall profits while household budgets shrink and our planet burns…today I am calling on all developed countries to tax the windfall profits of fossil fuel companies.”[137] Indeed, energy giant Shell for example, recently disclosed record profits of $40 billion in 2022, the highest in its 115-year history.[138] Targeted funds can contribute to supporting the costs of green transition by African countries. This is consistent with a document released by a consortium of the world poorest countries in advance of COP27 – in the long running debate over climate related Loss and Damage financing – that speaks to a “climate-related and justice-based” global tax as a means of raising finance, inclusive of proceeds from carbon taxes (such as the EU’s CBAM) a tax on airline travel and levies on heavy oils used in shipping.[139]

Part V: Conclusion

There can be no question as to the importance of the EU-African relationship to both parties. And while there have been many moments when a resetting of relations has been called for – perhaps at no other time has the moment been more urgent. There is a sense that current global dynamics demand such a reset and that doing so paves the way to delivering wins of great value to both parties. Indeed, benefits may well prove to be strategic for the EU as it navigates the consequence of US – China rivalry, while seeking to secure its own interests. The war in Ukraine and sanctions on Russia have accelerated the pace of global fragmentation into different blocs. Global supply chain disruptions have further deepened divisions. A divided world is producing a multi-layered, multipolarity, which affords Africa a widening menu of non-western alliances and partnerships with countries and regions whose shares of global output and wealth are increasing.[140] Forging a partnership fit for purpose, given the imperatives of these times, requires that the EU values Africa's increasing strategic importance as a global partner, and positions itself as a partner supportive of Africa's vision for its future, and the role of sustainable industrial development in attaining that vision. This will require that EU policies in support of the green energy transition move from laudable intentions into concrete actions, "quicker and smarter".

While Africa's carbon footprint is small, African countries are on the front line of the effects of climate change. The EU's response to the green subsidies in the US' IRA provides an opportunity to incentivise investments by EU companies in Africa. Efforts at decoupling from China, continue, led by US efforts. Increasingly, companies are looking for opportunities to "build local for local" and engage in "friend shoring". Africa's proximity to Europe provides opportunities in this regard, and green transition and energy investments in Africa will deliver multiple wins. Such investments will support EU climate change action strategies, enable strategic decoupling from China, support the competitiveness of EU firms vs their US competitors, and also support the building of African capabilities in new green growth industries and jobs. However, the EU must be prepared to move from rhetoric to action in meeting African ambition and expectations of a genuine partnership. Africa has other suitors. While Africa needs the EU, the EU needs Africa – just as much.

Resetting the relationship will also require greater efforts at genuine consultation and dialogue. The EU speaks of shoring up efforts in "green diplomacy". These can start with Africa. The EGD presents challenges for Africa, and modalities must be found to mitigate the most egregious of these. Principles of equity and climate justice must be embedded in the relationship, and these must be cross cutting. CBAM is a case in point. A level playing field for Africa's farmers, is critical, given the importance of the sector to the continent's social and economic development. Consulting with Africa on modalities to ensure that the GG supports Africa's green transition, is a useful place to start. Low income countries require higher levels of grants and concessionary financing, especially in these times. And energy poverty in Africa must be equated the same level of attention and urgency as Europe's energy security.

This is not to deny the complexity of the green energy transition. Tensions between short term imperatives and long-term objectives of decarbonisation, provoked by the war in Ukraine – compounded by the effects of an ongoing global pandemic – have added layers of complexity to a relationship which was not previously without its challenges. The EU and member states revamped fossil fuel quest in Africa as a result of a shift away from dependency on Russian supplies, has come in for special scrutiny, given African concerns that supporting European energy security requirements will come at Africa's expense. Africa needs safeguards in this respect, and dialogue is required. A mix of non-renewable and renewable energy sources will be a feature of Africa's development over a yet-to-be-determined transitional period. Growing numbers need to be lifted out of poverty; energy gaps remain. The green transition across Africa, will be multi-speed.

This discordant, fractious epoch may very well be the moment which creates the space and conditions for much needed, honest dialogue, away from the heavily scripted format of EU-Africa summits, on the future which both Africa and the EU desire, and the joint actions required to deliver mutual wins. A resetting of relations could very well demonstrate an important lesson: That cooperation between North and South is possible, desirable and necessary. In so doing, a new role for Africa and the EU will be articulated: That of twin continents engaged in a new model of cooperation based on dignity and mutual respect, bridging a divided world. Such an objective, in such a world, would surely be worth striving for.

The Work of the Hanns Seidel Foundation in Africa

For more than 50 years, the Hanns Seidel Foundation has been engaged in international cooperation and supports about 90 projects in over 70 countries worldwide. Africa is an important region in that context, with the foundation's international development work starting in 1977 with a project in Togo.

Africa is one of the most important partners for European and German development cooperation as it borders directly on the Southern Mediterranean. Through its work in the countries of Africa, the Hanns Seidel Foundation primarily aims to contribute to improving living conditions.

Climate change is affecting the African continent particularly hard: Extreme droughts and the resulting increase in desertification of the Sahel as well as environmental disasters are claiming thousands of lives and depriving millions of people of their livelihoods. The war in Ukraine has further exacerbated the situation. Similarly, water scarcity is becoming an increasingly important issue, while population growth and industrialisation point to a massive increase in Africa's energy needs.

To address these and other challenges, the Hanns Seidel Foundation is engaged in Africa with concrete projects which inter alia foster environmental protection and the promotion of a sustainable circular economy. The Hanns Seidel Foundation works with partners in 17 African countries. For example, it promotes the implementation of national environmental strategies in Egypt; has been implementing agroforestry projects on behalf of the EU in the Democratic Republic of Congo for over 20 years; facilitates an EU-funded project on sustainable forest management in Namibia; or fosters dialogue on issues of water management and the promotion of renewable energies in Morocco. For the foundation's international project work, the African continent remains the most important region.

In addition, the Hanns Seidel Foundation fosters dialogue between Europe and Africa by receiving expert delegations in Brussels, Berlin and Munich, conducting thematic studies or organising expert roundtables and events.

List of abbreviations

AIDA:	Accelerated Industrial Development for Africa Initiative
ARC:	Africa Catastrophic Risk Pool Capacity
AIP:	Africa Continental Water Investment Programme
AEEP:	Africa-EU Energy Partnership
AFCFTA:	African the Continental Free Trade Area
BRI:	Belt and Road Initiative
CBAM:	Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism
CCRDS:	Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan
CAHOSCC:	Committee of the African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change
CAP:	Common Agricultural Policy
CRM:	Critical Raw Materials
EACOP:	East-Africa Crude Oil Pipeline
ECOWAS:	Economic Community of West Africa States
ETS:	Emissions Trading System
ESGs:	Environmentally and socially sustainable investments
EBRD:	European Bank for Reconstruction and Redevelopment
EC:	European Commission
EGD:	European Green Deal
EIB:	European Investment Bank
GG:	Global Gateway
GCF:	Green Climate Fund
GSSS:	Green, social, sustainability and sustainability-linked
GDP:	Gross Domestic Product
IRA:	Inflation Reduction Act
IEA:	International Energy Agency

IMF:	International Monetary Fund
LDCs:	Least Developed Countries
LNG:	Liquefied Natural Gas
NDCs:	Nationally Determined Contributions
NDICI:	Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument
ODA:	Official Development Assistance
RECs:	Regional Economic Communities
REIPPPP:	Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme
SCO:	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SADC:	Southern Development Community
SDGs:	Sustainable Development Goals
UfM:	Union for the Mediterranean
WB:	World Bank
WTO:	World Trade Organisation

End Notes

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[132] John Pickard, Lenard Hook, Jack Cotterill. Western Nations agree $8.5 billion deal to help South Africa decarbonise. Financial Times. November 2, 2021.

[133] Hafez Ghanem. The World Needs a Green Bank. Policy Brief. Policy Center for the New South. February 1, 2023.

[134] Ibid.

[135] Catherine Osborn. The Barbadian Proposal Turning Heads at COP27. Foreign Policy. Weekly Latin America Brief. November 11, 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/11/cop27-un-climate-barbados-mottley-climate-finance-imf/

136 It is reported that the US Climate Envoy John Kerry is supportive, as are the French President and IMF and WB Managing Directors, who, with others, have applauded the Prime Minister's "moral clarity". Initiatives such as this should be supported by the EU in other multilateral settings including the G7, G20 and at COP28 in 2023.

137 BBC News. UN Chief: Tax Fossil Fuel Profits for Climate damage. Science. September 20, 2022. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-62970887

138 Simon Jack, Nick Edser. Shell reports highest profits in 115 years. BBC News. February 2, 2023. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-64489147

139 Ibid.

140 Len Ishmael. A World Divided: A Multilayered, Multipolar World. In. L. Ishmael (Ed). Aftermath of war in Europe. The West VS. the Global South? Policy Center for the New South. December 2022.